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Abstract
Everybody knows what it feels to be surprised. Surprise raises our attention and
is crucial for learning. It is a ubiquitous concept whose traces have been found in
both neuroscience and machine learning. However, a comprehensive theory has
not yet been developed that addresses fundamental problems about surprise : (1)
surprise is difﬁcult to quantify. How should we measure the level of surprise when
we encounter an unexpected event ? What is the link between surprise and startle
responses in behavioral biology ? (2) the key role of surprise in learning is somewhat
unclear. We believe that surprise drives attention and modiﬁes learning ; but, how
should surprise be incorporated, in general paradigms of learning ? and (3) can we
develop a biologically plausible theory that explains how surprise can be neurally
calculated and implemented in the brain ?
I propose a theoretical framework to address the above issues about surprise. There are
three components to this framework : (1) a subjective conﬁdence-adjusted measure
of surprise, that can be used for quantiﬁcation purposes, (2) a surprise-minimization
learning rule that models the role of surprise in learning by balancing the relative
contribution of new and old data for inference about the world, and (3) a surprise-
modulated Hebbian plasticity rule that can be implemented in both artiﬁcial and
spiking neural networks. The proposed online rule links surprise to the activity of
the neuromodulatory system in the brain, and belongs to the class of neo-Hebbian
plasticity rules.
My work on the foundations of surprise provides a suitable framework for future
studies on learning with surprise. Reinforcement learning methods can be enhanced
by incorporating the proposed theory of surprise. The theory could ultimately become
interesting for the analysis of fMRI and EEG data. It may also inspire new synaptic
plasticity rules that are under the simultaneous control of reward and surprise. More-
over, the proposed theory can be used to make testable predictions about the time
course of the neural substrate of surprise (e.g., noradrenaline), and suggests behav-
ioral experiments that can be performed on real animals for studying surprise-related
neural activity.
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iv
Résumé
Tout le monde sait ce que cela fait d’être surpris. La surprise attire notre attention et est
cruciale pour l’apprentissage. C’est un concept omniprésent dont les origines ont été
fondées au travers des neurosciences et de l’apprentissage automatique. Cependant,
aucune théorie globale n’a encore été développée abordant les problèmes fondamen-
taux concernant la surprise car : (1) la surprise est difﬁcile à quantiﬁer. Comment
mesurer le niveau de surprise quand nous rencontrons un événement inattendu ?
Quel est le lien entre la surprise et le sursaut en biologie comportementale ? (2) le rôle
clé de la surprise dans l’apprentissage reste un peu ﬂou. Nous croyons que la surprise
attire l’attention et modiﬁe l’apprentissage ; mais, comment la surprise doit-elle être
incorporée dans les paradigmes d’apprentissage ? et (3) pouvons-nous développer
une théorie biologiquement plausible qui explique comment la surprise peut être
calculée et implémentée dans le cerveau ?
Je propose un cadre théorique pour aborder les questions mentionnées ci-dessus à
propos de la surprise. Il existe trois composantes dans ce cadre théorique : (1) une
mesure de surprise subjective ajustée en fonction de la conﬁance, qui peut être util-
isée à des ﬁns de quantiﬁcation ; (2) une règle d’apprentissage de minimisation de
la surprise qui modélise le rôle de la surprise dans l’apprentissage en équilibrant la
contribution relative de données nouvelles et anciennes inférant le monde extérieur,
et (3) une règle de plasticité Hebbienne modulée par la surprise qui peut être implé-
mentée dans des réseaux de neurones artiﬁciels et à impulsions. La règle proposée
ici relie la surprise à l’activité du système de neuromodulation dans le cerveau, et
appartient à la classe des règles de plasticité néo-Hebbienne.
Mon travail sur les fondements de la surprise fournit un cadre approprié pour les
futures études sur l’apprentissage avec la surprise. Les méthodes d’apprentissage
par renforcement peuvent être améliorées en incorporant la théorie proposée de
la surprise. Cette théorie pourrait ﬁnalement être intéressante pour l’analyse des
données d’IRMf et d’EEG. Il peut également inspirer de nouvelles règles de plasticité
synaptique qui sont sous le contrôle simultané de la récompense et de la surprise.
De plus, la théorie proposée peut être utilisée pour établir des prédictions pouvant
être testées sur la dynamique des neuromodulateurs de la surprise (par exemple, la
v
noradrénaline) et suggère des expériences comportementales pouvant être réalisées
sur des animaux réels pour étudier l’activité neuronale liée à la surprise.
Mots clefs : Surprise, Règles d’apprentissage multi-facteurs, Plasticité synaptique,
Neuromodulation, Noradrenaline, Locus coeruleus, Neurones à impulsions, Énergie
libre, Exploration labyrinthe, Modèle de Markov caché, Espérance-maximisation,
Algorithme du gradient, Théorie de l’information, Inférence Bayésienne.
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1 Introduction
A strongmathematical framework is required to elucidate how the brain learns tomake
decisions, to form new memories, and to organize behaviors. One of the crucial yet
largely undetermined factors that affects learning and plasticity in the brain is Surprise.
It is a widely used concept describing a range of phenomena from unexpected events
to behavioral responses. Surprise can play a role in learning that is similar to that of
reward, but surprise is obviously much less well understood than reward. Although
traces of surprise and surprise-related concepts (such as novelty) have been found
in both neuroscience and machine learning, a well-established theory that links
conceptual as well as computational considerations of surprise to behavioral research
and neuroscience is still missing.
Surprise is difﬁcult to quantify. Neither is there a comprehensive theory that quantita-
tively links surprise to the startle responses in biology, nor is there an agreement on
how surprise should affect learning speed or other parameters in statistical learning
algorithms. Moreover, much less is known about how surprise is neurally calculated
and how it affects plasticity in a biologically plausible way. The research described in
this thesis aims in providing a theory of quantiﬁcation, utilization, and neural imple-
mentation of surprise. The theory could ultimately become interesting as a correlator
for fMRI or EEG, but could also inﬂuence learning theory.
1.1 Surprise in neuroscience
Behaviorally, surprise can be identiﬁed through startle responses [Kalat, 2012], which
are vital for humans and animals. It manifests itself as physiological responses such
as pupil dilation [Hess and Polt, 1960,Nassar et al., 2012] and tension in the mus-
cles [Kalat, 2012]. Surprise is usually followed by emotions such as joy or confusion.
Neurally, the P300 component of the event-related potential [Pineda et al., 1997,Mis-
1
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sonnier et al., 1999] measured by electroencephalography is associated with the viola-
tion of expectation [Jaskowski et al., 1994,Kolossa et al., 2015]. Surprising events have
been shown to inﬂuence the development of the sensory cortex [Fairhall et al., 2001],
and to drive attention [Itti and Baldi, 2009]. It triggers associative learning [Schultz
and Dickinson, 2000,Fletcher et al., 2001] and affects memory formation [Ranganath
and Rainer, 2003,Hasselmo, 1999,Wallenstein et al., 1998].
Novel stimuli are often very surprising. Although surprise and novelty differ in some of
their conceptual aspects, for many researchers they are considered as interchangeable
concepts. Therefore, many interesting neuroscientiﬁc facts that have been discovered
about novelty can also be associated to surprise and its importance in controlling
learning and attention. For instance, neural responses have been reported to be larger
for novel (i.e., surprising) stimuli than repeated and prolonged stimuli in cortical
areas [Müller et al., 1999,Ulanovsky et al., 2003,Nelken et al., 1999] as well as sub-
cortical structures [Solomon et al., 2004,Kennedy et al., 2003].
Memory retention, in both humans and animals, is enhanced when something novel
happens [Takeuchi et al., 2016]. Recent ﬁndings, using optogenetic methods, show
that neuronal ﬁring in Locus coeruleus (LC, a brainstem neuromodulatory nuclei
that releases Noradrenaline (NE) throughout the brain) is sensitive to environmental
novelty, and its dopaminergic projection to the hippocampus modulates memory
formation [Takeuchi et al., 2016]. Neurophysiological evidence suggests that Hip-
pocampus plays a key role in novelty (and surprise) detection [Knight et al., 1996,Stern
et al., 1996,Li et al., 2003]. Moreover, it has been hypothesized that seeking novel and
surprising inputs during exploration of unknown environments is associated with a
dopamine receptor gene [Ebstein et al., 1996,Lusher et al., 2001].
1.1.1 Neural correlate of surprise
There is ample evidence for a neural substrate of surprise. Existing measures of
expectation violations such as absolute and variance-scaled reward prediction er-
rors [Schultz et al., 1997, Schultz, 2016, Schultz, 2015], unexpected uncertainty [Yu
and Dayan, 2005] and risk prediction errors [Preuschoff et al., 2008] have been linked
to different neuromodulatory systems. Among those, the noradrenergic system has
emerged as a prime candidate for signaling unexpected uncertainty and surprise:
noradrenergic neurons respond to unexpected changes such as the presence of a
novel stimulus, unexpected pairing of a stimulus with a reinforcement signal dur-
ing conditioning, and reversal of the contingencies [Sara and Segal, 1991,Sara et al.,
1994,Vankov et al., 1995,Aston-Jones et al., 1997]. The P300 component of the event-
related potential [Pineda et al., 1997,Missonnier et al., 1999] which is associated with
2
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novelty [Donchin et al., 1978] and surprise [Jaskowski et al., 1994] is modulated by No-
radrenaline (NE). It also modulates pupil size [Costa and Rudebeck, 2016,Preuschoff
et al., 2011] as a physiological response to surprise.
The dynamics of the noradrenergic system are fast enough to quickly respond to
unexpected events [Rajkowski et al., 1994,Clayton et al., 2004,Bouret and Sara, 2004],
a functional requirement for surprise to control learning; see [Sara, 2009, Bouret
and Sara, 2005, Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005] for a review. Locus coeruleus (LC)
and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC, a part of the brain’s limbic system) have been
frequently reported as neural structures included in the surprise-related circuitry
of the brain [Hayden et al., 2011, Bouret and Sara, 2005]. For instance, the neural
responses to rewards in macaque dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) enhances
when the outcome is surprising [Hayden et al., 2011]. It has been shown that lo-
cus coeruleus-norepinephrine (LC-NE) system regulates cognitive performance in
cortical areas [Usher et al., 1999] and inﬂuences neuronal responses via gain modu-
lation [Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005]. ACC, whose functional role in conﬂict/error
detection and performance monitoring has been frequently reported [Carter et al.,
1998,Bush et al., 2000], sends prominent inputs to LC neurons [Aston-Jones and Co-
hen, 2005], consistent with aforementioned hypothesis that links surprise to LC and
noradrenaline.
1.2 Surprise in machine learning
Quantities related to surprise have been previously used in machine learning. Plan-
ning to be surprised so as to maximize information gain has been suggested as an
optimal exploration technique in dynamic environments [Sun et al., 2011,Little and
Sommer, 2011,Kolter and Ng, 2009]. Signatures of surprise have been observed in
artiﬁcial models of curiosity and interestingness both of which drive active explo-
ration for learning unknown environments, in the absence of external reward [Frank
et al., 2013]. Surprise is also linked to Bayesian experimental design [Chaloner and
Verdinelli, 1995] and active learning [Settles, 2010]. Furthermore, a surprise measure
deﬁned as a prediction error has been optimized in the context of free energy mini-
mization [Friston, 2010,Friston and Kiebel, 2009,Rezende and Gerstner, 2014,Brea
et al., 2013].
Being able to detect novel and surprising stimuli is necessary for efﬁciently learning
new memories without altering past useful memories [Carpenter and Grossberg, 1988].
Furthermore, it is critical to consider novelty information (related to the structure
of the environment) in addition to reward information in models of reinforcement
3
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learning (RL) [Sutton and Barto, 1998b]. Surprise enables an agent to generate (trigger)
new states (in the context of RL), an essential feature for learning new environments.
As such, surprise is a crucial factor in both learning andmemory formation [Ranganath
and Rainer, 2003], and should be incorporated in existing machine learning tools to
empower them for learning a wide range of learning problems.
1.2.1 Implications of surprise
Surprise has wide-reaching implications: surprise can not only modulate learning
and drive attention, but can be used as a trigger signal for an algorithm that needs
to choose between several uncertain states or actions as is the case in change point
detection [Nassar et al., 2010,Wilson et al., 2013,Rüter et al., 2012], memory and cluster
formation [Gershman and Niv, 2015], exploration/exploitation tradeoff [Cohen et al.,
2007, Jepma and Nieuwenhuis, 2011], novelty detection [Knight et al., 1996,Bishop,
1994], and network reset [Bouret and Sara, 2005].
Surprise can be used for learning unknown environmental states that a learning agent
encounters while interacting with an environment. This empowers the existing re-
inforcement learning algorithms for coping with learning paradigms in which the
environment is not completely known for the agent. The exploration-exploitation
tradeoff can also be addressed by surprise. Surprise appears whenever large mis-
matches between bottom-up sensory information and top-down expectations occur.
For instance if a learning agent expects a reward at a certain location, and that loca-
tion is manually changed, a surprise may be required for increasing the exploration
to quickly adapt to the new environment [Cohen et al., 2007, Jepma and Nieuwen-
huis, 2011]. The idea is related to the vigilance signal in adaptive resonance theory
(ART) [Carpenter and Grossberg, 1988].
ART is based on the insight that learning in artiﬁcial and biological neural systems
requires a balance between plasticity and stability (the challenge of stability-plasticity
dilemma [Carpenter and Grossberg, 1988]). While plasticity is necessary for being
able to integrate new knowledge, stability is needed to prevent forgetting previously
learned memories. The role of surprise for this purpose is crucial, and it is highlighted
in ART [Carpenter and Grossberg, 1988], that has been proposed to address this
challenge by using a surprise-like “vigilance” signal.
Humans and animals learn invariant properties of the environment by building a set
of critical features or prototypes that provide compressed representation of the input
data space. These prototypes efﬁciently represent different classes of environmental
inputs that the learner encountered beforehand. Such a coding is required for percep-
4
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tion and cognition, because it is neither possible nor efﬁcient to store the full sensory
information in a limited memory system. Once a data sample arrives, our brain de-
cides whether it should be associated to one of the existing prototypes or whether it
belongs to a new prototype which has never been learned (or has been forgotten in
case of earlier occurrence). The answer to this question is determined after the brain
evaluates how novel (surprising) the data sample is. If the newly acquired sample does
not belong to any of the existing prototypes, then surprise could trigger mechanisms
for the formation of new memories by opening a gate for a set of synapses that do not
yet represent environmental features.
1.3 Multi-factor learning rules for synaptic plasticity
Learning in neural system has been postulated to be linked to synaptic plasticity. This
refers to experimental ﬁndings in biology which suggest that the strength of a connec-
tion between neurons in neural circuitry of the brain is not ﬁxed, but subject to change.
The change in strength of neural connections can persist from a few seconds to days
and even years, serving as a neural substrate of memory. Theoretical descriptions of
synaptic plasticity have been dominated by Hebb’s rule [Hebb, 2002] which is based
on two major insights: locality and coactivity. According to Hebb’s rule, both pre- and
post-synaptic neurons have to be active to make their connection stronger. We call
these, the two local factors necessary for Hebbian learning. Hebbian rules are simple
yet invaluable tools for modeling developmental plasticity such as development of
receptive ﬁelds. However, Hebbian rules are limited to the realm of unsupervised
learning paradigms. Unsupervised paradigms, however, are often incapable of coping
with motor learning tasks or conditioning.
Empirical studies, on the other hand, show the existence of additional global factors
that can inﬂuence synaptic plasticity [Reynolds and Wickens, 2002]. These global
factors correspond to the activity of neuromodulators that are broadly distributed
via multiple ramiﬁcations of axons. Deﬁcits in activity of the neuromodulatory sys-
tem (corresponding to global factors) in humans and animals leave many tasks un-
learnable [Decker and McGaugh, 1991]. For instance, Dopamine (DA) as a neuro-
modulator is used in signaling reward prediction error that takes part in temporal
difference (TD) learning algorithms such as Q-learning and SARSA [Schultz et al.,
1997,Sutton and Barto, 1998b,Steinberg et al., 2013]. Acetylcholine (ACh) is another
candidate neuromodulator used in signaling alertness [Posner and Fan, 2004] and
modulating spike-timing dependent plasticity (STDP) [Seol et al., 2007,Couey et al.,
2007]. Noradrenaline (NA) inﬂuences STDP [Lin et al., 2003, Seol et al., 2007] and
modulates neural responses [Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005,Usher et al., 1999].
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It is thus of interest to expand on Hebbian learning rules and formulate general new
synaptic plasticity rules that combine the two local Hebbian activity factors with one
or multiple global factors. The simplest 3-factor learning rule, including two Hebbian
terms modulated by a third factor, is sketched in Fig. 1.1. We believe that surprise-
based learning falls into the category of multi-factor learning rules. A surprise signal,
just like a reward or success signal in RL, can be theoretically interpreted as a global
factor, and biologically explained by the release of a non-speciﬁc neuromodulator
(e.g., norepinephrine (NE) released from locus coeruleus neurons). Therefore, it can
modulate the strength of plasticity that depends, as before, on local Hebbian factors
(i.e., the coactivity of pre- and post-synaptic neurons).
Reward Surprise 
A B 
3-factor: Hebb + global factor Hebb: two local factors 
 ?w = f (pre, post)  ?w = g(Hebb,M )
pre 
post 
M1 M2 
Figure 1.1 – Hebbian versus 3-factor plasticity. A. Standard Hebbian plasticity rule is
described by the co-activity of pre and post synaptic neurons. All the information that
is needed for change in the strength of a connection is locally available for the neurons
that are connected by that synapse. B. In 3-factor learning rules a global factor (such
as reward or surprise) is required to modulate the strength of plasticity in addition to
the two local Hebbian factors.
1.4 Structure of the thesis
In Chapter 2, we ﬁrst conceptually discuss the requirements that should be taken
into account for quantiﬁcation of surprise. We review existing methods and explain
their shortcomings. Inspired by information theoretic and Bayesian approaches, we
then propose a conﬁdence-corrected surprise measure to incorporate subjectivity and
uncertainty, two conceptually different aspects of surprise.
We use our proposed measure of surprise in Chapter 3 to develop a new framework
for surprise-driven learning. We formulate the principle of surprise minimization as
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a learning strategy and derive a class of learning rules which obey that principle. A
surprise-minimization learning rule, or SMiLe-rule, is derived by a constraint opti-
mization problem in that framework. The SMiLe rule can be used for learning within
changing environments by dynamically adjusting the balance between new and old
information for inference about the world, without making prior assumptions about
the temporal statistics of the environment.
We apply our proposed method to a dynamic decision making task in a Gaussian
environment, as well as an exploration task in a maze-like environment. We demon-
strate how surprise and uncertainty interact with each other to make learning in
changing environments possible. The proposed algorithm beneﬁts from a reduced
computational complexity and simpler implementation compared to an explicit so-
lution of a hierarchical Bayesian model. The proposed surprise-modulated belief
update algorithm provides a framework to study and model the behavior of humans
and animals encountering surprising events. It captures a wide range of behaviors in
realistic experimental environments. Moreover, it makes testable prediction about the
time course of Noradrenaline [Sara, 2009] or LC-dopamine [Takeuchi et al., 2016] as a
neuronal surprise signal, and suggests behavioral experiments that can be performed
on real animals.
Chapter 4 links our theory of surprise to the multi-factor learning rules introduced
above, and demonstrates how surprise could play the role of a global factor for affect-
ing synaptic plasticity. We ﬁrst propose a general framework for approximating the
exact optimal solution (i.e., the maximizer) of a functional (objective function) that is
expressed as an average over many data samples, using an online stochastic learning
rule. The proposed learning rule has the form of a 3-factor learning rule, if a neural
network is used for parametrization. We then apply our proposed technique to the
objective function of the SMiLe rule. We show that the obtained online rule can be
interpreted as a covariance learning rule. We implement the online rule in a spiking
neural network to demonstrate that our proposed SMiLe rule can also be neurally
implemented.
In summary, our work on the foundations of surprise in this thesis provides a frame-
work for future studies on learning with surprise. These include computational studies,
such as understanding the interplay between surprise and reward, and neurobiologi-
cal studies, such as unraveling the interaction between different neural circuits that
are functionally involved in learning under surprise. This helps us in addressing unre-
solved issues about understanding the neural basis of learning.
My contribution to each of these chapters is detailed in the last chapter of the thesis.
7

2 A Mathematical Description of Sur-
prise
The Webster dictionary deﬁnes surprise as “an unexpected event, piece of informa-
tion” and “the feeling caused by something that is unexpected or unusual” [merriam-
webster.com]. Therefore, surprise is unexpectedness and represents the gap between
what happens and what was expected to happen.
Surprise occurs whenever there is uncertainty, be it in the world or in the model that
we build of the world. While the former corresponds to the probabilistic nature of
the world, the latter is caused by an imperfect internal model of the outside world.
We emphasize that surprise is subjective: events that are surprising to me may not be
surprising to you, although we may both have used the same data to build our models
of the world. Subjectivity may arise from different methods for building our internal
models, or different prior beliefs about the world [Baldi and Itti, 2010, Palm, 2012].
Individuals may also differ in the way they perceive a same event. Therefore they may
differently be surprised by the same data because of that subjective perception.
Model uncertainty differs from subjectivity in that the former refers to uncertainty in
parameter estimation, given the available data, that remains even in the “best” model
(e.g., Bayes-optimal). The latter incorporates individual differences in the construction
of a (potentially suboptimal) model given identical data.
Inspired by information theoretic and Bayesian approaches we propose a conﬁdence-
corrected surprise measure to incorporate subjectivity and uncertainty, two concep-
tually different aspects of surprise. Our proposed measure of surprise inherits the
advantages of Shannon surprise [Shannon, 1948,Tribus, 1961] (a data-driven measure
of unexpectedness) and Bayesian surprise [Baldi and Itti, 2010, Itti and Baldi, 2005] (a
model-driven approach for quantifying surprise), and overcome their shortcomings.
We also emphasize that the conﬁdence-corrected surprise is deﬁned for a single data
sample, such that an organism can respond to a single event. In contrast, information
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theoretic quantities, such as data entropy and mutual information, are usually deﬁned
as average quantities, and thus are not suitable for quantifying surprise in one-shot
paradigms.
2.1 Probability-based surprise measures
In order to quantify surprise we need to measure “how much wow" [Baldi and Itti,
2010] we get when we encounter an event that deviates from our expectation. Through-
out this section, we use a (Bayesian) statistical framework to formulate probability-
based surprise measures.
2.1.1 Shannon surprise
We assume that the world is governed by a set of parameters θ∗ chosen by nature. If
θ∗ is known, the information content − lnp(X |θ∗) for a speciﬁc outcome X ∈X is
a measure of surprise [Tribus, 1961,Shannon, 1948,Palm, 2012] which says that the
occurrence of a rare (i.e., unlikely to occur) data sample X is surprising.
As the information content relates to the true probabilities p(X |θ∗) of samples in
the real world, it is an objective, model-independent, measure of unexpectedness.
However, the true set of parameters θ∗, and so the true probability p(X |θ∗), is rarely
known to the observer, such that it is difﬁcult to evaluate the exact information content
of a data sample X .
We can bypass this issue by modeling the world as a joint distribution p(X ,θ) =
p(X |θ)π0(θ) which speciﬁes how data X is generated if the model parameter is θ ∈Θ.
The distribution π0(θ) represents the current belief of the observer about the model
parameters θ before X is observed. In what follows we may call the distribution π0(θ)
the prior belief, but it always reﬂect the most recent belief before data sample X is
observed.
The marginal likelihood Z (X )=∫Θp(X ,θ)dθ is a subjective interpretation of the true
likelihood p(X |θ∗), where we integrate out the model parameters θ from the joint
distribution. Therefore, we can replace the exact information content − lnp(X |θ∗)
with the Shannon surprise
SSh(X ;π0)=− lnz(X )=− ln
[∫
Θ
p(X |θ)π0(θ)dθ
]
, (2.1)
which depends on the marginal likelihood Z (X ) and can be considered as a subjective
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version of the information content.
Although Shannon surprise [Eq. (2.1)] captures both uncertainty and subjectivity, it
may not be the best measure for quantiﬁcation of surprise. One of the shortcomings
of the Shannon surprise is that the calculation of the marginal likelihood Z (X ) (also
known as the evidence function) could be very intractable [MacKay, 2003,Barber, 2012].
Moreover, Shannon surprise does not incorporate the effect of model uncertainty, that
a subject has about his expectation of the world, in surprise evaluation (see Fig. 2.1).
x
θ
x
θ
p(x,θ )π 0 (θ )
pˆX (θ )
p(x |θi )
Z(x)
X
Figure 2.1 – Conﬁdence-corrected surprise. The impact of conﬁdence on surprise.
Top: Two distinct internal models (red and blue), described by joint distributions
p(x,θ) (contour plots) over observable data x and model parameters θ, may have the
same marginal distribution Z (x)=∫θ p(x,θ)dθ (distributions along the x-axis coin-
cide) but differ in the marginal distribution π0(θ)=
∫
x p(x,θ)dx (distributions along
the θ-axis). Surprise measures that are computed with respect to Z (x) neglect the un-
certainty as measured by the entropyH (π0). Therefore, a given data sample X (green
dot) may be equally surprising in terms of the Shannon surprise SSh(X ) [Eq (2.1)]
but results in higher conﬁdence-corrected surprise Scor r (X ) [Eq (2.8)] for the blue as
compared to the red model, because π0 in the red model is wider (corresponding to a
larger entropy) than in the blue model. Bottom: The scaled likelihood pˆX (θ) (magenta)
for the “red” internal model is calculated by evaluating the conditional probability
distribution functions p(x|θi ) (speciﬁed by different color for each θi ) at x = X (inter-
section of dashed green line with colored curves). The conﬁdence-corrected surprise
Scor r (X ) is the KL divergence between pˆX (θ) (bottom, magenta) and π0(θ) (top, red).
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2.1.2 Bayesian surprise
Once a data sample X is observed, a subject can modify his current belief π0(θ) about
the model parameters using Bayes’ rule:
π(θ|X )= p(X |θ)π0(θ)
Z (X )
. (2.2)
Bayesian surprise [Itti and Baldi, 2005,Baldi and Itti, 2010] is deﬁned as the Kullback-
Leibler (KL) divergence [Kullback and Leibler, 1951] between the prior π0(θ) and the
posterior π(θ|X ) either in the form
SBayes(X ;π0)=DKL[π0(θ)||π(θ|X )] (2.3)
or in the mirror form DKL[π(θ|X )||π0(θ)]. Bayesian surprise measures the discrepancy
or dissimilarity between the prior π(θ) and the posterior π(θ|X ) believes about the
model parameters θ. According to this measure, a data sample X is more surprising
than a data sample X ′ if it causes a larger change in our belief.
One of the shortcomings of the Bayesian surprise is that it is computed only after
learning (i.e., once we have changed our belief from prior to posterior). However,
behavioral and neural responses indicate that surprise is concurrent with the unex-
pected event. Our working hypothesis is that the brain evaluates surprise even before
recognition, inference or learning occurs. We thus need to evaluate surprise before we
update our belief so that surprise may control learning rather than emerge from it.
We believe that Bayesian surprise [Eq. (2.3)] resembles, by construction, a measure that
quantiﬁes the effectiveness of a data sample X on belief update, rather than quantifying
how surprising that data sample is perceived. But since surprising samples result in
larger change in our belief than non-surprising samples (it will be discussed later in
Chapter 3), we may be deceived by Eq. (2.3) as a measure of surprise, while it should
not be the case.
2.1.3 Conﬁdence-corrected surprise
Shannon surprise Eq. (2.1) and Bayesian surprise Eq. (2.3) are two distinct yet com-
plementary approaches for calculating surprise. Shannon surprise is about data as it
captures the inherent unexpectedness of a piece of data given a model. However, it
suffers from not covering the inﬂuence of model uncertainty on surprise. Bayesian
surprise is about a model as it measures the change in belief about model parameters.
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However, it is computed only after learning, which is inconsistent with behavioral
and neural data that suggest an instantaneous response to surprise. Our deﬁnition of
conﬁdence-corrected surprise (what follows) combines these two measures to use their
complementary beneﬁts and overcome their shortcomings.
Our conﬁdence-corrected surprise measure is derived in three steps. First we replace
the exact information content − lnp(X |θ∗) of the observed data sample X with a
weighted average over all possible model parameters. It gives us the raw surprise of a
data sample X :
Sraw (X ;π0) :=−
∫
Θ
π0(θ) lnp(X |θ) dθ. (2.4)
In the raw surprise [Eq. (2.4)], we calculate the information content − lnp(X |θ) of a
data sample X if the true model parameter is θ, and then we average this quantity
over all model parameters with a weight that is determined by the current belief π0(θ).
Interestingly, the raw surprise in Eq (2.11) can be expressed as a sum of the Shannon
surprise and the Bayesian surprise (see Materials and Methods for the proof):
Sraw (X ;π0)= SSh(X ;π0)+SBayes(X ;π0). (2.5)
As such, it combines both data-driven approach (Shannon surprise) and the model-
driven approach (Bayesian surprise) for measuring surprise.
In addition to the raw surprise [Eq (2.4)] being subjective, we would also like to capture
the impact of a subject’s conﬁdence in her belief. Intuitively, if we are uncertain about
what to expect (because we have not yet learned the structure of the world), receiving a
data sample that occurs with low probability under the present model is less surprising
than a low-probability sample in a situation when we are almost certain about the
world.
Our conﬁdence about the current model of the world is represented by the entropy
H (π0)=−
∫
Θπ0(θ) lnπ0(θ)dθ of our current belief about the model parameters. To
arrive at the conﬁdence-corrected surprise, we subtract the entropy H (π0) of our
current belief from the raw surprise, i.e.,
Sraw (X ;π0)−H (π0)=
∫
Θ
π0(θ) ln
π0(θ)
p(X |θ) dθ. (2.6)
While the right-hand side of Eq (2.6) is reminiscent of a KL divergence (between π0(θ)
and p(X |θ) as a function of θ), the likelihood function p(X |θ) is not a normalized
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probability distribution function with respect to θ. To rewrite Eq (2.6) as a KL diver-
gence, we divide the likelihood p(X |θ) by a scaling factor ||pX || =
∫
Θp(X |θ′) dθ′. The
scaled likelihood
pˆX (θ)= p(X |θ)||pX ||
= p(X |θ)∫
Θp(X |θ′) dθ′
, (2.7)
can be considered as a probability distribution function over θ, just like the prior π0(θ).
Therefore, the scaled likelihood pˆX (θ) and the prior belief π0(θ) both belong to the
space of well-deﬁned probability density functions for the model parameters θ. Note
that we may need to discretize the space of the model parameters θ to ensure that
everything is well-deﬁned and easy to be calculated.
The KL divergence DKL[π0(θ)||pˆX (θ)] between the two distributions is the conﬁdence-
corrected surprise:
Scor r (X ;π0)=DKL[π0(θ)||pˆX (θ)]=
∫
Θ
π0(θ) ln
π0(θ)
pˆX (θ)
dθ. (2.8)
The conﬁdence-corrected surprise measure [Eq. (2.8)] represents the difference be-
tween what we expected to happen (as indicated by the current belief π0(θ)) and what
actually happened in the world, where the relevance of a new data point X is indicated
by the (scaled) likelihood pˆX (θ) [Eq. (2.7)]. Therefore it meets our requirements: a
subjective, conﬁdence-adjusted measure of the difference between expectation and
realization.
We can alternatively interpret the conﬁdence-corrected surprise in the following way.
The scaled likelihood pˆ(θ) is in fact the posterior belief that is achieved under a ﬂat
prior, i.e., where we have no prior knowledge about the world (see Materials and
Methods). The prior π0(θ), on the other hand, can be interpreted as a posterior belief
that is achieved without taking into account the newly acquired data sample X . The
conﬁdence-corrected surprise [Eq. (2.8)] quantiﬁes how different these two posteriors
are, using the KL divergence.
Note that our proposed conﬁdence-corrected surprise measure Scor r (X ;π0) in Eq (2.8)
inherits the property of the raw surprise Sraw (X ;π0) in Eq (2.4), that can be expressed
as the sum of Shannon surprise and Bayesian surprise (see Eq. (2.5)). As such, it
also combines the beneﬁts of both data-driven and model-driven approaches for
measuring surprise.
In principal one could have a ﬁxed model of the world, with no ability to further adapt
it, and one can be surprised many times under this model. However, in order for
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surprise to be (behaviorally) meaningful, i.e., carry valuable information, there needs
to be consequences to surprise. These include interruption of an ongoing action,
attentional shifts, change in choice, or learning. In Chapter 3 we will more precisely
discuss the implications of surprise in learning.
2.2 Discussion
2.2.1 Absolute z-score
Apart from probability-based surprise measures, model-free approaches can also be
used to quantify surprise in simpliﬁed experimental paradigms. In a simple paradigm,
model-free approaches might even be preferred to probability-based surprise mea-
sures in fMRI and behavioral studies. Here we would like to emphasize that the
conﬁdence-corrected surprise can be simpliﬁed when they are put in a given context.
Here is an example:
In the context of reward-based learning, the prediction error signal δ= r −E(r ) quan-
tiﬁes the difference between the actual reward r and the expected reward E(r ), and
has been frequently used in error-driven algorithms such as temporal difference (TD)
learning [Sutton and Barto, 1998a]. Larger prediction errors in noisy and volatile en-
vironments (where the standard deviation σ of random reward r is high) are less
surprising than in stable environments (with small σ). As such the scaled absolute
prediction error (also known as z-score)
S(r )= |r −E(r )|
σ
, (2.9)
may be considered as one of the simplest model-free approaches for quantifying
surprise.
All probability-based surprise measures, we introduced in this chapter, can be simpli-
ﬁed to the absolute z-score Eq. (2.9), in case of random reward delivery that is modeled
in a Gaussian setting (see Materials and Methods).
2.2.2 Binary or graded surprise?
A key question in the quantiﬁcation of surprise is whether we should think about
surprise in a binary way (surprised or not surprised) or in a graded way (different
levels of surprise). Behavioral sciences almost suggest the former (i.e., in case of a
surprising event, I either interrupt what I’m doing or I don’t), but from the view point
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of neural implementations, surprise should be graded.
All the surprise measures introduced here can be bounded in the range of [0,1] by
using a sigmoid function (e.g., hyperbolic tangent). This formulation also accom-
modates binary theories of surprise in which an organism is either surprised or not,
without specifying a level of surprise. Moreover, a further incorporation of subjective
parameters to determine the shape of the function can be beneﬁcial for ﬁtting data to
behavior. An example in which the propensity of a subject in changing his belief is
modeled by a subjective parameter will be provided in Chapter 3.
2.2.3 Subjective perception affects surprise
Surprise is not directly related to the observation. It rather depends on how an out-
come is perceived in the subject’s mind. Different individuals may differently perceive
a same outcome, even if the world is completely known and even if they do not need
to build an internal model for that. In other words, subjectivity may not only arise
from different priors or different methods for model construction, but the subjects
may also have different perception approaches. For clariﬁcation of the statement
above, we provide an example, studied in Palm theory of surprise (see Appendix A for
a review, [Palm, 2012]).
In the context of game of lotto 6 numbers are drawn from a set L = {1,2, ...,49} of
numbers without replacement. Without loss of generality, we display these 6 random
numbers ordered by their size x1 < x2 < ...< x6 with xi ∈ L. In what follows, we would
like to discuss how surprising an observed data batch X = {x1,x2, ...,x6} is perceived in
different subjects’ minds. Note that in this example, there is no learning as the model
of the world is completely known (i.e., subject knows that all data batches X are equally
probable with probability p(X )= (49−6)!49! . In case of no learning, all surprise measures
we discussed earlier would be equivalent to the information content − lnp(x|θ∗),
except the Bayesian surprise which is not well-deﬁned in this context (because it
depends on model change while we have no change in the model). The information
content, however, results in an equal amount of surprise for all outcomes X , which is
not the case in real behavioral experiment.
For instance, the occurrence of X = {11,12,13,14,15,16} seems to be perceived as
much more surprising than the occurrence of Y = {7,16,23,35,40,48}, in reality. This
is because we “perceive” X and Y differently. X is perceived as a set of subsequent
numbers which is very unlikely to occur again. However, data batch Y is interpreted
as an ordinary set of numbers with no signiﬁcant relation between its entries. We can
simply model this ﬁnding by replacing p(X ) with p(c[X ]) where c[X ] is the class of
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all data batches (including X ) that are similarly perceived as X . In other words, to
quantify how surprising the outcome X above is perceived, we need to evaluate how
surprising is to have a data batch with six subsequent numbers. All data batches that
fulﬁll this description belongs to the class c[X ]. In fact, the surprise of X should be
calculated by − lnp(c[X ]) and not − lnp(X ).
Perception is a subjective concept and is affected by subjects’ background. To clarify,
we ask a question. Among outcome Y = {7,16,23,35,40,48} and Z = {2,7,19,23,37,43},
which one is more surprising? The answer depends on the subjective perception. For
those who recognize that all the numbers in Z are prime numbers, this conﬁguration
is probably more surprising than Y . This is because the probability of observing
six prime numbers as an outcome is less than an appearance of an ordinary set of
numbers. But for those who could not easily recognize such a relation between the
entries, both conﬁgurations Y and Z might be equally surprising.
2.3 Materials and Methods
2.3.1 The scaled likelihood is theposteriorbelief under theﬂatprior
Let us assume that all model parameters θmust stay in some bounded convex interval
of volume A. Given a data sample X , the posterior belief p f lat (θ|X ) about the model
parameters θ (derived by the Bayes rule) under the assumption of a ﬂat prior πˆ0(θ)=
1/A is:
p f lat (θ|X )= p(X |θ)πˆ0(θ)∫
Θp(X |θ)πˆ0(θ) dθ
= p(X |θ)∫
Θp(X |θ) dθ
= p(X |θ)||pX ||
= pˆX (θ). (2.10)
2.3.2 The raw surprise increases with the Shannon surprise and the
Bayesian surprise
An interesting feature of the raw surprise Eq. (2.4) is that it incorporates both data-
driven (Shannon surprise) and model-driven (Bayesian surprise) approaches for
calculating surprise. This is because the raw surprise can be expressed as the sum of
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the Shannon surprise and Bayesian surprise:
Sraw (X ;π0)
(2.4)= −
∫
Θ
π0(θ) lnp(X |θ) dθ
(2.2)= −
∫
Θ
π0(θ) ln
[π(θ|X )(∫Θp(X |θ)π0(θ) dθ)
π0(θ)
]
dθ
= DKL[π0(θ)||π(θ|X )]− ln
[∫
Θ
p(X |θ)π0(θ) dθ
]
(2.3),(2.1)= SBayes(X ;π0)+SSh(X ;π0). (2.11)
Therefore, the raw surprise is always lower bounded by the Shannon surprise, i.e.,
Sraw (X ;π0)≥ SSh(X ,π0), (2.12)
because the difference between these two surprise measures is equal to the Bayesian
surprise, according to Eq. (2.11), which is expressed as a KL divergence (a non-negative
quantity). The fact that the raw surprise is always bigger than or equal to the Shannon
surprise, can also be explained by the Jensen’s inequality: If θ is a random variable and
φ(θ)=− lnp(X |θ) is a convex function, then E[φ(θ)]≥φ(E[θ]), i.e.,
Sraw (X ;π0)
(2.4)= Eπ0[− lnp(X |θ)] ≥ − lnEπ0[p(X |θ)]
(2.1)= SSh(X ;π0). (2.13)
2.3.3 Absolute z-score is linked to probability-based surprise mea-
sures in a Gaussian setting
In the following we provide a simple example in a Gaussian setting, and analytically
calculate all the probability-based surprise measures introduced in this chapter, for a
given data sample X . We show that all these surprise measures can be linked to the
z-scoreZ (X ) using a quadratic mapping:
S(X )=mZ (X )2+n, (2.14)
for some constants m,n ∈R.
Suppose that the world generates samples that are normally distributed around the
(unknown) mean μ∗. We assume that the variance σ2x of the distribution from which
samples X are drawn is known. Therefore, the only parameter that we may be un-
certain about (in our internal model of the external world) is the true underlying
mean. The uncertainty about the true mean μ∗ is modeled by the current belief
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π0(μ) ∼ N (μ∗,σ2μ) which is a normal distribution with mean μ∗ and variance σ2μ.
Larger σ2μ implies higher uncertainty about the mean. Note that the probability of ob-
serving X given the mean μ is also normal, i.e., p(X |μ)∼N (μ,σ2x). We ﬁrst calculate
all the probability-based surprise measures, introduced in this chapter, for a given
data sample X :
The information content (as an objective, model-independent measure of surprise) is
equal to
− lnp(X |μ∗)= 1
2
ln[2πσ2x]+
(X −μ∗)2
2σ2x
(2.15)
Since both likelihood p(X |μ) and the prior π0(μ) are normal, the marginal likelihood
Z (X )=∫μp(X |μ)π0(μ)dμ is also expressed by a normal distributionN (μ∗,σ2x +σ2μ).
Therefore, the Shannon surprise SSh(X ;π0) [Eq. (2.1)] is equal to
SSh(X ;π0)=
1
2
ln[2π(σ2x +σ2μ)]+
(X −μ∗)2
2(σ2x +σ2μ)
. (2.16)
The posterior belief π(μ|X ) that is obtained by the Bayes’ rule in Eq. (2.2) has also a
normal distributionN (αX +(1−α)μ∗,σ2x⊕σ2μ), whereα=
σ2μ
σ2x+σ2μ andσ
2
x⊕σ2μ =
σ2xσ
2
μ
σ2x+σ2μ .
The Bayesian surprise SBayes(X ;π0) [Eq. (2.3)] is therefore equal to:
SBayes(X ;π0)=
σ2μ
2σ2x
(
(X −μ∗)2
σ2μ+σ2x
)
+ 1
2
(
σ2μ
σ2x
− ln
[
1+
σ2μ
σ2x
])
, (2.17)
where we used the following formula for the KL divergence of the normal distributions:
DKL[N (a1,b
2
1)||N (a2,b22)]=
(a1−a2)2
2b22
+ 1
2
(
b21
b22
−1− ln b
2
1
b22
)
. (2.18)
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The raw surprise Sraw (X ;π0) [Eq. (2.4)] is equal to
Sraw (X ;π0)
(2.4)=
∫
μ
− lnp(X |μ)N (μ|μ∗,σ2μ) dμ
(2.15)=
∫∞
−∞
(
1
2
ln[2πσ2x]+
(X −μ)2
2σ2x
)
N (μ|μ∗,σ2μ) dμ
= 1
2
ln[2πσ2x]+
1
2σ2x
∫∞
−∞
(X 2−2Xμ+μ2)N (μ|μ∗,σ2μ) dμ
= 1
2
ln[2πσ2x]+
1
2σ2x
[
X 2−2Xμ∗+ (σ2μ+μ∗2)
]
= 1
2
ln[2πσ2x]+
(X −μ∗)2
2σ2x
+
σ2μ
2σ2x
. (2.19)
The conﬁdence-corrected surprise [Eq. (2.8)] is equal to
Scor r (X ;π0)= (X −μ
∗)2
2σ2x
+ 1
2
(
σ2μ
σ2x
−1− ln
σ2μ
σ2x
)
(2.20)
where we used Eq. (2.18) for calculating the KL divergence between pˆX (θ)∼N (X ,σ2x)
and π0(μ)∼N (μ∗,σ2μ). The conﬁdence-corrected surprise [Eq. (2.8)], in this example,
can also be derived by subtracting the entropy form the raw surprise:
Scor r (X ;π0) = Sraw (X ;π0)−H (π0)
(2.19)= 1
2
ln[2πσ2x]+
(X −μ∗)2
2σ2x
+
σ2μ
2σ2x
− 1
2
ln[2πeσ2μ]
= (X −μ
∗)2
2σ2x
+ 1
2
(
σ2μ
σ2x
−1− ln
σ2μ
σ2x
)
, (2.21)
where we usedH (π0)= 12 ln[2πeσ2μ] in the second line of derivation above. Note that
in case of Gaussian likelihood, the scaled likelihood is the same as the likelihood (be-
cause ||pX || = 1,∀X ). Therefore, the conﬁdence-corrected surprise can be expressed
as Eq. (2.6).
To see why all probability-based surprise measures above can be linked to the absolute
z-scoreZ (X )= X−μ∗
σ2x
via Eq. (2.14), assume σ2x =σ2μ and rewrite Eqs.(2.15-2.20).
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3 Balancing New Against Old Informa-
tion: The Role of Surprise in Learning
Encountering unexpected (surprising) events is part of our daily experience. How
humans and animals can rapidly detect unexpected events and quickly adapt to
changing environments is an open question. Our hypothesis is that humans and
animals use a surprise signal to deﬁne the moments when learning should be most
effective. In the present study, a new framework for surprise-driven learning is pro-
posed which consists of two components: (i) a conﬁdence-adjusted surprise measure
to capture environmental statistics as well as subjective beliefs (see Chapter 2), and
(ii) a surprise-minimization learning rule, or SMiLe-rule, which dynamically adjust
the balance between new and old information for inference about the world, without
making prior assumptions about the temporal statistics of the environment.
We apply our framework to a dynamic decision-making task and a maze exploration
task to demonstrate that it is suitable for learning in complex environments that
undergo gradual or sudden changes. The proposed algorithm beneﬁts from a reduced
computational complexity and simpler implementation compared to an explicit so-
lution of a hierarchical Bayesian model. The proposed surprise-modulated belief
update algorithm is able to capture a wide range of behaviors in realistic experimental
environments. It provides a framework to study the behavior of humans and animals
encountering surprising events. Moreover, it makes testable prediction about the time
course of Noradrenaline as a neuronal surprise signal.
3.1 Introduction
Humans and animals rely on previously learned knowledge to guide their behavior. A
crucial challenge when collecting new data in uncertain environments is the balance
between new and old information. How much should we trust what we have learned
in the past and how much should we adjust our model of the world based on newly
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acquired data? In noisy environments, individual data samples are not reliable and a
model needs to average over the past data. However, when a structural change occurs
in the environment, the most recent data samples are the most informative ones and
we would like to quickly forget what was learned in the past.
Both humans and animals adaptively adjust the relative contribution of old and
newly acquired data on learning [Behrens et al., 2007,Nassar et al., 2012,Krugel et al.,
2009,Pearce and Hall, 1980] and rapidly adapt to changing environments [Pearce and
Hall, 1980,Wilson et al., 1992,Holland, 1997]. To capture this behavior, existing models
detect and respond to sudden changes using (absolute) reward prediction errors [Hay-
den et al., 2011,Pearce and Hall, 1980], risk prediction errors [Preuschoff and Bossaerts,
2007,Preuschoff et al., 2008], uncertainty-based jump detection [Nassar et al., 2010,
Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts, 2011] and hierarchical modeling [Behrens et al.,
2007,Adams and MacKay, 2007]. The nature of the environmental change determines
which of these models works best. Here we aim to generalize these approaches by
using surprise as a trigger for shifting the balance between old and new information.
We formulate the principle of surprise minimization as a learning strategy and de-
rive a class of learning rules which obey that principle. We then propose a surprise-
modulated belief update rule that can be used for learning within changing envi-
ronments. We apply our proposed method to a dynamic decision making task in a
Gaussian environment, as well as an exploration task in a maze-like environment. We
demonstrate how surprise and uncertainty interact with each other to make learning
in changing environments possible. Finally, we discuss implications of surprise in
reinforcement learning, and link surprise and its role in learning/plasticity to existing
neurophysiological evidence and behavioral data.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Surprise minimization: the SMiLe-rule
Successful learning implies an adaptation to the environment such that an event
occurring for a second time is perceived as less surprising than the ﬁrst time. In
the following surprise minimization refers to a learning strategy which modiﬁes the
internal model of the external world such that the unexpected observation becomes
less surprising if it happens again in the near future. Surprise minimization is akin to –
though more general than – reward prediction error learning. Reward based learning
modiﬁes the reward expectation such that a recurring reward results in a smaller
reward prediction error. Similarly, surprise-minimization learning results in a smaller
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surprise for recurring events.
To mathematically formulate learning through surprise minimization, we deﬁne a
learning rule L(X ,π0) as a mapping from a prior belief π0(θ) to a posterior belief q(θ)
after receiving data sample X , i.e., q = L(X ,π0). Moreover, we deﬁne a belief update as
the learning step after a single data sample.
We deﬁne the classL of plausible learning rules as the set of those learning rules L
for which the surpriseS (X ;q) of any data sample X under the posterior belief q(θ)
is at most as surprising as the surpriseS (X ;π0) of that data sample under the prior
belief π0(θ), i.e.,
L = {L :S (X ;q)≤S (X ;π0), q = L(X ,π0),∀X ∈X }. (3.1)
In other words, if the same data sample X occurs a second time right after a belief
update, it is perceived as less surprising than the ﬁrst time.
After the belief update we can measure how much the new data X has impacted the
internal model by comparing the surprise of data sample X under the posterior belief
to its surprise under the prior belief:
ΔS (X ;L)=S (X ;π0)−S (X ;q). (3.2)
Given a learning rule L, a data sample X is considered more effective for a belief
update than X ′, if ΔS (X ;L)>ΔS (X ′;L). Note that deﬁnitions in Eqs (3.1) and (3.2)
do not depend on our speciﬁc choice of surprise measure S . In the following we
chooseS to be the conﬁdence-corrected surprise Scor r [Eq (2.8)].
The impact function ΔScor r (X ;L) [Eq (3.2)], for a given data sample X , is maximized
by the learning rule that maps the prior belief π0(θ) to the scaled likelihood pˆX (θ).
However, as this posterior distribution q = pˆX does not depend on the prior belief π0,
it discards all previously learned information. Therefore, it amounts to a valid though
meaningless solution.
To avoid overﬁtting to the last data sample, we need to limit our search to posteriors q
that are not too different from the prior π0. This limited set can be expressed as the set
of posteriors q that fulﬁll the constraint DKL[q||π0]≤B , for some non-negative upper
bound B ≥ 0. The parameter B determines how much we allow our belief to change
after receiving a data sample X . Maximizing the impact function ΔScor r (X ;L) under
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such a constraint, is equivalent to the following constraint optimization problem:
min
q :DKL[q||π0]≤B
Scor r (X ;q). (3.3)
Using the method of Lagrange multipliers we ﬁnd the solution of problem in Eq (3.3)
to be
qγ(θ)= p(X |θ)
γπ0(θ)1−γ
Z (X ;γ)
, (3.4)
where Z (X ;γ)=∫Θp(X |θ)γπ0(θ)1−γ dθ is a normalizing factor and 0≤ γ≤ 1 is uniquely
determined by the bound B (see Materials and Methods for the proof). The unique
relationship between γ and B means that once B has been chosen, γ is no longer a
free parameter and vice versa.
We call the learning rule of Eq (3.4) surprise minimization learning (SMiLe) rule. It is
reminiscent of Bayes’ rule except for the parameter γ which modulates the relative
contribution of the likelihood p(X |θ) and the prior π0(θ) to the posterior q(θ). Note
that the SMiLe rule belongs to the classL of plausible learning rules, for all 0≤ γ≤ 1.
Choosing γ in the range 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is equivalent to choosing a bound B ≥ 0. To un-
derstand how the optimal solution in Eq (3.4), and thus γ, relates to the boundary
B , we illustrate its limiting cases (see Fig 3.1): (i) B = 0 yields γ= 0 and the posterior
q is identical to the prior π0. In other words, the new information is discarded. (ii)
For B ≥ Bmax = DKL[pˆX ||π0], the solution is always the scaled likelihood pˆX (cor-
responding to γ = 1) because q = pˆX fulﬁlls the constraint DKL[q||π0] ≤ B for any
B ≥ Bmax and minimizes Scor r (X ;q) among all posteriors q . This is equivalent to
the unconstrained case, and implies that all previous information is discarded. (iii)
For 0 < B < Bmax the optimal solution is the posterior qγ [Eq (3.4)] with 0 < γ < 1
satisfying DKL[qγ||π0]=B . Moreover, B >B ′ implies γ> γ′ (see Fig 3.1, and Materials
and Methods for the proof).
While the SMiLe rule [Eq (3.4)] depends on a parameter γ which is uniquely deter-
mined by the bound B , we have yet to indicate how to choose B . Highly surprising
data should result in larger belief shifts. As such, the bound B should increase with
the level of surprise Scor r .
The deﬁnition of an optimal (nonlinear) mapping from Scor r to B (and thus to γ)
would require further assumptions about how surprise is related to the bound and
we will therefore not search for optimality. However, it is instructive to study a few
examples. For instance, if the nonlinear mapping were a step function, the system
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Figure 3.1 – Constraint surprise minimization. Solutions to the (constraint) optimiza-
tion problem in Eq (3.3). The objective function, i.e. the posterior surprise Scor r (X ;q)
(black) for a given data sample X , is a parabolic landscape over γwhere each γ cor-
responds to a unique posterior qγ. Its global minimum is at γ = 1 (corresponding
to q1 = pˆX ) which is equivalent to discarding all previously observed samples. The
boundary B constrains the range of γ and thus the set of admissible posteriors. At
B = 0 no change is allowed resulting in γ= 0 with a posterior equals to the prior π0
(green). B ≥ Bmax =DKL[pˆX ||π0] (red dashed line) implies that we allow posteriors
that are further away from the prior than the sample itself so the optimal solution is
the scaled likelihood pˆX or γ= 1 as for the unconstrained problem. For 0<B <Bmax
(blue dashed line) the objective function is minimized by qγ in Eq (3.4) that fulﬁlls the
constraint DKL[qγ||π0]=B with 0< γ< 1.
would make a binary choice between either keeping the old belief or relying on the
last new data point. On the other hand, an extremely slow increase would amount
to largely ignoring the surprise and sticking to the same old belief. Therefore, the
sharpness of the transition in the mapping function matters. The exact link between
the bound and surprise is, however, not crucial as long as B is monotonic in surprise
in a reasonable way.
In the following, we choose a simple monotonic function to link the bound to the
surprise. For each data sample X , we take
B(X )= mScor r (X ;π0)
1+mScor r (X ;π0)
Bmax(X ), (3.5)
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where Bmax(X )=DKL[pˆX ||π0]. Here, the monotonic function depends on a subject-
speciﬁc parameter m that describes an organism’s propensity toward changing its be-
lief. Note that in Eq (3.5), m = 0 indicates that the subject will never change her belief.
As m increases so does a subject’s willingness to change her belief. Thus, differences
in m from one subject to the next will eventually allow us to capture heterogeneity
in belief update strategies. Although m is inserted in Eq (3.5) to model subjective
behaviors, one could also search for the best m algorithmically in a given simulated
environment or other computational setting.
Note that biological correlates of surprise such as pupil dilation or the activity of a
neuromodulator will normally saturate at some maximal value, consistent with our
choice of a saturating function in Eq (3.5).
3.2.2 Surprise-modulated belief update
The surprise-modulated belief update combines the conﬁdence-corrected surprise
[Eq (2.8)] and the SMiLe rule [Eq (3.4)] to dynamically update our belief: after receiving
a new data point X , we evaluate the surprise Scor r (X ;π0) which sets the bound B
[Eq (3.5)] for our update and allows us to solve for γ. We then update the belief, using
the SMiLe rule [Eq (3.4)] with parameter γ (see Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 1 Pseudo algorithm for surprise-modulated belief update (SMiLe)
1: N ← number of data samples
2: Belief←π0 (the prior belief)
3: m ← 0.1 (subject-dependent)
4: for n: 1 to N do
5: Xn ← a new data sample
6: (i) evaluate the surprise Scor r (Xn ;Belief), Eq (2.8)
7: (ii-a) calculate Bmax(Xn)=DKL[pˆXn ||Belief]
8: (ii-b) choose the bound B(Xn)= mScor r (Xn ;Belief)1+mScor r (Xn ;Belief)Bmax(Xn)
9: (iii) ﬁnd γ by solving DKL[qγ||Belief]=B(Xn)
10: (iv) update using SMiLe, Eq (3.4): Belief(θ)← p(Xn |θ)γBelief(θ)1−γ∫
Θ p(Xn |θ)γBelief(θ)1−γ dθ
11: Return Belief;
Note 1: In each iteration, we ﬁrst calculate the surprise, step (i), before the model
is updated in step (iv).
Note 2: The steps (ii-a), (ii-b), and (iii) can be merged and approximated by γ=
f (Scor r (Xn ;Belief)) where f (.) is a subjective function that increases with surprise.
The parameter γ in the SMiLe rule controls the impact of a data sample X on belief
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update such that a bigger γ causes a larger impact. More precisely, the impact func-
tion ΔScor r (X ;L) in Eq (3.2), where L is replaced by the SMiLe rule [Eq (3.4)], is an
increasing function of γ (see Materials and Methods for the proof).
We note that in classical models of perception and attention [Itti and Baldi, 2009,Baldi
and Itti, 2010], surprise has been deﬁned as a measure of belief change (such as
DKL[qγ||π0] or its mirror form DKL[π0||qγ]). We emphasize that our model of surprise
is “fast” in the sense that it can be evaluated before the beliefs are changed. Interest-
ingly, the impact function is linked to the measure of belief change by the following
equation (see Materials and Methods for derivation),
ΔScor r (X ;L)= 1
γ
DKL[π0||qγ]+
(
1
γ
−1
)
DKL[qγ||π0]≥ 0. (3.6)
Therefore a larger reduction in the surprise implies a bigger change in belief.
3.2.3 Simulations
In the following we will look at two examples to illustrate the functionality of our
proposed surprise-modulated belief update Algorithm 1. The ﬁrst is a simple, one-
dimensional dynamic decision-making task which has been used in behavioral stud-
ies [Nassar et al., 2012, Behrens et al., 2007] of learning under uncertainty. While
somewhat artiﬁcial as a task, it is appealing as it nicely isolates different forms of
uncertainty. This allows us: (i) to demonstrate the basic quantities and properties of
our algorithm, and (ii) to show how its ﬂexibility allows it to capture a wide range of be-
haviors. The second example is a multi-dimensional maze-exploration task which we
will use to demonstrate how our algorithm extends to and performs in more complex
and realistic experimental environments.
Gaussian estimation
Task. In the one-dimensional dynamic decision-making task, subjects are asked to
estimate the mean of a distribution based on consecutively and independently drawn
samples. At each time step n, a data sample Xn is drawn from a normal distribution
N (μn ,σ2x) and the subject is asked to provide her current estimate μˆn of the mean of
the distribution. Throughout the experiment, the mean may change without warning
(Fig 3.2A). Changes occur with a hazard rate of H = 0.066. The variance σ2x remains
ﬁxed.
Model. We model the subject’s belief before the n-th sample Xn is observed, as the
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Figure 3.2 – Gaussian mean estimation task. At each time step, a data sample Xn
is independently drawn from a normal distribution whose underlying mean may
change within the interval [−20,20] at unpredictable change points. On average, the
underlying mean remains unchanged for 15 time steps corresponding to a hazard rate
H = 0.066. The standard deviation of the distribution is ﬁxed to 4 and is assumed to be
known to the subject. A. Using a surprise-modulated belief update (Algorithm 1), the
estimated mean (blue) quickly approaches the true mean (dashed red) given observed
samples (black circles). A few selected change points are indicated by green arrows.
B. The weight factor γ in Eq (3.8) (magenta) increases at the change points, resulting
in higher inﬂuence of newly acquired data samples on the posterior mean. C. The
estimation error 	 per time step versus the weight factor 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 in the delta-rule
method with constant γ for four different hazard rates. The minimum estimation
error (for best ﬁxed γ) is achieved by a γ (points on the horizontal axis) that decreases
with the hazard rate, indicating that a bigger γ is preferred in volatile environments.
Error bars indicate standard deviation over all trials and 50 episodes. D. For all models,
the average estimation error 	 increases with the hazard rate. Moreover, surprise-
modulated belief update (SMile, dark blue) outperforms the delta-rule with the best
ﬁxed γ (Best ﬁxed γ, yellow). The best ﬁxed γ for each hazard rate corresponds to the
learning rate that has minimal estimation error (indicated by points on the horizontal
axis in sub-ﬁgure C). Although the surprise-modulated SMile rule performs worse
than the approximate Bayesian delta-rule [Nassar et al., 2010] (App. Bayes, light blue),
the difference in the performance is not signiﬁcant, except for the very small hazard
rate of 0.01.
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normal distributionN (μˆn−1,σ2n−1) where μˆn−1 is the estimated mean and σ
2
n−1 deter-
mines how uncertain the subject is about her estimation. In order to keep the scenario
as simple as possible, we assume σ20 =σ2x . The posterior mean μˆn resulting from the
surprise-modulated belief update (Algorithm 1) is a weighted average of the prior
mean μˆn−1 and the new sample Xn (see Materials and Methods for derivation),
μˆn = γXn + (1−γ)μˆn−1. (3.7)
The weight factor, that determines to what extent a new sample Xn affects the posterior
mean μˆn , is determined by γ which increases with the surprise Scor r (Xn) of that
sample (Fig 3.2B), i.e.,
γ=
√
mScor r (Xn)
1+mScor r (Xn)
, Scor r (Xn)= (Xn − μˆn−1)
2
2σ2x
. (3.8)
Note that in this example, the conﬁdence-corrected surprise measure is related to
the normalized unsigned prediction error |Xn − μˆn−1|/σx . This outcome of our SMiLe-
update is consistent with recent approaches in reward learning that suggest to use
reward prediction errors scaled by standard deviation or variance [Preuschoff and
Bossaerts, 2007].
Results. The conﬁdence-corrected surprise increases suddenly in response to the
samples immediately after the change points, as they are unexpected under the
current prior. As a consequence, surprising samples increase the inﬂuence of a new
data sample on the posterior mean (Fig 3.2B). We can compare our surprise modulated
belief update [Eqs (3.7) and (3.8)] with a delta-rule [Eq (3.7)] with constant weighting
factor γ. To enable a fair comparison we consider two situations: (i) we arbitrarily ﬁx γ
at 0.5 or (ii) for a given hazard rate H , we ﬁrst search for the optimal value of ﬁxed γ so
as to minimize the estimation error (Fig 3.2C). We ﬁnd that our surprise-modulated
belief update outperforms the delta-rule with any constant learning rate (Fig 3.2D).
This clearly shows that an adaptive learning rate is preferable to a ﬁxed learning rate.
We also compared our proposed algorithm with a delta-rule that approximates the
optimal Bayesian solution [Nassar et al., 2010]. In the optimal model, the subject
knows a-priori that the mean will change at unknown points in time, i.e., the subject
makes use of a hierarchical statistical model of the world. The algorithm proposed
in [Nassar et al., 2010] provides an efﬁcient approximate solution to estimate the
parameters of the hierarchical model. In this algorithm, the subject increases the
learning rate as a function of the probability of encountering a change point at a given
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time step. This probability requires knowledge or online estimation of the hazard
rate, which indicates how frequently change points occur. Although our surprise-
modulated belief update does not outperform the approximate Bayesian delta-rule,
the difference in performance is, in most cases, not signiﬁcant (see Fig 3.2D). In other
words, our method, which does not require any information about the hazard rate, can
nearly reach the quality of the optimal Bayesian solution, with signiﬁcantly reduced
computational complexity. Note that the SMiLe rule is not designed for (almost)
stationary environments where no fundamental change in context occurs. Therefore,
in the case where the true mean is constant (low hazard rate), the SMiLe rule results in
increased volatility in estimation. This is why the difference in performance of SMiLe
and the optimized Bayesian delta-rule becomes more evident for smaller hazard rates
than bigger ones (see Fig 3.2D).
Maze exploration
Task. The maze exploration task is similar to tasks used in behavioral neuroscience
and robotics [Morris, 1984, Gillner and Mallot, 1998, Nelson et al., 2004, Rezende
and Gerstner, 2014]. There are two environments A and B, each composed of the
same uniquely labeled (e.g., by colors or cue cards) rooms. A and B only differ in
the topology / spatial arrangement of rooms (see Fig 3.3). Neighboring rooms are
connected and accessible through doors. Initially, the agent is placed into eitherA or
B. At each time step, a door of the current room opens and the agent moves into the
adjacent room, thus exploring the environment. After a random exploration time the
environment is switched. Once it is changed, the agent must quickly adapt to the new
environment. Note that this task differs from a reinforcement learning task because
the task at hand just consists of the exploration phase. In particular, there is no reward
involved in learning.
Model. We model the knowledge of the environment by a learning agent that updates
a set of parameters α(s, sˇ)≥ 1 used for describing its belief about state transitions from
s ∈ {1,2, ...,16} to sˇ ∈ {1,2, ...,16}\s, where 16 is the number of rooms. More precisely,
an agent’s belief about how likely it is to visit sˇ, given the current state s, is modeled
by a Dirichlet distribution parametrized by a vector of parameters α(s) ∈ R15. The
components of the vector α(s) are denoted as α(s, sˇ).
The surprise-modulated belief update (Algorithm 1), with the Dirichlet distribution
inserted, yields Algorithm 2 for the maze exploration task (see Materials and Methods
for derivation). Immediately after a transition from the current state s to the next
state s′, the posterior belief qγ obtained by the SMiLe rule [Eq (3.4)] is a Dirichlet
distribution αnew (s) with components αnew (s, sˇ) = γ(1+ [sˇ = s′])+ (1−γ)αold (s, sˇ),
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Figure 3.3 – Maze exploration task. Environments A (left) and B (right) both con-
sist of 16 rooms, but differ in topology. At each time step, one of the four available
doors (up, down, right, left) in the current room (e.g. s = 6) is randomly opened (with
probability 0.25). While the learning agent is in environmentA , the environment may
change toB with probability PA→B ≤ 0.1 in the next time step of duration Δt . Simi-
larly, PB→A indicates the environment switches fromB toA . Therefore, as the agent
starts moving out of state s = 6, depending on the current environment and switch
probabilities PA→B and PB→A , it will end up in environmentA (i.e., s′ ∈ {2,10,7,5})
orB (i.e., s′ ∈ {10,1,3,13}). The duration of a stay in environmentA is therefore expo-
nentially distributed with mean τA =Δt/PA→B , where the parameter τA determines
the time scale of stability in environmentA , i.e., for larger τA an agent has more time
for adapting to A after a change point. The expected fraction of time spent in total
within environmentA is equal toψA = PB→A /(PB→A +PA→B). Note that τA and
ψA are two free parameters that we can change to study how the agent performs in
different circumstances (e.g., see Fig 3.7).
that can be written as a weighted average of the parameters of the prior belief π0 (i.e.,
αold (s, sˇ)) and those of the scaled likelihood pˆX (i.e., 1+[sˇ = s′]). Here, [sˇ = s′] indicates
a number that is 1 if the condition in square brackets is satisﬁed, and 0 otherwise.
In order to see how well our proposed surprise-modulated belief update algorithm
performs in this task, we compare it with a naive Bayesian learner and an online
expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm [Mongillo and Deneve, 2008]. While in the
former the agent assumes that there is only a single stable, but stochastic environment,
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the latter beneﬁts from knowing the true hidden Markov model (HMM) of the task
and approximates the optimal hierarchical Bayesian solution (see Materials and
Methods).
Algorithm 2 Surprise-modulated belief update for the maze exploration task
1: N ← number of data samples
2: α(s, sˇ)= 1, ∀s ∈ {1,2, ...,16}, sˇ ∈ {1,2, ...,16}\{s} (a uniform prior belief)
3: m ← 0.1 (subject-dependent)
4: Start in state s
5: for n: 1 to N do
# at this time step we only update the parameters that describe state transitions
from the current state s to all possible next states sˇ ∈ {1,2, ...,16}\{s}. The prior
belief, for the state s, is π0 ∼Dir (a), a ∈R15, a(sˇ)=α(s, sˇ).
6: Xn : s → s′ (a new transition is observed)
# the scaled likelihood is pˆX ∼Dir (b),b ∈R15, b(sˇ)= 1+ [sˇ = s′]
7: (i) Scor r (Xn ;π0)=DKL[Dir (a)||Dir (b)]
8: (ii-a) Bmax(Xn)=DKL[Dir (b)||Dir (a)]
9: (ii-b) B(Xn)= mScor r (Xn ;π0)1+mScor r (Xn ;π0)Bmax(Xn)
10: (iii) ﬁnd γ by solving DKL[Dir (γb+ (1−γ)a)||Dir (a)]=B(Xn)
11: (iv) α(s, sˇ)← (1−γ)α(s, sˇ)+γ(1+ [sˇ = s′])
12: Return α(s, sˇ),∀s, sˇ;
Note 1: DKL[Dir (m)||Dir (n)] = lnΓ(∑sˇ m(sˇ)) − lnΓ(∑sˇ n(sˇ)) − ∑sˇ lnΓ(m(sˇ)) +∑
sˇ lnΓ(n(sˇ))+
∑
sˇ(m(sˇ)−n(sˇ))(Ψ(m(sˇ))−Ψ(
∑
sˇ m(sˇ))).
Note 2: Γ(.) and Ψ(.) denote the gamma and digamma functions, respectively.
[sˇ = s′] denotes the Iverson bracket, a number that is 1 if the condition in square
brackets is satisﬁed, and 0 otherwise.
Results. Similar to the Gaussian mean estimation task, surprise is initially high and
slowly decreases as the agent learns the topology of the environment (Fig 3.4A). When
the environment is switched, the sudden increase in the surprise signal (Fig 3.4A)
causes the parameter γ to increase (Fig 3.4B). This is equivalent to discounting previ-
ously learned information and results in a quick adaptation to the new environment.
To quantify the adaptation to the new environment, we compare the state transition
probabilities of the current model with the true transition probabilities of the two
environments. We ﬁnd that the estimation error of the state transition probabilities in
the new environment is quickly reduced after the switch points (Fig 3.4C). Following a
change point, the model uncertainty, measured as the entropy of the current belief
about the state transition probabilities, increases indicating that the current model
of the topology is inaccurate (Fig 3.4D). A few time steps later the uncertainty slowly
decreases, indicating increased conﬁdence in what is learned in the new environment.
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Figure 3.4 – Time-series of relevant signals in the surprise-modulated belief up-
date (Algorithm 2) applied to the maze exploration task. All the curves have been
smoothed with an exponential moving average (EMA) with a decay constant 0.1. The
plots are shown for 1100 time steps (horizontal axis) toward the end of a simulation
with 20000 time steps. The agent visits environments A and B equally often and
spends on average 200 time steps in each environment before a switch occurs. Red
bars indicate the time that the agent explores environmentA . Blue diamonds indicate
100 time steps after a change point fromB toA . A. Conﬁdence-corrected surprise
Scor r [Eq (2.8)] (green) increases at switch points and decreases (with ﬂuctuations)
till the next change point. B. The parameter γ (magenta) increases with the surprise
at the change points and causes the next data samples to be more effective on belief
update than the samples before the change point. C. The estimation errors for the
transition matrix Tˆ , EA [t ] = ||Tˆ [t ]−TA ||2 = 256−1∑s,s′[Tˆ [t ](s, s′)−TA (s, s′)]2 (solid
black) and EB[t ]= ||Tˆ [t ]−TB ||2 (solid yellow) while in environmentA andB, respec-
tively, indicate a rapid adaptation to the new environment after the change points.
The dashed black and yellow lines correspond to the estimation errors EA and EB ,
respectively, when the naive Bayes rule (as a control experiment) is used for belief
update. The naive Bayes rule converges to a stationary solution (no signiﬁcant change
in the estimation error after a switch of environment). D. The model uncertainty (light
blue) increases for a few time steps following a change in the environment, an alert
that the current model might be wrong. It then starts decreasing as the agent becomes
more certain in the new environment.
If we look more closely at the model parameters, we ﬁnd that the surprise-modulated
belief update (Algorithm 2) enables the agent to adjust the estimated state transition
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probabilities. In Fig 3.5 we compare the estimated and the true transition probabilities
100 time steps after a switch. Given that the environment is characterized by 64
different transitions (in a space of 16×15= 240 potential transitions), 100 time steps
allow an agent to explore only a fraction of the potential transitions. Nevertheless, 100
time steps after a switch, the matrix of transition probabilities already resembles that
of the present environment (Figs 3.5C and 3.5D).
The surprise-modulated belief update is a method of quick learning. How well does
our SMiLe update rule perform relative to other existing models? We compared it
with two well-known models. First, we compared to a naive Bayesian learner which
tries to estimate the 240 state transition probabilities using Bayes rule. Note that, by
construction, the naive Bayesian learner is not aware of the switches between the
environments. Second, we compared to a hierarchical statistical model that reﬂects
the architecture of the true world as in Fig 3.3. The task is to estimate the 2×240 state
transitions in the two environments as well as transition probabilities between the
environments pA→B and pB→A by an online EM algorithm.
For the naive Bayesian learner, we ﬁnd that its behavior indicates a steady increase in
certainty, regardless of how surprising the samples are. In other words, it is incapable
of changing its belief after it has sufﬁciently explored the environments (Fig 3.4C). The
state transition probabilities are estimated by averaging over the true parameters of
both environments, where the weight of averaging is determined by the fraction of
time spent in the corresponding environment (Figs 3.5E and 3.5F).
The comparison of our surprise-modulated belief update with the online EM algo-
rithm for the hierarchical Bayesian model associated with the changing environments
provides several insights (see Fig 3.6). First, already after less than 1000 time steps, the
estimation error for environmentA during short episodes in environmentA drops
below EA = 0.002. Only after 10000 time steps, the online EM algorithm achieves the
same level of accuracy. While the solution of the SMiLe rule in the long run is not as
good, our algorithm beneﬁts from a reduced computational complexity and simpler
implementation.
To further investigate the ability of an agent to adapt to the new environment after a
switch, we analyzed performance as a function of two free parameters that control the
setting of the task: (i) the fraction of time spent in environmentA , and (ii) the average
time spent in environment A before a switch to B occurs. To do so, we calculate
the average estimation error in state transition probabilities 64 time steps after a
switch occurs. We consider only those switches after which the agent stays in that
environment for at least 64 time steps. Note that 64 is the minimum number of time
steps that is required to ensure that all possible transitions from 16 room to their 4
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Figure 3.5 – True and estimated state transition probabilities in the maze explo-
ration task. The color intensity for each entry (s, s′) represents the probability of
transition from a current state s (row) to a next state s′ (column). A. The true state
transition probability matrix TA (s, s′) in environmentA . Each row TA (s, :) has only
four non-zero entries (small squares with the light brown color) whose position indi-
cate the neighboring rooms of state s in environmentA . Note that
∑
sˇ TA (s, sˇ)= 1 ,∀s.
B. The true state transition probability matrix TB(s, s′) for the environmentB which
has a different topology compared toA . C. The estimated state transition probabil-
ity matrix TˆA when the surprise-modulated Algorithm 2 is used for belief update.
TˆA = K−1∑Kk=1 Tˆ [tkB→A + 100] is calculated by averaging the estimated transition
matrix Tˆ [t ] at 100 time steps after each of K change points tk
B→A . Here, t
k
B→A de-
notes the k-th time that the environment is changed fromB toA and has remained
unchanged for at least the next 100 time steps (relevant time points are indicated
by blue diamonds in Fig 3.4). The similarity between TˆA and TA indicates that Al-
gorithm 2 enables the agent to quickly adapt to environmentA once a switch from
B toA occurs. D. The estimated transition matrix TˆB (similarly deﬁned as TˆA but
for environment B) when Algorithm 2 is used for belief update. Note its similarity
to the true matrix TB . E-F. The estimated state transition probability matrices TˆA
(top) and TˆB (bottom) when the naive Bayesian method (as a control experiment) is
used for belief update. A Bayesian agent does not adapt well to the new environment
after a switch occurs, because it learns a weighted average of true transition matrices
TA and TB , where the weight is proportional to the fraction of time spent in each
environment. Since both environments are visited equally in this experiment, the
estimated quantities approach (TA +TB)/2.
neighbors could occur. A smaller estimation error for a given pair of free parameters
indicates a faster adaptation to the new environment for that setting.
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Figure 3.6 – Comparison of surprise-modulated belief update with an online EM
algorithm for the hierarchical Bayesian model. A. The estimation error EA (vertical
axis) of state transition probabilities within environmentA versus time (horizontal
axis), for surprise-modulated belief update (black) and online EM learner (blue). Bot-
tom plots depict zooms during the early (left) and late (right) phases of a simulation of
20000 time steps. In the early phase of learning (bottom left), the surprise-modulated
belief update enables the agent to quickly learn model parameters after a switch to
environmentA (indicated by red bars). In the late phase of learning (right), however,
the online EM algorithm adapts to the new environment faster and more accurately
than the surprise-modulated belief update. B. The inferred probability PA of being
in environment A (blue, right vertical axis) used in the online EM algorithm, and
the conﬁdence-corrected surprise Scor r (black, left vertical axis) used in the surprise-
modulated belief update.
We found that the surprise-modulated belief enables an agent to quickly readjust its
estimation of model parameters, even if the fraction of time spent in an environment
is relatively short. In that sense, it behaves similarly to the approximate hierarchical
Bayesian approach (online EM algorithm). This is not, however, the case for a naive
Bayesian learner whose estimation error in each environment depends on the fraction
of time spent in the corresponding environment (see Fig 3.7).
The naive Bayesian learner suffers from low accuracy in estimation and cannot adapt
to environmental changes. A full hierarchical Bayesian model, however, requires prior
information about the task and is computationally demanding. For example, the
computational load of the hierarchical Bayesian model increases with the number
N of environments between which switching occurs. The surprise-modulated belief
update, however, balances accuracy and computational complexity: computational
complexity remains, by construction, independent of the number of switched envi-
ronments.
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Figure 3.7 – The estimation error 	 in the maze exploration task, as a function of
(1) the average time spent in environment A before a switch to environment B
(τA = Δt/pA→B , vertical axis) and (2) the fraction of time spent in environment
A (ψA = PB→A /(PB→A +PA→B), horizontal axis). A. The average estimation error
(of state transition probabilities), 64 time steps after a switch from B to A , when
surprise-modulated belief update (Algorithm 2) is used for learning. The spread of blue
color (lower estimation error) illustrates that the surprise-modulated belief update
enables an agent to quickly adapt to the environment visited after a switch. For
each pair (τA ,ψA ), the simulation is repeated for 20 episodes, each consisting of
20000 time steps. In each episode a different rearrangement of rooms for building
environmentB is used to make sure that the result is not biased by a speciﬁc choice
of this environment. B. The average estimation error when the online EM algorithm is
used for learning the hierarchical statistical model. C. The average estimation error
when the naive Bayesian learner is used for belief update. The estimation error for this
model is mainly determined by the fraction of time spent in environmentA (i.e.,ψA ).
The estimation error decreases with the time spent in environmentA , regardless of
the time scale of stability determined by τA .
3.3 Discussion
We proposed a new framework for surprise-driven learning. There are two compo-
nents to this framework: (i) a conﬁdence-adjusted surprise measure to capture envi-
ronmental statistics as well as subjective beliefs, and (ii) the surprise-minimization
learning rule, or SMiLe-rule, which dynamically adjusts the balance between new
and old information without prior assumptions about the temporal statistics in the
environment. Within this framework, surprise is a single subject-speciﬁc variable that
determines a subject’s propensity to modify existing beliefs. This algorithm is suitable
for learning in complex environments that are either stable or undergo gradual or
sudden changes. The latter are signalled by high surprise and result in placing more
weight on new information. The signiﬁcance of the proposed method is that it neither
requires knowledge of the full Bayesian model of the environment nor any prior as-
sumption about the temporal statistics in the environment. Moreover, it provides a
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simple framework that could potentially be implemented in a neurally plausible way
using probabilistic population codes [Ma et al., 2006,Beck et al., 2008].
New versus old information
The proposed algorithm’s performance is primarily driven by two features: (i) the
algorithm adaptively increases the inﬂuence of new data on the belief update as
a function of how surprising the data was; and (ii) the algorithm increases model
uncertainty in the face of surprising data thus increasing the inﬂuence of new data
on current and future belief updates. The importance of the ﬁrst point has been
recognized and incorporated previously [Nassar et al., 2012,Pearce and Hall, 1980].
The second point is particularly worth noting: a surprising sample not only signals
a potential change, it also signals that our current model may be wrong, so that we
should be less certain about its accuracy. This increase in model uncertainty implies
discounting the inﬂuence of past information in current and future belief updates.
Both humans and animals adaptively adjust the relative contribution of old and
newly acquired data on learning [Behrens et al., 2007,Nassar et al., 2012,Krugel et al.,
2009,Pearce and Hall, 1980] and rapidly adapt to changing environments [Pearce and
Hall, 1980,Wilson et al., 1992,Holland, 1997]. Standard Bayesian and reinforcement
learning models in humans [Tenenbaum and Grifﬁths, 2001] or animals [Dayan et al.,
2000,Kakade and Dayan, 2002] assume a stable environment and are slow to adapt
to sudden changes in the environment. To quickly learn in dynamic environments,
models need to include a way to detect and respond to sudden changes.
A full (hierarchical) Bayesian approach works only if the subject is aware of the correct
model of the task, (e.g., the time scale of change in the environment or the number of
environments between which switches occur). Calculating the probability of a change
point in a Gaussian estimation task [Nassar et al., 2010], estimating the volatility of
the environment in a reversal learning task [Behrens et al., 2007], and dynamically
forgetting the past information with a controlled time constant [Rüter et al., 2012]
are all examples of addressing learning in changing environments without explicit
knowledge of the full Bayesian model.
In changing environments, hierarchical Bayesian models outperform the standard
delta-rule with a ﬁxed learning rate. However, hierarchical models either make as-
sumptions about how fast the world is changing on average or about the underlying
data generating process, in order to accurately detect a change in the environment.
While our proposed surprise-based algorithm may not be theoretically optimal, it
approximates the optimal (hierarchical) Bayesian solution without making any such
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assumption.
Model uncertainty
The ability of our proposed method to increase model uncertainty solves a common
problem in standard Bayesian learning, namely, a model uncertainty or a learning
rate approaching zero when the number of data samples increases. This is particularly
prominent in Bayes’ rule which is derived under the assumption of stationarity and
which thus reduces posterior uncertainty in each step no matter how surprising
a sample is. The SMiLe rule [Eq (3.4)] guarantees that a small model uncertainty
remains even after a long stationary period. This remaining uncertainty ensures that
an organism can still detect a change even after having spent an extensive amount
of time in a given environment (see Fig 3.4C). One might argue, that reducing the
learning rate to zero after extensive training is desirable under certain conditions
as it corresponds to the well-documented phenomenon of overtraining whereby an
organism no longer responds to changes in goal value. We would argue that this
insensitivity is a consequence of behavioral control being handed over to the habitual
system and thus to a different neural substrate [Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010,Balleine
and Dickinson, 1998,Redgrave et al., 2010].
Potential applications
Surprise minimization is a more general approach to learning than learning by re-
ward prediction error. Recent approaches in reward learning suggest using a scaled
reward prediction error [Preuschoff and Bossaerts, 2007]. A recurring problem in
reward-based learning is the observation that subjects use different learning rates
on a trial-by-trial basis even in stable environments. Researchers typically assume
an average learning rate for ﬁtting data. Note that in our approach, the learning rate
varies naturally as a function of the last data point (as it should) while keeping the
subject-speciﬁc parameter m constant.
Note that both conﬁdence-corrected surprise and the SMiLe rule have wide-reaching
implications outside the framework presented here. On the one hand, our surprise
measure can not only modulate learning, but can be used as a trigger signal for an
algorithm that needs to choose between several uncertain states or actions as is the
case in change point detection [Nassar et al., 2010,Wilson et al., 2013,Rüter et al., 2012],
memory and cluster formation [Gershman and Niv, 2015], exploration/exploitation
tradeoff [Cohen et al., 2007, Jepma and Nieuwenhuis, 2011], novelty detection [Knight
et al., 1996,Bishop, 1994], and network reset [Bouret and Sara, 2005]. On the other
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hand, the SMiLe-rule could add ﬂexibility in learning and replace existing learning
algorithms in scenarios where dynamically balancing old and new information is
desired. This includes ﬁtting γ to behavioral data without computing surprise or
controlling γ by something other than surprise. Replacing the full Bayesian model
of a learning task in changing environment with the SMile rule simpliﬁes calcula-
tions, which makes the SMiLe-framework suitable for ﬁtting relevant parameters to
behavioral data.
Relation to the free energy principle and variational methods
Although the free energy principle [Friston, 2010] is a contemporary theory of surprise
minimization, the idea behind it differs from our proposed surprise modulated belief
update. In the free energy principle (or in variational Bayesian methods in general)
the aim is to “approximate” the Bayesian posterior q(θ)∝ p(X |θ)π0(θ) that is difﬁcult
or intractable to be directly derived. In fact, given a candidate posterior distribution
q(θ) a variational bound J (X ;q)=DKL[q||π0]−〈lnp(X |θ)〉q on the Shannon surprise
SSh(X ;q) [Eq. (2.1)] is introduced such that SSh(X ;q) ≤ J(X ;q). Then the aim is to
minimize the bound J (X ;q) with respect to q . The minimum of the variational bound
J (X ;q) with respect to q simply recovers the posterior Bayes q(θ)∝ p(X |θ)π0(θ).
In the surprise-modulated belief update, however, the aim is not to approximate the
Bayesian posterior. Instead, we would like to have a belief-update rule that enables us
to dynamically adjust the balance between the inﬂuence of the prior and the likelihood
for deriving the posterior, using a surprise-related signal. Although our approach for
deriving the SMiLe rule Eq. (3.4) was different from the variational method, we can
rederive an equation that is somewhat equivalent to the SMiLe rule but using the
variational method. The constraint DKL[q||π0]≤B that we introduced for deriving the
SMiLe posterior q(θ)∝ p(X |θ)γπ0(θ)1−γ (see Eqs. (3.3), (3.4)) can also be imposed on
the variational bound J ′(X ;q)=βDKL[q||π0]−〈lnp(X |θ)〉q with the help of a Lagrange
multiplier β. By minimizing the variational bound J ′(X ;q) we can interpolate between
the prior (β→∞) and the scaled likelihood (β→ 0).
Experimental predictions
The noradrenergic system has emerged as a prime candidate for signaling unexpected
uncertainty and surprise. We predict that in experiments with changing environments,
the activity of NE should exhibit a high correlation with the conﬁdence-corrected
surprise signal. Note that Acetylcholine (ACh), on the other hand, is a candidate
neuromodulator for encoding expected uncertainty [Yu and Dayan, 2005] and thus is
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linked to the model uncertainty (although it might also be linked to other forms of
uncertainty such as environmental stochasticity).
A variety of experimental ﬁndings are consistent with and can be explained by our
deﬁnition of conﬁdence-corrected surprise and the SMiLe rule. It has been suggested
that ACh and NE interact in a complex manner [Yu and Dayan, 2005]. For instance, the
effectiveness of NE in controlling learning and detecting contextual changes is gated
by ACh [Yu and Dayan, 2005]. This is consistent with our hypothesis that if an agent is
uncertain about its current model of the world, unexpected events are perceived as less
surprising than when the agent is almost certain about its model (the idea behind the
conﬁdence-corrected surprise). The impairment of adaptation to contextual changes
due to NE depletion [Sara, 1998] can be explained by the incapability of subjects to
respond to surprising events signaled by NE. The absence/suppression of ACh (low
model uncertainty) implies little or no variability of the environment so that even
small prediction error signals are perceived as surprising [Jones and Higgins, 1995],
consistent with the excessive activation of NE system in such situations.
Moreover, there is empirical evidence that NE and ACh both affect synaptic plasticity
in the cortex and the hippocampus [Gu, 2002,Bear and Singer, 1986], suppress cortical
processing [Kimura et al., 1999, Kobayashi et al., 2000], and facilitate information
processing from thalamus to the cerebral cortex [Gil et al., 1997, Hasselmo et al.,
1996, Hsieh et al., 2000]. This is consistent with our theory that surprise balances
the inﬂuence of newly acquired data (thalamocortical pathway) and old information
(corticocortical pathway) during belief update.
In summary, we proposed a measure of surprise and a surprise-modulated belief
update algorithm that can be used for modeling how humans and animals learn in
changing environments. Our results suggest that the proposed method can approxi-
mate an optimal hierarchical Bayesian learner, but with signiﬁcantly reduced compu-
tational complexity. Our model provides a framework for future studies on learning
with surprise. These include computational studies, such as how the proposed model
can be neurally implemented, and neurobiological studies, such as unraveling the
interaction between different neural circuits that are functionally involved in learning
under surprise.
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3.4 Materials and Methods
Derivation of the SMiLe rule.
We note that the KL divergence DKL[a||b] is convex with respect to the ﬁrst argument
a. Therefore, both the objective function Scor r (X ;q) in Eq (2.8) and the constraint
DKL[q||π0]≤B in the optimization problem in Eq (3.3) are convex with respect to q ,
which ensures the existence of the optimal solution. In the following, small numbers
above an equality sign refer to equations in the main text.
We solve the constraint optimization by introducing a non-negative Lagrange multi-
plier λ−1 ≥ 0 and a Lagrangian
L(q,λ) = Scor r (X ;q)− 1
λ
(B −DKL[q||π0])
(2.6)= 〈− lnp(X |θ)+ lnq(θ)+ 1
λ
ln
q(θ)
π0(θ)
〉
q
− B
λ
+ ln ||p||, (3.9)
where 〈.〉q denotes the average with respect to q . Similar to the standard approach
that is used in support vector machines [Schölkopf and Smola, 2002], the Lagrangian
L deﬁned in Eq (3.9) must be minimized with respect to the primal variable q and
maximized with respect to the dual variable λ (i.e., a saddle point must be found).
Therefore the constraint problem in Eq (3.3) can be expressed as
argmin
q
max
λ≥0
L(q,λ). (3.10)
By taking the derivative of L with respect to q and setting it equal to zero,
∂L
∂q
=− lnp(X |θ)+ [1+ lnq(θ)]+ 1
λ
[
1+ ln q(θ)
π0(θ)
]= 0, (3.11)
we ﬁnd that the Lagrangian in Eq (3.9) is minimized by the SMiLe rule [Eq (3.4)], i.e.,
q(θ)∝ p(X |θ)γπ0(θ)1−γ, where γ is determined by the Lagrange multiplier λ:
0≤ γ= λ
λ+1 ≤ 1. (3.12)
Note that the constant Z (X ;γ) in Eq (3.4) follows from straight normalization of q(θ)
to integral one.
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A larger bound B > B ′ on belief change implies a bigger γ > γ′ in the
SMiLe rule.
For 0 < B < Bmax the solution of optimization problem in Eq (3.3) is the posterior
qγ [Eq (3.4)] with 0 < γ < 1 satisfying DKL[qγ||π0] = B . In order to prove that B > B ′
implies γ> γ′, we just need to show that DKL[qγ||π0] is an increasing function of γ
and thus its ﬁrst derivative with respect to γ is always non-negative.
For this purpose, ﬁrst we need to evaluate the derivative of qγ(θ), [Eq (3.4)], with
respect to γ:
∂
∂γ
qγ(θ) = 1
Z (X ;γ)
∂
∂γ
[
p(X |θ)γπ0(θ)1−γ
]+p(X |θ)γπ0(θ)1−γ ∂
∂γ
[ 1
Z (X ;γ)
]
= 1
Z (X ;γ)
[
p(X |θ)γπ0(θ)1−γ ln p(X |θ)
π0(θ)
]− p(X |θ)γπ0(θ)1−γ
Z (X ;γ)2
∂
∂γ
[
Z (X ;γ)
]
= qγ(θ) ln p(X |θ)
π0(θ)
−qγ(θ) 1
Z (X ;γ)
[∫
Θ
ln
p(X |θ)
π0(θ)
p(X |θ)γπ0(θ)1−γ dθ
]
= qγ(θ)
(
ln
p(X |θ)
π0(θ)
−〈ln p(X |θ)
π0(θ)
〉
qγ
)
. (3.13)
Note also that
∫
Θ
∂
∂γ
qγ(θ) dθ
(3.13)=
∫
Θ
qγ(θ)
(
ln
p(X |θ)
π0(θ)
−〈ln p(X |θ)
π0(θ)
〉
qγ
)
dθ = 0. (3.14)
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Then we calculate the derivative of DKL[qγ||π0] with respect to γ:
∂
∂γ
DKL[qγ||π0] =
∫
Θ
∂
∂γ
[
qγ ln
qγ(θ)
π0(θ)
]
dθ
=
∫
Θ
(
ln
qγ(θ)
π0(θ)
∂
∂γ
[
qγ(θ)
]+qγ(θ) ∂
∂γ
[
ln
qγ(θ)
π0(θ)
])
dθ
=
∫
Θ
(
ln
qγ(θ)
π0(θ)
+1
)
∂
∂γ
[
qγ(θ)
]
dθ
(3.4)=
∫
Θ
(
γ ln
p(X |θ)
π0(θ)
− lnZ (X ;γ)+1
)
∂
∂γ
[
qγ(θ)
]
dθ
(3.14)= γ
∫
Θ
(
ln
p(X |θ)
π0(θ)
)
∂
∂γ
[
qγ(θ)
]
dθ
(3.13)= γ
∫
Θ
(
ln
p(X |θ)
π0(θ)
) (
ln
p(X |θ)
π0(θ)
−〈ln p(X |θ)
π0(θ)
〉
qγ
)
qγ(θ) dθ
= γ
∫
Θ
(
ln
p(X |θ)
π0(θ)
)2
qγ(θ) dθ
− γ〈ln p(X |θ)
π0(θ)
〉
qγ
∫
Θ
(
ln
p(X |θ)
π0(θ)
)
qγ(θ) dθ
= γ
(
〈
(
ln
p(X |θ)
qγ(θ)
)2
〉
qγ
−
(
〈ln p(X |θ)
π0(θ)
〉
qγ
)2)
= γ var [ln p(X |θ)
π0(θ)
]≥ 0. (3.15)
The impact of a data sample X on belief update increases with γ in
the SMiLe rule.
To prove the statement above we need to show that the impact function ΔScor r (X ;L)
in Eq (3.2), where L is replaced by the SMiLe rule in Eq (3.4), increases with the
parameter γ. In the following we show that the ﬁrst derivative of the impact function
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ΔScor r (X ;L(γ)) with respect to γ is always non-negative.
∂
∂γ
ΔScor r (X ;L(γ)) = − ∂
∂γ
Scor r (X ;qγ)
(2.8)=
∫
Θ
∂
∂γ
[
qγ ln
p(X |θ)
qγ(θ)
]
dθ
=
∫
Θ
(
ln
p(X |θ)
qγ(θ)
∂
∂γ
[
qγ(θ)
]+qγ(θ) ∂
∂γ
[
ln
p(X |θ)
qγ(θ)
])
dθ
=
∫
Θ
(
ln
p(X |θ)
qγ(θ)
−1
)
∂
∂γ
[
qγ(θ)
]
dθ
(3.4)=
∫
Θ
(
(1−γ) ln p(X |θ)
π0(θ)
+ lnZ (X ;γ)−1
)
∂
∂γ
[
qγ(θ)
]
dθ
(3.14)= (1−γ)
∫
Θ
(
ln
p(X |θ)
π0(θ)
)
∂
∂γ
[
qγ(θ)
]
dθ
(3.13)= (1−γ)
∫
Θ
(
ln
p(X |θ)
π0(θ)
)(
ln
p(X |θ)
π0(θ)
−〈ln p(X |θ)
π0(θ)
〉
qγ
)
qγ(θ) dθ
= (1−γ)
∫
Θ
(
ln
p(X |θ)
π0(θ)
)2
qγ(θ) dθ
− (1−γ)〈ln p(X |θ)
π0(θ)
〉
qγ
∫
Θ
(
ln
p(X |θ)
π0(θ)
)
qγ(θ) dθ
= (1−γ)
(
〈
(
ln
p(X |θ)
qγ(θ)
)2
〉
qγ
−
(
〈ln p(X |θ)
π0(θ)
〉
qγ
)2)
= (1−γ) var [ln p(X |θ)
π0(θ)
]≥ 0. (3.16)
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A larger reduction in the surprise implies a bigger change in belief.
The minimal value of the Lagrangian L(q,λ) in Eq (3.9) that is achieved by the posterior
qγ in Eq (3.4), obtained by the SMiLe rule, is equal to
L(qγ,λ)
(3.9)= 〈− lnp(X |θ)+ lnqγ(θ)+ 1
λ
ln
qγ(θ)
π0(θ)
〉
qγ
=C︷ ︸︸ ︷
−B
λ
+ ln ||p||
= 〈− lnp(X |θ)+ ln p(X |θ)
γπ0(θ)1−γ
Z (X ;γ)
+ 1
λ
ln
p(X |θ)γπ0(θ)1−γ
Z (X ;γ)π0(θ)
〉
qγ
+C
= 〈(−1+γ+ γ
λ
) lnp(X |θ)+ (1−γ− γ
λ
) lnπ0− (1+ 1
λ
) lnZ (X ;γ)〉
qγ
+C
= 〈
(
−1+γ(1+ 1
λ
)
)
ln
p(X |θ)
π0(θ)
− (1+ 1
λ
) lnZ (X ;γ)〉
qγ
+C
= −1
γ
lnZ (X ;γ)+C . (3.17)
Note that we used the equality 1
γ
= 1+ 1
λ
, from Eq (3.12), in the last line of Eq (3.17). If
the minimizer qγ is approximated by any other distribution function q , then its corre-
sponding functional value L(q,λ) differs from its minimal value L(qγ,λ) in proportion
to the KL divergence DKL[q||qγ]. This is because,
L(q,λ)−L(qγ,λ) (3.9),(3.17)= 〈− lnp(X |θ)+ lnq(θ)+ 1
λ
ln
q(θ)
π0(θ)
〉
q
+ 1
γ
lnZ (X ;γ)
= 1
γ
〈− lnp(X |θ)γ+ lnq(θ)γ+ ln
(
q(θ)
π0(θ)
) γ
λ + lnZ (X ;γ)〉
q
= 1
γ
〈ln q(θ)
γ(1+ 1λ )Z (X ;γ)
p(X |θ)γπ0(θ)
γ
λ
〉
q
= 1
γ
〈ln q(θ)Z (X ;γ)
p(X |θ)γπ0(θ)1−γ
〉
q
= 1
γ
DKL[q||qγ]. (3.18)
Replacing q with π0 in Eq (3.18) follows the impact function ΔScor r (X ;L) in Eq (3.2)
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to be,
ΔScor r (X ;L(γ)) = Scor r (X ;π0)−Scor r (X ;qγ)
(3.9)= L(π0,λ)+ 1
λ
B −L(qγ,λ)− 1
λ
(B −DKL[qγ||π0])
= L(π0,λ)−L(qγ,λ)+ 1
λ
DKL[qγ||π0]
(3.18)= 1
γ
DKL[π0||qγ]+ 1
λ
DKL[qγ||π0]
(3.12)= 1
γ
DKL[π0||qγ]+
(
1
γ
−1
)
DKL[qγ||π0]≥ 0. (3.19)
Therefore, the reduction in the posterior surprise is related to the belief changes
DKL[π0||qγ] and DKL[qγ||π0] via Eq (3.19). Note that the equality in Eq (3.19) holds
if and only if there is no change in the prior belief, i.e., if qγ =π0. This happens only
if γ= 0 which is equivalent to the full neglect of the new data point in deriving the
posterior belief.
The SMiLe rule for beliefs described by Gaussian distribution.
Suppose we have drawn n−1 samples X1, ...,Xn−1 from a Gaussian distribution of
known variance σ2x , but unknown mean. The empirical mean after n−1 samples is
μˆn−1.
Assume that the current belief about the mean μ is a normal distribution, i.e., π0(μ)∼
N (μˆn−1,σ2n−1). Since the likelihood of receiving a new sample Xn is also normal, i.e.,
p(Xn |μ)∼N (μ,σ2x), the posterior belief obtained by the SMiLe rule [Eq (3.4)] is
qγ(μ) ∝
(
exp
(
− (Xn −μ)
2
2σ2x
))γ (
exp
(
− (μ− μˆn−1)
2
2σ2n−1
))1−γ
∝ exp
(
− (Xn −μ)
2
2(σ′x)2
)
exp
(
− (μ− μˆn−1)
2
2(σ′n−1)2
)
, (3.20)
where (σ′x)2 =σ2x/γ and (σ′n−1)2 =σ2n−1/(1−γ). Because the product of two Gaussians
is a Gaussian, we arrive at a posterior distribution qγ ∼N (μˆn ,σ2n) with the mean μˆn =
wnXn+(1−wn)μˆn−1 (with wn = (σ
′
n−1)
2
(σ′x )2+(σ′n−1)2
), and the varianceσ2n =
(
1
(σ′x )2
+ 1
(σ′n−1)2
)−1
;
see [MacKay, 2003] for the exact derivation. Assuming σ2n−1 =σ2x , then wn = γ. More-
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over, we can evaluate the conﬁdence-corrected surprise to be
Scor r (Xn ;π0)=DKL[N (μˆn−1,σ2n−1)||N (Xn ,σ2x)]=
(Xn − μˆn−1)2
2σ2x
. (3.21)
Note that in Eq (3.21), we used the following equality in Eq (3.22) (assumingσ2x =σ2n−1),
DKL[N (a1,b
2
1)||N (a2,b22)]=
(a1−a2)2
2b22
+ 1
2
(
b21
b22
−1− ln b
2
1
b22
)
. (3.22)
The SMiLe rule for beliefs described by a Dirichlet distribution.
Assume that the current belief about the probability of transition from state s ∈
{1,2, ...,D} to all D−1 possible next states sˇ ∈ {1,2, ...,D}\s is described by a Dirichlet
distribution π0(θs) ∝ Πsˇ θ(s, sˇ)α(s,sˇ)−1 parametrized by αs = α(s, :). Here, θs = θ(s, :)
denotes a vector of random variable θ(s, sˇ) that determines the probability of transi-
tion from s to sˇ, i.e., 0 ≤ θ(s, sˇ) ≤ 1 and ∑sˇ θ(s, sˇ) = 1. The likelihood function for an
occurred transition X : s → s′ is p(X |θs) = θ(s, s′) =Πsˇ θ(s, sˇ)[sˇ=s′], where [.] denotes
the Iverson bracket. Therefore, the posterior belief qγ(θs) obtained by the SMiLe rule
[Eq (3.4)],
qγ(θs)∝
(
Πsˇ θ(s, sˇ)
[sˇ=s′]
)γ
.
(
Πsˇ θ(s, sˇ)
α(s,sˇ)−1
)1−γ∝Πsˇ θ(s, sˇ)β(s,sˇ)−1, (3.23)
is again a Dirichlet distribution parametrized by β(s, sˇ)= (1−γ)α(s, sˇ)+γ(1+ [sˇ = s′]).
The probability Tˆ [t ](s, s′) of transition from s to s′ at time step t is estimated by
Tˆ [t ](s, s′)= α[t ](s,s′)−1+	∑
sˇ (α[t ](s,sˇ)−1+	) , where α[t ](s, sˇ) denotes the updated model parameter at
time step t . Here, 	> 0 is a very small number which prevents the denominator from
being zero.
The online EM algorithm for the maze-exploration task.
The online EM algorithm, presented in [Mongillo and Deneve, 2008], is an estima-
tion algorithm for the unknown parameters of a hidden Markov model (HMM). For
the maze-exploration task we adapted the method presented in [Mongillo and Den-
eve, 2008] such that the transition probability to a new room also depends on the
previously visited room (and not just the current environment). The HMM of the maze-
exploration task consists of two sets of unknown parameters: (i) a set P= [Pi j ]2×2 of
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(unknown) switch probabilities from environment i to j (where we use 1 for environ-
mentA and 2 for environmentB), and (ii) a set T= [Tj ss′]2×16×16 of state transition
probabilities, where Tj ss′ denotes the probability of transition from state s to state s
′
within environment j . The set of all unknown parameters is denoted byΘ≡ (P,T).
At each time step t , we estimate the probability qtl = P (Et = l |s0→t ) of being in en-
vironment Et = l ∈ {1,2}, given all previous state transitions s0→t = {s0, s1, ..., st }. The
probability qtl can be recursively calculated by
qˆ tl =
∑
m
qˆt−1m γ
t
ml , (3.24)
where γtml = P (s
′=st |s=st−1,Et=l )P (Et=l |Et−1=m)
P (s′=st |s0→(t−1)) belongs to a set of auxiliary variables Γ=
[γlh]2×2 that are calculated by the last estimate Θˆt−1 of the model parameters:
γtlh =
Pˆ t−1lh Tˆ
t−1
hst−1st∑
m,n qˆ
t−1
m Pˆ
t−1
mn Tˆ
t−1
nst−1st
. (3.25)
Then, using these auxiliary variables γlh , a setΦ= [φˆi , j ,s,s′,h]2×2×16×16×2 of parameters
is recursively updated:
φˆti , j ,s,s′,h =
∑
l
γtlh
[
(1−η)φˆt−1i , j ,s,s′,l +ηqˆ t−1l Δlhst−1sti j ss′
]
, (3.26)
where Δlhst−1sti j ss′ = δ(i − l )δ( j −h)δ(s− st−1)δ(s′ − st ), δ(.) is the Kronecker delta (i.e., 1
when its argument is zero and 0 otherwise), and η is the learning rate.
Finally, the model parameters are updated by
Pˆ ti j =
∑
s,s′,h φˆ
t
i j ss′h∑
j ,s,s′,h φˆ
t
i j ss′h
; Tˆ tj ss′ =
∑
i ,h φˆ
t
i j ss′h∑
i ,s′,h φˆ
t
i j ss′h
. (3.27)
We emphasize that in order for the online EM algorithm to work properly, some tech-
nical considerations must be respected. For instance, in the beginning of learning,
only online estimation ofΦmust be updated (without updating the model parameters
Θ), so that the estimation error for the ﬁrst 2000 time steps of our simulation (Fig 3.6A,
blue) remains ﬁxed. Moreover, we found that the online EM algorithm works well only
if it is correctly initialized. To make our comparison fair, we assumed the agent “be-
lieves in” frequent transitions between environments by initializing the probabilities
Pˆ0i j that describe the switch between environmentA andB to be very close to true
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ones. Without such an assumption, the online EM takes even more time than what we
reported here to learn the maze-exploration task. The actual initialization values were
Pˆ012 = Pˆ021 = 0.1 while the true values were P12 = P21 = 0.005.
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4 A Biologically Plausible 3-Factor
Learning Rule from Gradient Descent
Optimization
One of the most frequent problems in both decision making and reinforcement learn-
ing (RL) is maximizing an expected quantity involving functionals such as reward
or utility. Generally, these problems consist of computing the optimal solution of a
density function. Instead of trying to ﬁnd this exact solution, a common approach is
to approximate it iteratively through a learning process.
In this work we propose a functional gradient rule for the maximization of a general
form of density-dependent functionals using a stochastic gradient ascent algorithm. If
a neural network is used for parametrization of the desired density function, the pro-
posed learning rule can be viewed as a modulated Hebbian rule. Such a learning rule is
biologically plausible, because it consists of both local and global factors correspond-
ing to the coactivity of pre/post-synaptic neurons and the effect of neuromodulation,
respectively.
We ﬁrst apply our technique to standard reward maximization in RL and a variational
learning problem to show that reward and surprise signals can be interpreted as third
factors in this framework. We then use our functional gradient method to derive an
online rule for the approximation of the SMiLe rule, introduced in Chapter 3. We
implement the aforementioned maze-exploration task in a spiking neural network
using our proposed online rule. We show that the proposed online rule is a covariance
learning rule, where the strength of the connections between the neurons changes as a
function of covariance between the activity of post-synaptic neurons and an estimate
of conﬁdence-corrected surprise.
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4.1 Introduction
Maximizing an expected quantity, is one of the most frequently encountered problems
in both decision making [Janis and Mann, 1977] and reinforcement learning [Sutton
and Barto, 1998b]. It usually implies computing the optimal solution of a density
function. The density might represent a learning agent’s policy in RL, or the likeli-
hood of selecting different choices in a decision making process. We introduce a
functional gradient rule for the maximization of a general form of density-dependent
functionals, such as reward or utility, using a stochastic gradient ascent algorithm. The
resulting learning rule approaches the optimal solution through an iterative process.
This learning rule beneﬁts from biological plausibility if a neural network is used for
parametrization of the desired density function. As we will see below, it is consistent
with a modulated Hebbian learning rule (i.e., 3-factor learning rule) in which both
global and local factors inﬂuence the synaptic connections among the neurons.
We ﬁrst apply our technique to standard reward maximization in RL. As expected,
this yields the standard policy gradient rule [Baxter et al., 2001,Florian, 2007,Peters
and Schaal, 2006,Pﬁster et al., 2006,Williams, 1992,Xie and Seung, 2004,Sutton et al.,
1999], in which parameters of the model are updated proportional to the amount of
reward. Next, we use variational free energy as a functional and ﬁnd that the estimated
change in parameters is modulated by a measure of surprise (the subjective Shannon
surprise Eq. (2.1)). We then apply our technique to the constraint surprise minimiza-
tion problem, introduced in Chapter 3, to approximate the SMiLe rule. It yields an
online rule, in which the estimated change in the parameters is determined by the
covariance of surprise and the activity of the post-synaptic neuron. These examples
demonstrate that reward and surprise can both play the role of global third factors in
the general framework of three-factor learning rules.
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Functional gradient rule: Theory
We apply stochastic gradient ascent to approximate the optimal density function that
maximizes a functional
F[P ]= 〈F [P ]〉P , (4.1)
where 〈.〉P denotes the average with respect to the probability density P (x) of a random
variable x. The term F [P ] might be considered as a general form of reward, utility,
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or surprise function which may itself depend on the density function P . The general
form of the online gradient rule is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (functional gradient rule): The stochastic gradient ascent algorithm for
maximizing the functional F[P ] in Eq. (4.1) over all possible distributionsP parametrized
by θ ∈Rn yields the online learning rule,
Δθ∝ F˜∇θ lnP, (4.2)
where the multiplicative factor F˜ is deﬁned as
F˜ = ∂
∂P
(PF [P ])=F [P ]+ ∂F [P ]
∂ lnP
, (4.3)
evaluated at a sample x = X ∗.
Proof: In order to have an online learning rule for θ ∈Rn , we ﬁrst need to calculate the
gradient ofF [P ] with respect to θ. The exact gradient of the functional in Eq. (4.1) is
∇θ 〈F [P ]〉P =
∫
dx
[
P∇θF [P ]+F [P ]∇θP
]
=
∫
dx
[
P
(
∂F [P ]
∂P
∇θP
)
+F [P ] (P∇θ lnP )
]
= 〈∂F [P ]
∂P
∇θP +F [P ]∇θ lnP〉
P
= 〈∂F [P ]
∂P
(P∇θ lnP )+F [P ]∇θ lnP〉
P
= 〈
(
∂F [P ]
∂P
P +F [P ]
)
∇θ lnP〉
P
= 〈∂ (PF [P ])
∂P
∇θ lnP〉
P
, (4.4)
where we used the equality P∇θ lnP =∇θP in the ﬁrst two lines of derivation above.
In gradient ascent algorithm, the amount of change in the model parameter is in
proportion to the exact gradient. However it might be difﬁcult or intractable to exactly
calculate the gradient. For instance, the exact gradient in Eq. (4.4) is expressed as an
average quantity 〈.〉P which may be difﬁcult to be calculated at each time step. There-
fore, we may replace the exact gradient with an estimate using one or a few samples
drawn from the distribution P . This replacement is the idea behind the stochastic
gradient method. For deriving the online learning rule Eq. (4.2), we replace the exact
gradient with a point-estimate of that quantity to change the model parameters (at
each time step) by a Δθ that fulﬁlls the equation 〈Δθ〉P =∇θF[P ].
Corollary 1: The multiplicative factor F˜ in the learning rule (4.2) can be replaced by
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F˜ +c where c is a constant or a variable that does not depend on x, because
〈(F˜ +c)∇θ lnP〉P = 〈F˜∇θ lnP〉P +c 〈∇θ lnP〉P , (4.5)
and 〈∇θ lnP〉P =
∫
dx P∇θ lnP =
∫
dx ∇θP =∇θ
∫
dx P =∇θ(1)= 0.
Corollary 2: IfF [P ] is linear with respect to lnP , then the multiplier factor F˜ can be
replaced byF . The proof is simply done by using Corollary 1 in (4.3).
Corollary 3: The proposed online stochastic gradient rule (Eq. (4.2)) can be trans-
formed to a covariance learning ruleΔθ∝Cov(F˜ ,∇θ lnP ). This is done by subtracting
a constant c = 〈F˜ 〉P from the third factor (according to Corollary 1), i.e.,
〈Δθ〉P = 〈
(
F˜ −〈F˜ 〉P
)∇θ lnP〉P = 〈F˜∇θ lnP〉P −〈F˜ 〉P 〈∇θ lnP〉P . (4.6)
Cor. 1 - Cor. 3 are generalizations of the policy-gradient method [Baxter et al., 2001].
We want to stress that our proposed learning rule (4.2) can indeed be embedded in
the class of biologically plausible 3-factor learning rules, if a neural network is used
for parametrization. Detailed examples will be shown below, but the two generic
aspects are: (i) the term F˜ represents a globally modulating third factor. We note that
to evaluate F˜ we need information from all neurons in the ensemble. Importantly, we
need to evaluate F˜ only once and this information is then used in the update step
for all neurons; (ii) the term ∇θ lnP represents a local Hebbian term, and depends on
both pre-synaptic and post-synpatic neural activity as shown now.
The two local factors
As an example, we use a population of spiking neurons for learning the density func-
tion P such that the spontaneous activity of the neural population at each time step
represents a sample drawn from that distribution. Importantly, we assume that there
are no “hidden” neurons so that the spike trains of all neurons are observable and
part of the density function P (x). The neuron model that we use here is a generalized
linear model (GLM). This model has the form of a Spike Response Model (SRM) with
escape noise [Pillow et al., 2008, Jolivet et al., 2006]. The membrane potential ui (t ) of
neuron i at time t is given as
ui (t )=
∑
j
wi j (X j ∗φ)(t )+ηi (t ), (4.7)
where wi j is the synaptic efﬁcacy between pre-synaptic neuron j and post-synaptic
neuron i , X j (t )=∑ f δ(t − t fj ) denotes the presynaptic spike train, φ(t ) is the somatic
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Excitatory Post Synaptic Potential (EPSP), and ηi (t) = −η0
∫t
0 ds e
− t−sτa Xi (s) is the
adaptation potential (η0 and τa are constants). The spikes are then generated by
a stochastic Point process using an exponential intensity ρi (t) [Jolivet et al., 2006]
conditioned on the membrane potentials,
ρi (t )= ρ0 exp(ui (t )−θ
ΔU
), (4.8)
where θ and ΔU are physical constants of the neuron. The synaptic efﬁcacies wi j
between neurons are free parameters θ ∈Rn and parametrize P . A set of spike trains
{Xi } generated by all the neurons in a time interval T represents a data sample x.
Therefore, the relative frequency of the occurrence of a given set of spike trains x =
{Xi } compared to all other possible sets of spike trains represents the corresponding
probability density P (x).
The likelihood of a particular spike train x = {Xi } which is observed in the interval
[0,T ] can be written as [Pﬁster et al., 2006,Rezende et al., 2011]
lnP (x)=∑
k
∫T
0
dt [lnρk(t )Xk(t )−ρk(t )], (4.9)
and its gradient with respect to the particular synaptic weight wi j is calculated as
(see [Pﬁster et al., 2006,Rezende et al., 2011,Rezende and Gerstner, 2014] for details)
∇wi j lnP (x)=
1
ΔU
(X j ∗φ)(t ) [Xi (t )−ρi (t )]. (4.10)
Therefore, we conclude that an update of synaptic weights wi j according to gradient
ascent Δwi j ∝∇wi j lnP (x) can be calculated locally and is written as a product of
two local (Hebbian) factors: (X j ∗φ)(t ) which depends on the ﬁring times of the pre-
synaptic neuron j and [Xi (t)−ρi (t)] that depends on the state of the post-synaptic
neuron i . Note that similar derivations can be performed for simpler neuronal models
such as binary neurons without refractoriness [Xie and Seung, 2004].
4.2.2 Functional gradient rule: Applications
The functional online gradient rule of Eq. (4.2) can be applied to a wide range of
learning problems in different contexts. In this section, we ﬁrst review two of the
existing learning algorithms (policy gradient methods and variational learning meth-
ods) and predict how their corresponding online learning rule in a neural network
should look like. We show that our prediction (using the functional gradient rule of
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Eq. (4.2)) is consistent with the existing models that have been used for the neural
implementation of such learning methods.
We then apply our technique to the constraint surprise minimization problem, from
which the SMiLe rule was derived, to provide an appropriate online rule for the neural
implementation of the surprise belief update algorithm. In Section 4.3 we will use
that online rule in a spiking neural network to simulate the aforementioned maze-
exploration task in a neural system.
Policy gradient (review)
Reward maximization in the context of reinforcement learning is formulated as ﬁnding
an action policy π(a|s) that maximizes the expected reward 〈R(s,a)〉π(a|s) f (s), where
R(s,a) denotes the reward for taking action a in state s and f (s) is the density function
of state space. Policy gradient methods [Baxter et al., 2001,Florian, 2007,Peters and
Schaal, 2006, Pﬁster et al., 2006,Williams, 1992, Xie and Seung, 2004, Sutton et al.,
1999] are well-established iterative algorithms to address the reward maximization
problems. They iteratively learn the optimal action policy π(a|s) by modifying the
model parameters in the direction of the gradient of the expected reward function
〈R(s,a)〉π(a|s) f (s) with respect to the corresponding parameters.
Policy gradient methods have been applied to spiking neural networks [Pﬁster et al.,
2006,Florian, 2007,Xie and Seung, 2004,Vasilaki et al., 2009]. To keep things simple,
we assume that the state s of the environment and the action a that the agent chooses
are respectively determined by the spike trains of place cells and action cells as two
separate neuronal populations. The synaptic weights wi j between the place cells
j and the action cells i are then used as free parameters that encode the action
policy π(a|s). Policy gradient method for the network of spiking neurons suggests
reward maximization (also known as R-max [Frémaux et al., 2010]) learning rule that
is generally expressed as (see [Pﬁster et al., 2006,Vasilaki et al., 2009] for the details of
derivation)
dei j
d t
= −ei j
τ
+ (X j ∗φ)(t ) [Xi (t )−ρi (t )], (4.11)
dwi j
d t
= η(R(t )−b)ei j (t ). (4.12)
R-max learning rule in Eqs. (4.11),(4.12) is an example of three-factor learning rule. The
eligibility trace ei j [Sutton and Barto, 1998b] deﬁned as a low-pass ﬁlter of co-activity
between neurons j and i combines the two local Hebbian factors. The success signal
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R(t )−b modulates the direction and speed of weight update. The constant baseline b
in the success signal R(t )−b is often replaced by the average reward R¯ [Frémaux et al.,
2010].
We emphasize again that the amount of change in wi j (Eq. (4.12)) does not only
depend on the local Hebbian factors (i.e., the eligibility trace ei j ), but it also depends
on the reward R(t ) delivered at time t . This is consistent with the functional gradient
rule (Theorem 1) in combination with Eq. (4.10), which predict that the change in the
model parameters should have the following form:
Δwi j ∝ (R±c) ∇wi j lnπ
(4.10)= (R±c) (X j ∗φ)(t ) [Xi (t )−ρi (t )]. (4.13)
Note that for maximizing the expected reward 〈R(s,a)〉π(a|s) f (s), the third factor F˜
[Eq. (4.3)] may be equal to R :=R(s,a) or R±c because the reward does not explicitly
depend on the policy π (and the model parameters wi j ) and so F˜ =F (according to
Corollary 2) or F˜ =F±c (according to Corollary 1). The shift by an arbitrary amount
c is a well-known result for policy gradient rules [Baxter et al., 2001,Sutton et al., 1999]
Variational learning (review)
Variational methods are typically used in complex statistical models which are de-
ﬁned by a joint distribution p(v,h) over a set of observed (visible) variables v and
latent (hidden) variables h. The joint distribution p can be interpreted as a generative
model for the input statistics p(v) governed by some adaptive parameters θ ∈ Rn .
Variational methods are used in machine learning to approach two important aims:
ﬁrst, to analytically approximate the posterior distribution p(h|v) of hidden variables
(for statistical inference over them); second to derive a lower bound for a marginal
likelihood p(v)=∑h p(v,h) of the visible variables (usually for model selection). We
focus on this second aim. A computationally tractable lower boundL (q ;w,θ) for the
marginal likelihood p(v) of the visible variables is calculated by using an auxiliary
distribution q(h|v):
lnp(v) = ln∑
h
p(v,h)= ln∑
h
q(h|v) p(v,h)
q(h|v)
≥ ∑
h
q(h|v) ln p(v,h)
q(h|v) :=L (q ;w,θ), (4.14)
where we have applied Jensen’s inequality. Here w ∈Rm denotes adaptive parameters
used for expressing q(h|v). The difference between the true log likelihood lnp(v) and
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its approximated lower boundL (q ;w,θ) is
lnp(v)−L (q ;w,θ)=∑
h
q(h|v) ln q(h|v)
p(h|v) :=DKL(q||p). (4.15)
Therefore, maximizing the lower boundL (q ;w,θ) with respect to w is equivalent to
minimizing the Kullback-Leibler divergence DKL(q||p) between the true posterior
distribution p(h|v) and the approximated one q(h|v). The lower bound L (q ;w,θ)
is known as (negative) variational free energy F[q ;v] in statistical learning [MacKay,
2003] and can be expressed as
F[q ;v]=−L (q ;w,θ)= 〈− lnp(v,h)〉q −H(q)= 〈− lnp(v,h)+ lnq(h|v)〉q . (4.16)
The variational free energy F[q ;v], for a given observed sample v , is an estimate of
the Shannon surprise SSh(v)=− ln
∫
h p(v,h)dh =− lnp(v) [Eq. (2.1)] [Friston, 2010].
Therefore, it indicates how surprising a new observed sample v is perceived for a
subject whose internal model of the external world is modeled by a generative model
p(v,h) and an auxiliary distribution q(h|v).
Let us now relate the above results to our Theorem 1 [Eqs. (4.2), (4.3)]. We can ex-
press the variational free energy F[q ;v] as an expected quantity 〈F [q ;v]〉q , where
F [q ;v]=− lnp(v,h)+ lnq(h|v). We introduce weights w which parametrize the dis-
tribution q(h|v). Therefore we can apply our technique for approximating the optimal
solution. The online learning rule, suggested by Theorem 1, for variational free energy
minimization is then given by
Δw ∝−(F ±c)∇w lnq, (4.17)
where the minus sign arises because of the minimization. Here F =F [q ;v] is the
point-estimate of free energy for the observed sample v : note that the modulation
factor F in Eq. (4.17) is − lnp(v,h)+ lnq(h|v) evaluated at a randomly sampled h
from q(h|v). According to Corollary 2, the multiplicative factor F˜ in Eq. (4.2) is equal
toF [q ;v] sinceF [q ;v] is linear in lnq .
The learning rule Eq. (4.17) suggests that the amount of change in model parameters
w is proportional to an estimate of the Shannon surprise SSh(v). In other words, the
surprise signal measured as the instantaneous free energy (an estimate of the Shannon
surprise) modulates the learning rate such that more surprising samples v result in a
larger change in model parameters. A practical example of this technique has been
reported in [Rezende and Gerstner, 2014], where the same quantity as in Eq. (4.10) is
used for the Hebbian term and the third factor is considered to be a novelty-related
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signal e(t )=F −F , consistent with what we suggested in Eq. (4.17).
Surprise minimization
In Chapter 3, we derived the posterior belief qγ(θ) from the SMiLe rule [Eq. (3.4)] as a
solution to the constraint surprise minimization problem in Eq. (3.3). As before, given
a data sample X , we deﬁne the objective function to be the conﬁdence-corrected sur-
prise Scor r (X ;q)=DKL[q(θ)||pˆX (θ)] of the data sample X , under a parametrized belief
q(θ) about the latent variables θ. Before observing X , we have q(θ) = π0(θ), where
π0(θ) is the current belief about the model parameters, built from previous samples. If
we minimize the above objective function under the constraint DKL[q(θ)||π0(θ)]≤B ,
we will have q(θ)= qγ(θ) [Eq. (3.4)].
Instead of solving for the exact solution, we can approximate it iteratively using
stochastic gradient descent on the following Lagrangian:
L[q] = DKL[q(θ)||pˆX (θ)]+ 1
λ
(
DKL[q(θ)||π0(θ)]−B
)−λ′ (∫
θ
q(θ)dθ−1
)
= 〈lnq(θ)− ln pˆX (θ)+ 1
λ
ln
q(θ)
π0(θ)
−λ′〉
q
− B
λ
+λ′, (4.18)
where 1λ is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint on bound B , and λ
′ is the La-
grange multiplier for constraint on q(θ) to be a probability density function that
integrates to 1. We expressed the ﬁrst Lagrange multiplier as 1λ (and not λ) just to
be consistent with our notation in Chapter 3 (see Eq. (3.9)). We emphasize that the
Lagrangian Eq. (4.18) is expressed for a single data sample X , and not an average (or
summation) over a set of data samples.
We now apply Theorem 1 and ﬁnd an update Δw for the parameters w that control
the current belief:
Δw =−η(F [q]±c)∇w lnq. (4.19)
The third factorF [q] in Eq. (4.19) is equal to
F [q]= lnq(θ)− ln pˆX (θ)+ 1
λ
ln
q(θ)
π0(θ)
. (4.20)
The third factor F [q] in Eq. (4.20) consists of three terms. The ﬁrst two terms (i.e.,
lnq(θ)− ln pˆX (θ)) quantify a point-estimate of the conﬁdence-corrected surprise
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(using a sample θ from the latent variable space), and the third term 1
λ
ln q(θ)
π0(θ)
controls
the stickiness of the model parameters to its previous values. The degree of stickiness
is determined by the Lagrange multiplier 1
λ
.
Note that in Eqs. (4.19) and (4.20), q(θ) is not the updated belief, which is obtained
only after updating w using Eq. (4.19). We can think of q(θ) as the current approximate
of the posterior belief after the data sample X is observed. Therefore, one could also
replace q(θ) withπ0(θ) (as the initial guess for the posterior belief) and update w using
the online rule Eq. (4.19). Such as assumption simpliﬁes all the above derivations.
Note that in all expressions above, we can replace the scaled likelihood pˆX (θ) with the
likelihood p(X |θ)= pˆX (θ)
(∫′
θ p(X |θ′)dθ′
)
, because they differ only in a multiplicative
factor
∫′
θ p(X |θ′)dθ′ which does not depend on θ and is absorbed during normaliza-
tion. We emphasize again that since the Lagrangian Eq. (4.18) is expressed for a single
data sample X , the scale factor
∫′
θ p(X |θ′)dθ′ is a constant. We can further add other
constant terms to the online rule to ensure that it works in practice.
4.3 Neural implementation of the SMiLe rule
4.3.1 Neural network model
We propose a neural network model that can be used for the neural implementa-
tion of the maze-exploration task, introduced in Chapter 3. Our model consists of a
recognition network and a prediction network (see Fig. 4.1).
Recognition network
The recognition network is a two-layer feed-forward spiking network whose aim is
to correctly recognize the room from which environmental inputs are received. The
input layer consists of 784 neurons whose activities y j , j ∈ {1, ...,784} stand for the
neural representation of the environmental inputs (sensory cues). The output layer
consists of 16 excitatory neurons corresponding to 16 available rooms. Given an input
vectory (a sensory stimulus from the current room), only one of the output neurons
k ∈ {1, ...,16} is allowed to be active in a time step. We imagine this to be neurally
implemented by a winner-take-all (WTA) framework. This neuron determines the
most likely room that the agent visits at that time. Such WTA assumption provides
computational beneﬁts for the neural implementation of Bayesian modeling and
simpliﬁes analysis of such neural networks [Nessler et al., 2013,Kappel et al., 2014].
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Figure 4.1 – Neural network model for the maze exploration task. A. The model con-
sists of a recognition and a prediction network as well as a sub-network M evaluating
surprise. The neural representation of the current state st is given as binary input
vectorsy . One of the neurons in the output layer of the recognition network responds
and indicates to which state that input belongs. The previously visited state is recalled
by working memory (WM) which clamps one neuron (orange) in the ﬁrst layer of the
prediction network to the active state. The agent’s model about state transition prob-
abilities q(s′|s) is encoded in synaptic strengths of the prediction network. Multiple
samples (red) are selected via a soft-max spiking probability rule and communicate
information to a modulatory sub-network M (green). Once surprise is calculated by
M , the global signal is propagated through the network and affects plasticity in the
prediction model. In both recognition and prediction networks a WTA framework is
employed using an abstract inhibitory neuron (magenta). B. Time schedule of net-
work operation during the time spent in a state (lasting for 5 seconds). Once the agent
enters a state, the recognition phase starts. Then it starts predicting the next states
until the surprise is calculated (at the end of prediction phase). The recognition and
the prediction phases could also be in parallel. By release of the global modulatory
surprise signal, synaptic strengths change during an update phase. Excess time re-
maining before entering the next state may be used by the agent for consolidation or
advance prediction of the next visited state.
We consider a simpliﬁed Spike Response Model for the neurons in the output layer
of the recognition model, where the instantaneous ﬁring rate vk = exp(uk) of each
neuron k is exponentially linked to its membrane potential uk = Ek − I . Here, Ek =∑
j wk j y j denotes the total excitatory input received by neuron k and I is the common
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inhibitory input to all neurons k ∈ {1, ...,16} in the output layer. Following [Nessler et al.,
2013], inhibitory neurons are not modeled explicitly but calculated algorithmically as
I = ln∑
k
eEk . (4.21)
Such an assumption results in soft-max spiking probability rule vk = e
Ek∑
k e
Ek
and nor-
malization of the ﬁring rates, i.e.,
∑
k vk = 1 (see [Nessler et al., 2013, Kappel et al.,
2014]). The aim of learning in the recognition model is to modify the synaptic strengths
between the neurons such that the agent correctly recognizes the room from which
environmental inputs are received. We use the following online Hebbian rule (derived
from Likelihood maximization) to learn the recognition model (see Materials and
Methods for derivation):
Δwk j = ηδkk∗(y j −ewk j ). (4.22)
Here y j is the state of the presynaptic neuron, δkk∗ denotes Kronecker delta function
and k∗ indicates the index of winner neuron in the WTA network of the output layer
of the recognition network. The online rule Eq. (4.22) has a simple interpretation. If
the post-synaptic neuron k is inactive, the strength of none of its afferent synapses
change. If the post-synaptic and pre-synaptic neurons are both active, then LTP occurs.
Otherwise (i.e., if only post-synaptic neuron is active) LTD occurs. The term ewi j in
Eq. (4.22) stands for heterosynaptic plasticity that is naturally derived as a result of
normalization. The online rule Eq. (4.22) enables our recognition network to correctly
learn the association between the environmental inputs and their corresponding
sources that generated them (see Fig. 4.2). The rule Eq. (4.22) is identical to that of
Nessler et al. [Nessler et al., 2013], but our derivation is more direct (see Materials
and Methods). After learning, a neuron with index k codes for a state (or room) s and
another neuron k˜ for a different state s˜. The neuron k in the recognition network is
linked (via a working memory) to a neuron with index s in the prediction network.
Prediction network
The prediction network is also a two-layer feed-forward network but with 16 neurons
in each layer. The activity of the input layer of this network is driven by working
memory (see Fig. 4.1). Working memory recalls the last visited room and enforces
neuron s to be the only active neuron at time t in the ﬁrst layer of the prediction
network, if room k was visited at time t −1. The activity of the output layer is then
driven by neuron s. A neuron with index s′ in the output layer of the prediction network
indicates a state that is predicted to be visited in the next time step. The agent’s belief
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Figure 4.2 – Inputs and outputs of the recognition network before and after learn-
ing. A. An example of noisy environmental inputs the agent receives from state 2
(top) and state 11 (bottom). The majority (= 1516 ×784) of entries of an input vectory
(visualized as 28×28 square) are independently and identically drawn from a binomial
distribution with probability of generating a black pixel equal to 0.1. The remaining
entries correspond to the spatial position of the current state and have a black pixel
with probability 0.9. The indices of the pixels are randomly shufﬂed in input vectory .
B. The raster plot (spiking activity) of the input and output neurons in the recognition
model before and after learning. After the network learns the hidden statistical struc-
ture of the input data set, a unique neuron is assigned to the class of input vectors that
are generated by a same source corresponding to a particular state (“room”). After
learning, the network correctly recognizes the state from which an input vector is
presented to the network.
about the state transition probabilities is modeled by synaptic weights ws′s between
the two layers. Note that our prediction network also uses a WTA framework to ensure
that at each time step, only one neuron in each layer remains active. The WTA of the
prediction network is implemented analogously to that of recognition network.
In the prediction network, we use the same neuronal model as in the recognition
network, i.e., a simpliﬁed Spike Response Model, where the instantaneous ﬁring rate
vs′ = exp(us′) of each neuron s′ is exponentially linked to its membrane potential us′ =
Es′ − I , with Es′ =
∑
s ws′sδsst−1 =ws′st−1 and I = ln
∑
s′ e
Es′ = ln∑s′ ews′st−1 . Note that in
above equations, we assumed that the synaptic weights in the recognition network
have converged to their stationary values, and the recognition network is now capable
of correctly recognizing the current state, given environmental inputs. Therefore, the
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state that is recalled from working memory at time t indeed corresponds to previously
visited state st−1. The same assumption will be used in following derivations.
We introduce a surprise-related modulatory signal M(s′, st ) expressed as
M(s′, st )=ws′st−1 − ln (1+δs′st )+
1
mS(X )
(ws′st−1 −wolds′st−1), (4.23)
where s′ denotes a predicted next state (using the prediction network with parameters
ws′s), given the last visited state was st−1. The probability of predicting s′ as the
next state is determined by the current model qt−1(s′), and is equal to e
ws′st−1 . The
modulatory signal M(s′, st ) in Eq. (4.23) depends on whether the predicted state s′
is the same as the real visited state st via δs′st . Therefore, it is linked to a notion of
prediction error signal.
The ﬁrst two terms (i.e., ws′st−1 − ln (1+δs′st )) in the modulatory expression M(s′, st )
[Eq. (4.23)], in fact, quantiﬁes a point-estimate of the conﬁdence-corrected surprise
(i.e., 〈lnq(θ)− ln pˆX (θ)〉q(θ) in Eq. (4.20), where q is expressed in terms of synaptic
weights wss′). The third term
1
mS(X ) (ws′st−1 −wolds′st−1) controls the stickiness of the
model parameters at their previous values. The degree of stickiness is determined
by the surprise S(X ) of the most recent state transition X : st−1 → st , such that if X
is more surprising than X ′, then the updated belief moves more towards pˆX (θ) after
observing X than after observing X ′.
We emphasize that S(X ) stands for “prior” surprise (i.e., the surprise of data sample X
before the model is updated). In derivation of the SMiLe rule in Chapter 3, however, we
minimized “posterior” surprise (i.e., the surprise of data sample X after belief update)
with a constraint that was linked to the “prior” surprise S(X ). Therefore, we can ignore
any dependency between S(X ) and current model parameters ws′s (i.e.,
∂S(X )
∂ws′s
= 0).
The plasticity rule that we use in the prediction model is derived by applying stochastic
gradient descent to the Lagrangian Eq. (4.18). We emphasize that the functional
Eq. (4.18) is expressed for a “single” data sample X , and not an average over a set of
data samples. The online rule (see Materials and Methods for derivation) is analogous
to Eq. (4.19):
Δws′′s = ηδsst−1
(
〈M(s′, st )δs′s′′ 〉q(s′)−〈M(s′, st )〉q(s′) 〈δs′s′′ 〉q(s′)
)
. (4.24)
The online rule Eq. (4.24) is a covariance learning rule (see Corollary 3) in which the
strength ws′′s of connection between the pre-synaptic neuron s ∈ {1, ...,16} and the
post-synaptic neuron s′′ ∈ {1, ...,16} changes as a function of covariance between the
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activity of the post-synaptic neuron (i.e., δs′s′′) and the surprise-related modulatory
signal M(s′, st ), where covariance is approximated by averaging over multiple pre-
dicted states s′. Note that the online rule Eq. (4.24) also depends on the activity of the
presynaptic neuron s via δsst−1 , indicating that only the efferent synapses of neuron
s = st−1 that is activated by working memory are under the inﬂuence of the online rule
Eq. (4.24) at time t .
Surprise-related sub-network
The online rule Eq. (4.24) requires a covariance term to be approximated. Therefore
modules in our neural network need to calculate three separate quantities: (1) a
correlation term 〈M(s′, st )δs′s′′ 〉q , (2) an estimate of the ﬁring rate 〈δs′s′′ 〉q of each
neuron s′′, and (3) the average modulatory signal 〈M(s′, st )〉q . While the ﬁrst two
quantities are neuron-speciﬁc parameters, the third one does not depend on the
post-synaptic neuron s′′. In what follows we explain how these three quantities can be
implemented by artiﬁcial neurons.
When neuron s = st−1 in the ﬁrst layer of the prediction network is clamped to be
active, multiple samples s′ are drawn from the second layer using the current model
q(s′). Whenever a neuron is active, it sends a signal to the modulatory sub-network M
(see Fig.4.1). A signal from M is fed back to the prediction network, but it only affects
the presently active neuron s′. Note that at each time step, only one of the neurons
in the second layer becomes active (because of WTA). Once a neuron s′ ﬁres, three
neuron-speciﬁc traces e1(s′),e2(s′), and e3(s′) as well as a modulatory trace e(M) will
be updated according to the following rules (see also Fig. 4.3)
e˙1(s
′) = −e1(s
′)
τb
+ ∑
t f (s′)∈Tp
δ(t − t f (s′)) (4.25)
e˙2(s
′) = −e2(s
′)
τs
+ ∑
t f (s′)∈Tp
δ(t − t f (s′)) (4.26)
e˙3(s
′) = −e3(s
′)
τb
+e2(s′)M(s′, st )
∑
t f (s′)∈Tp
δ(t − t f (s′)−dt ) (4.27)
e˙(M) = −e(M)
τb
+∑
s′
e2(s
′)M(s′, st )
∑
t f (s′)∈Tp
δ(t − t f (s′)). (4.28)
The trace e1(s′) in Eq. (4.25) approximates the ﬁring rate of neuron s′ during the
prediction phase (in a time interval Tp), with a long time constant τb . On a short time
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scale τs , the trace e2(s′) in Eq. (4.26) tags the currently active neuron to ensure that the
“global” feedback M(s′, st ) only affects the tagged neuron s′. We assume that e2(s′) has
a very small time constant τs and decays back to zero before the next sample appears.
The third trace e3(s′) in Eq. (4.27) estimates the correlation term 〈M(s˜, st )δs˜s′ 〉q(s˜) for
neuron s′ using multiple samples s˜. The time delay dt in Eq. (4.27) is because of the
delay in receiving the feedback from the modulatory sub-network M . Note that the
ﬁrst and the the third traces e1(s′) and e3(s′) have big time constant τb >> τs and act
as integrators. Finally, the trace e(M) in Eq. (4.28) integrates M(s′, st ) over all samples
s′. We emphasize that during prediction phase, the subnetwork M ﬁres whenever any
neuron s′ in the second layer ﬁres. At the end of the prediction phase, all the local
traces e1(s′),e2(s′),e3(s′) [Eqs. (4.25)-(4.27)], as well as the global trace e(M) [Eq. (4.28)]
will be used for updating the model parameters, i.e., the synaptic strengths. Upon
presentation of the next state, all traces will reset to zero.
The online rule Eq. (4.24), therefore, can be transformed to
Δws′′s = ηδsst−1
(
e3(s
′′)−e(M)e1(s′′)
)
. (4.29)
Three-cycle regime
We assume that the time spent in each room (i.e., the time between visiting st−1 and st )
is 5 seconds. This time will be further divided into 4 smaller time duration as follows
(see Fig. 4.1). Once the agent enters a room, it takes some time to recognize what
the state st is (the recognition phase). Then the last visited state st−1 is recalled from
working memory, and the agent starts thinking about those states that were most likely
to be visited at time t . This phase is called prediction phase during which neuron st−1
is clamped to be active in the ﬁrst layer of the prediction network and multiple sample
states s′ are drawn from the second layer according to the soft-max spiking probability
rule. Neurons s′ leave traces when they ﬁre. Surprise of the observed state transition
st−1 → st is then calculated by a modulatory trace e(M) in the sub-network M . Note
that there is a non-plastic 1-to-1 connection from any neuron s′ to modulatory sub-
neuron M , such that M ﬁres whenever a neuron in the second layer of the prediction
neuron ﬁres.
Once surprise is calculated (at the end of the prediction phase), the synaptic strengths
will be ready to change. The strength ws′′s of each synaptic connection in the pre-
diction network is then modiﬁed using both local factors (presynaptic activity δsst−1 ,
and post-synaptic traces e1(s′′),e3(s′′)) and global factors (modulatory trace e(M) and
learning rate η) according to Eq. (4.29). All synaptic changes occur during the update
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Figure 4.3 – Local and global traces required for plasticity. A. Each one of the states s′
is equipped with three local traces. The ﬁrst trace (blue) estimates the ﬁring rate of the
neuron by integrating over the spike train (orange) of the neuron. The second trace has
a very fast decay and is used to ensure that at the time of feedback from the modulatory
sub-network M , the only neuron that is affected by that feedback is the one that is
recently ﬁred. The third trace approximates the correlation term between the activity
of the post-synaptic neuron and the modulatory signal M(s′, st ). B. The modulatory
sub-network M ﬁres whenever one of the neurons in the second layer of the prediction
network (e.g., s′ or s′′) ﬁres. The trace e(M) increases by M(s′, st ) whenever neuron
s′ ﬁres and it increases by M(s′′, st ) whenever neuron s′′ ﬁres. Therefore, the change
size at each time step is different and depends on the neuron that has just ﬁred in the
prediction network.
phase. After these three phases (i.e., recognition, prediction, and update phases) the
agent may still have some excess time that can be used for the consolidation of the
recent updates or for developing a prior expectation of what it may visit as next time.
But these ideas have not been implemented. Note that whether the network is in the
phase of recognition, prediction, or update can be determined by a background signal
that controls the timing of regimes in which the network operates (like a three-cycle
clock).
4.3.2 Simulation results
The setting of the maze exploration we neurally simulate is exactly the same as in
Chapter 3. We use the exact parameters as before to generate the same sequence of
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states that had been visited by the agent in our previous simulation. However, in the
neural network implementation of this task, the agent is not aware of the exact state,
and it has to recognize the true state using the recognition network.
As described earlier, each time step between states st−1 and st is divided into recog-
nition, prediction, and update phases. Once the agent enters state st and during
recognition phase, 50 input vectors y ∈R784 are randomly generated and given to the
recognition network (see Fig. 4.2). These vectors correspond to the neural representa-
tion of the sensory cues within state st . In the early phase of learning, the recognition
network does not perform well. However, as time goes by, the network becomes capa-
ble of recognizing the true state (the current room) by assigning a unique neuron k to
the set of all input vectors that are generated by the same source (see Fig. 4.2).
During the prediction phase, the previous state is ﬁrst recalled from working memory
and its corresponding neuron is clamped to be the only active neuron in the ﬁrst layer
of the prediction model. Then we sample 10 times from the prediction network, where
at each time one of the neurons s′ ∈ {1, ...,16} can be selected (according to the soft-
max spiking probability, discussed earlier). Fig. 4.3 depicts a schematic representation
of traces obtained at the end of prediction phase.
The estimation error in the model parameters is depicted in Fig. 4.4 indicating that
the neural network quickly adapts to the parameters of the new environment once
a switch occurs. Our estimation error graphs are similar to Fig. 3.4 in Chapter 3. The
surprise-related modulatory signal M(s′, st ) averaged over multiple samples using
current model q(s′) responds to unexpected switch points (see Fig. 4.4).
To analyze the sensitivity of network performance to the number of samples at each
state, we simulated the network with two different settings. In the ﬁrst setting, we
reduced the number of samples in the recognition network to 1. This increases the time
required for the recognition network to learn the state (room) given the one sensory
input vectory . As such the network does not perform well (see Fig. 4.5A). In the second
setting, we reduced the number of samples in the prediction network to 1. Here the
recognition network quickly learns the statistical structure of the feature space, but
using online rule Eq. (4.24) the prediction network cannot learn at all, because when
only one s∗ is sampled as the predicted next state (in the second layer of the prediction
network), then Δws′s = 0 for all s′ in the second layer (Fig. 4.5B). To resolve this issue
(when there is only one sample s∗ in the prediction network), we suggest to replace
the online rule Eq. (4.24) with a learning rule of the form pre.post .(M −M), where
post = 〈δs′s′′ 〉q(s′) = ews′′s is explicitly linked to the synaptic strengths ws′′s . Fig. 4.5C
shows that using this online rule, the network now starts learning but still it does
not perform very well. Therefore, a sufﬁcient number of samples in both recognition
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Time(s) 
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Figure 4.4 – The estimation error and the modulatory signal in spiking network
during maze-exploration task A. The normalized estimation error EA and EB when
the estimated probabilities are compared with the true parameters in environmentA
(black) and in environmentB (yellow). The red bars indicate the time steps the agent
stays in environmentA . All the setting parameters are chosen as before (see details
of the maze-exploration task in Chapter 3). During 5 seconds of staying in a given
state (room), the number of samples for the recognition and the prediction networks
are selected as 50, and 10, respectively. The estimation error EA during exploration
of environment A decreases and then it starts increasing when the agent enters
the environmentB B. The average modulatory signal M = 〈M(s′, st )〉q(s′) [Eq. (4.23)]
(green) which depends on the point-estimate of surprise (but, is not exactly the same
as surprise) increases at switch points.
network and prediction network is necessary for the neural network to work properly.
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Figure 4.5 – The effect of number of samples in the recognition network and the pre-
diction network on the learning performance The estimation errors EA (black) and
EB (yellow) during maze exploration are depicted. A. When the number of samples in
the recognition network is set to 1, the network requires much more time than before
to correctly recognize the visited state given one environmental input. Therefore, no
learning happens in the early phase of simulation. B. If the number of samples for the
prediction network is reduced to 1, then Eq. (4.24) implies no change in all synaptic
strengths. This is because for (the “only”) sampled state s∗ in the prediction network,
Δws′′s ∝ M(s∗, st )−< M(s′, st )>= 0 and for all other states s′′ = s∗ we have δs′s′′ = 0
(see Eq. (4.24)). The estimation errors EA (black) and EB (yellow) coincide. C. For the
case of “one sample” in the prediction network, learning can be (partially) recovered if
the online rule is changed to the form of pre.post .(M −M), where we directly express
the ﬁring rate post =< δs′′s′ >q(s′) of neuron s′′ as the probability of that neuron to ﬁre,
i.e., post = ews′′s .
4.4 Discussion
We proposed a general framework for approximating the exact solution of a functional
that is expressed as an average quantity. The proposed learning rule is derived from
stochastic gradient ascent and has the form of a 3-factor learning rule. The proposed
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online rule depends on both local Hebbian factors as well as global modulatory factors,
if a neural network is used for learning. As such it beneﬁts from a certain degree of
biological plausibility and can be applied to various neural network models.
We showed that well-known existing learning methods such as policy gradient and
variational learning fall into this general class of 3-factor learning rules. We further
applied our model to the same functional from which the SMiLe rule was derived,
and showed that it is transformed to a covariance learning rule. We used that learning
rule in a spiking neural network to demonstrate that the SMiLe rule can be neurally
implemented.
Maximum likelihood estimate as minimization of the Shannon surprise
Maximum likelihood is often used to ﬁnd the most likely model under which a set
of observed input samples/vectors could have been generated by that model. In this
method we usually maximize a sum over the log-likelihood of data samples. This is in
fact a variant of surprise minimization technique in which the aim of learning is to
ﬁnd a set of parameters under which the observed input samples on average become
less surprising than before. The surprise function that is used in maximum likelihood
method is the subjective Shannon surprise Eq. (2.1).
Applying stochastic gradient descent for likelihood maximization results in deriving a
pure Hebbian online rule. An example was Eq. (4.22) used for training the recognition
network. However, if we replace the subjective Shannon surprise by our conﬁdence-
corrected surprise, then the online rule becomes a covariance learning rule. In other
words, if we apply stochastic gradient on the latter we derive an online rule similar
to Eq. (4.24), except that the modulatory term M(s′, st ) [Eq. (4.23)] becomes only the
point-estimate of the conﬁdence-corrected surprise, i.e., lnq(θ)− ln pˆX (θ) without
additional term that controls the stickiness of the model parameters i.e., 1
λ
ln q(θ)
π0(θ)
(see
Eq. (4.20)). Using conﬁdence-corrected surprise opens a gate to a series of covariance
online rules that are driven by a surprise-related signal.
Estimation of the covariance rule
The online rule Eq. (4.24) is a covariance learning rule. For the neural implementa-
tion of the maze-exploration task we approximated the covariance using multiple
samples randomly drawn from the network. Alternatively, one could approximate the
covariance using only one sample. The resulting learning rule would be a modulated
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Hebbian rule of the following form
Δws′′s = ηδst−1sM(s∗, st )(δs′′s∗ −ews′′s ), (4.30)
where s∗ denotes the only sampled state. Although the learning rule above is not
capable of learning the maze-exploration task (see Fig. 4.5), it represents a general
form of modulated Hebbian rules in which the modulatory factor is the point-estimate
of the conﬁdence-corrected surprise where it is approximated only by one sample s∗.
Another extreme case for the implementation of the covariance rule Eq. (4.24) is to
analytically calculate the covariance term. This is equivalent to the case in which all
states s′ had the chance of being sampled with the correct probability. This method
results in an online rule of the following form
Δws′′s = ηδst−1s 〈δs′′s′ 〉q(s′)
(
M(s′′, st )−〈M(s′, st )〉q(s′)
)
, (4.31)
where 〈δs′′s′ 〉q(s′) = ews′′s represents the ﬁring rate of post-synaptic neuron.
In other words the covariance rule in Eq. (4.24) has a form of pre.(post −post ).(M −
M), but the two most extreme cases for approximation of the covariance (i.e., one-
sample-based approximation Eq. (4.30) and many-sample-based approximation
Eq. (4.31)) have the online forms M .pre.(post − post) and pre.post .(M −M), re-
spectively. All proposed learning rules above can be considered as variants of 3-factor
learning rules.
Relation to a generalized theory of expected utility maximization
Inspired by our method for maximizing a density-dependent functional, we also
propose (in Appendix B) an information theoretical equivalent of existing models in
expected utility maximization, as a standard model of decision making, to incorporate
both individual preferences and choice variability. We then show that its exact solution
(as the optimal decision making policy) can also be approximated by our functional
gradient rule through an online three-factor learning rule.
Learning associations with a novelty signal
In the neural network that we proposed for the recognition network, we assumed
that the number of rooms is known for the agent. Therefore, the only thing that the
recognition network has to learn is the association between the environmental inputs
and the current room (state). In reality, however, the agent does not know the exact
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number of rooms and it requires to form new memories once a new room is visited
for the ﬁrst time. We can imagine this problem as a clustering task, where the number
of clusters is unknown for the agent. Inspired by the Adaptive Resonance Theory
(ART) [Carpenter and Grossberg, 1988], we propose a model in Appendix C that uses
a neurally computed novelty signal to enable the agent to add more clusters whenever
it judges an input sample to be novel.
The proposed model requires making a decision about whether an input sample is
novel or not. If the new sample is “sufﬁciently” different from the previous samples,
then the new sample is considered to be novel. The problem is then to determine
a threshold that indicates the border between the class of familiar samples and the
novel samples. In Appendix D, we discuss this problem, but in a different context.
We propose a theoretical argument that explains why it is difﬁcult for a Bayesian
critic (in the context of reinforcement learning) to distinguish similar tasks. Our
analysis provides a preliminary hypothesis about the existence of an optimal Bayesian
threshold that may determine the border of novelty and familiarity.
4.5 Materials and Methods
Derivation of the online rule for the recognition model
Environmental inputs that the agent receives from rooms are neurally represented as
an ensemble of binary vectors {y(a)}. We assume that these vectors encode several
environmental features, where each feature uses a 1-out-of-n code. For example if
feature number 3 takes the second out of 5 possibilities we would write (0,1,0,0,0) to
encode that particular feature. Feature number 3 may correspond to the color of a cue
that may take one of 5 possibilities of being blue, red, green, yellow, or black. In the
above example, the cue is red. We assume that each input vectory encodes m features
(e.g., color, shape, size, etc.). Therefore, each y is a binary vector with mn entries,
where m entries are equal to 1 and the rest of entries are equal to 0. This assumption
helps us to easily derive the online learning rule by which we can solve unsupervised
clustering tasks [Nessler et al., 2013]. The following paraghraph follows unpublished
notes of W. Gerstner “Local learning rules for a generative model: Remarks on a paper
of Nessler, Pfeiffer and Maass”.
We assume that the inputs are generated by a mixture of multinomial distributions
with k = 16 components. Each source k generates an input vectory with probability
p(y |k) using the following rule. The probability that the q-th feature of vector y
(generated by source k) takes the i -th possibility is equal to μ(i ,q)(k), where μ(i ,q)(k) is
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unknown to the agent. Therefore, the total probability of generating a vectory is
p(y)=∑
k
p(k)p(y |k)=
16∑
k=1
p(k)Πmq=1Π
n
i=1
(
μ(i ,q)(k)
)y(i ,q) . (4.32)
Here, y(i ,q) := y j denotes the j -th entry of the input vector y , where j is uniquely
determined by pair (i ,q) via a 1-to-1 mapping and a shufﬂing operator.
The aim is to estimate the unknown probabilities μ(i ,q)(k) from the set of data vectors
{y(1),y(2), ...} using a neural network. To do so, we parametrize the unknown probabil-
ities μ(i ,q)(k) by synaptic weights wk(i ,q) using the transform μ(i ,q)(k)= exp(wk(i ,q)).
Note that wk(i ,q) denotes the synaptic weight between neuron 1 < j < mn in the
ﬁrst layer, whose index j is uniquely determined by its corresponding pair (i ,q), and
neuron k in the second layer. Mixture proportions p(k) are also parametrized via
p(k)= exp(wk0). This gives
p(y)=∑
k
exp
(
wk0+
∑
i ,q
wk(i ,q)y(i ,q)
)
=∑
k
exp(uk). (4.33)
The parameter uk is interpreted as the membrane potential of neuron k in the second
layer that sums over all the inputs y(i ,q) from the ﬁrst layer using the weights wk(i ,q).
We need to choose synaptic weights wk(i ,q) so as to maximize the likelihood that
the set of observed data vectors {y(1),y(2), ...} could have been generated by our
mixture model. We maximize the log-likelihood L =∑a lnp(y(a)) under the constraint∑
i μ(i ,q)(k)=
∑
i exp(wk(i ,q))= 1 for any k,q .
The maximum of the constraint log-likelihood
L˜ =∑
a
lnp(y(a))−∑
k,q
λ
q
k
(∑
i
exp(wk(i ,q))−1
)
, (4.34)
where λqk denote Lagrange multipliers, is found by setting the derivatives to zero
0= ∂L˜
∂wk ′(i ,q)
= ∑
a
y(i ,q)(a)
exp(uk)
p(y(a))
−λqk ′exp(wk ′(i ,q))
= ∑
a
y(i ,q)(a)p(k
′|y(a))−λqk ′exp(wk ′(i ,q)), (4.35)
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where we have introduced
p(k ′|y(a))= p(k
′)p(y(a)|k ′)
p(y)(a)
= e
uk′ (a)∑
k euk (a)
. (4.36)
The expression in Eq. (4.36) is interpreted as the soft-max spiking probability rule in a
stochastic network with lateral interactions that make neuron k ′ to compete with its
neighbors k = k ′.
We sum Eq. (4.35) over i which gives us an explicit expression for the Lagrange multi-
pliers
λ
q
k ′ =
∑
a
∑
i
y(i ,q)(a)p(k
′|y(a))=∑
a
p(k ′|y(a)). (4.37)
Because of the 1-out-of-n coding in each feature of y , we have
∑
i y(i ,q)(a)= 1 so that
the expression for the Lagrange multipliers and so the online rule (as shown later)
become very simple. Note that all the Lagrange multipliers λqk ′ that depend on source
k ′ are the same, i.e., they are independent of feature q ∈ {1, ...,m} (see Eq. (4.37)). That
means it is not necessary to distinguish which input neurons are linked to a particular
feature q .
Instead of going directly to theminimumof the constraint log-likelihood L˜ in Eq. (4.34),
one can also do a 1-step gradient descent. From Eqs. (4.35),(4.37) we get
Δwk(i ,q) = η
∂L˜
∂wk(i ,q)
= η∑
a
y(i ,q)(a)p(k|y(a))−
∑
a
p(k|y(a))exp(wk(i ,q))
= η∑
a
p(k|y(a))(y(i ,q)(a)−exp(wk(i ,q)) (4.38)
The weight update in Eq. (4.38) can be easily transformed to our desired learning rule
in Eq. (4.22). To do so, we ﬁrst go from batch to online and neglect the sum over the
patterns a. This is a standard step done for all online learning rules in neural network
theory. Second, upon repeated representations of pattern a, the factor p(k|y(a)) gives
exactly the probability that the post-synaptic neuron ﬁres. Therefore, thanks to the
WTA framework in the second layer, we can replace p(k|y(a)) with a Kronecker delta
function δkk∗ , where k
∗ denotes the index of winner neuron upon presentation of
input y(a). The Kronecker delta δkk∗ is in fact a point-estimate of the probability
p(k|y(a)).
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Finally if we replace each pair (i ,q) with its corresponding index j , we will arrive in the
online learning rule Δwk j = ηδkk∗(y j (a)−exp(wk j )) that is presented in Eq. (4.22).
Derivation of the online rule for the prediction model
In Chapter 3, our belief about the state transition probabilities from state s to s′ ∈
{1, ...,16} \ s was described by a set of parameters α(s, s′). These parameters are used
for describing 16 Dirichlet distributions, where each distribution is used to model
state transition probabilities from a particular state s. We parametrize the model
parameters α(s, s′) by synaptic weights ws′s using the transform
ws′s = ln
α(s, s′)∑
s′′α(s, s′′)
, (4.39)
where ws′s denotes the strength of connection from pre-synaptic neuron s in the input
layer of the prediction network to the post-synaptic neuron s′ in the output layer of
the prediction network.
To derive the online rule Eq. (4.24) we need to apply the stochastic gradient descent
on the constraint Lagrangian Eq. (4.18), which we re-express it as
L˜ =∑
θ
qt−1(θ)
(
lnqt−1(θ)− ln pˆX (θ)+ 1
λ
ln
qt−1(θ)
qt−2(θ)
)
−λ′
(∑
θ
qt−1(θ)−1
)
, (4.40)
where we denoted q(θ) and π0(θ) in Eq. (4.18) by qt−1 and qt−2 in Eq. (4.40), respec-
tively, to emphasize that these two distributions correspond to our belief in subse-
quent time steps. We reserve qt to denote the updated belief after using the online
rule Eq. (4.24).
In Eq. (4.40), qt−1(θ) denotes a Dirichlet distribution and describes our most recent
belief about the state transitions from the last observed state st−1. The support of
qt−1(θ) is the set of 15-dimensional vectors θ whose entries are real numbers in
the interval (0,1) with the sum of the coordinates is 1. Since our neural network
cannot handle the distributions with a “continuous” support, we replace qt−1(θ) with
a suitable categorical distribution (with a “discrete” support):
qt−1(θ)=Πs′
(
α(st−1, s′)∑
s′′α(st−1, s′′)
)[θ=1s′ ]
=Πs′exp(ws′st−1[θ = 1s′]), (4.41)
where 1s′ ∈ R15 denotes a unity vector with entry s′ equal to 1, and [θ = 1s′] denotes
Iverson bracket (a variable that is 1 if the condition θ = 1s′ is fulﬁlled, and is 0 other-
76
4.5. Materials and Methods
wise). The support of vectors θ now becomes a set of 16 unity vectors {1s′}
16
s′=1, where
each unity vector is chosen with the probability
qt−1(θ = 1s′)=
α(st−1, s′)∑
s′′α(st−1, s′′)
= exp(ws′st−1). (4.42)
The scaled likelihood (which is originally a Dirichlet distribution) can also be replaced
by its corresponding categorical distribution, indicating that the likelihood of visiting
state st if the latent parameter is θ = 1s′ is equal to
pˆX (θ = 1s′)=
1+δs′st
16
. (4.43)
In the surprise modulated belief update (Algorithm 1 in Chapter 3), the parameter
γ increases with the surprise S(X ) of the newly acquired sample X . Without loss
of generality, we assume that γ = mS(X )1+mS(X ) , where m determines the propensity of
a subject to change his belief (see Eq. (3.5)). The Lagrange multiplier parameter 1λ
in Eq. (4.18) is explicitly linked to the parameter γ that is used in the SMiLe rule
via γ = λ1+λ (see Eq. (3.12)). As such, the Lagrange multiplier λ is linearly linked to
the surprise of the new data sample via λ=mS(X ). Therefore, in combination with
Eqs. (4.42), (4.43), the Lagrangian Eq. (4.40) can be expressed as
L˜ =∑
s′
ews′st−1
(
ws′st−1 − ln
1+δs′st
16
+
ws′st−1 −wolds′st−1
mS(X )
)
−λ′
(∑
s′
ews′st−1 −1
)
. (4.44)
Setting the derivative to zero
∂L˜
∂ws′′st−1
= ∑
s′
δs′s′′e
ws′st−1
(
ws′st−1 − ln
1+δs′st
16
+
ws′st−1 −wolds′st−1
mS(X )
+ (1+ 1
mS(X )
)
)
− λ′∑
s′
δs′s′′e
ws′st−1 = 0, (4.45)
and summing Eq. (4.45) over s′′ gives an explicit expression for the Lagrange multiplier
λ′ =∑
s′
ews′st−1
(
ws′st−1 − ln
1+δs′st
16
+
ws′st−1 −wolds′st−1
mS(X )
+ (1+ 1
mS(X )
)
)
(4.46)
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Therefore, we can derive the online rule by inserting Eq. (4.46) in Eq. (4.45):
∂L˜
∂ws′′st−1
=∑
s′
ews′st−1
(
δs′s′′M˜(s
′, st )
)−
(∑
s′
ews′st−1 M˜(s′, st )
)(∑
s′
ews′st−1δs′s′′
)
, (4.47)
where
M˜(s′, st )=ws′st−1 − ln
1+δs′st
16
+
ws′st−1 −wolds′st−1
mS(X )
+ (1+ 1
mS(X )
). (4.48)
From there there is only a few minor steps to derive the online rule in Eq. (4.24). First,∑
s′ e
ws′st−1 f (s′) is replaced by an average 〈 f (s′)〉qt−1 because qt−1(θ = 1s′) = e
ws′st−1 .
Second, the modulatory term M(s′, st ) in Eq. (4.23) differs from M˜(s′, st ) in Eq. (4.48)
only in constant terms which creates no problem (according to Corollary 2). In all
derivations above we assumed that s = st−1. Therefore, the dependency to the activity
of the pre-synaptic neuron is manually inserted by δsst−1 in Eq. (4.24).
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5.1 Dissociation between negative and positive surprise
Surprise may result either from the occurrence of an unexpected event or the non-
occurrence of an expected one. These two cases are known in the literature as positive
and negative surprise, respectively, and different neural substrates have been sug-
gested to be responsible for encoding each of them [Alexander and Brown, 2011].
Positive surprise is often more “surprising” than negative surprise consistent with our
theory of surprise, where we assign bigger surprise to zero-probability events than
low-probability events.
Note that whether surprise is positive or negative does not determine the actual
valance of the surprise consequent. In other words, the consequence to surprise can
be neutral, pleasant, or unpleasant regardless of surprise being positive or negative.
Negative surprise corresponds to the non-occurrence of an expected event. If our
expectation is rewarding and the reward is not delivered (i.e., omission of an expected
reward), we experience a negative surprise with a negative (unpleasant) valence. If
we expect a punishment and it does not occur, we experience a negative surprise but
with a positive (pleasant) valence. Positive surprise corresponds to the occurrence of
an unexpected outcome. In this case, an event occurs with no prior expectation. If
an unexpected reward is delivered we experience a positive surprise with a positive
(pleasant) valence, but if we encounter an unexpected punishment then we experience
a positive surprise with a negative (unpleasant) valence.
Which computational models can clearly dissociate these two types of surprises is
an interesting question that may worth to be studied in future. Moreover, surprise is
usually followed by emotional states such as joy or confusion. How we can integrate
such emotional responses into the surprise theory is also interesting to be investigated.
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5.2 Surprise in language of neurons
Although surprise is often studied in the behavioral level, we argue that surprise is
a neural phenomenon which is reﬂected globally, in emotions among other things.
What psychologists call surprise is really something that arises when surprise does
not just happen at the sensory level but propagates to higher cognitive and emotion
areas and as a result is reﬂected even in physiological responses and affects behavior.
In the microscopic level of neural activity, surprise might also be viewed as a drive
factor that makes a neuron ﬁre (the idea is originally proposed in [Palm, 2012]). Most
of the neurons in the brain ﬁre, if they are sufﬁciently excited or dis-inhibited. One
could interpret these excitation and dis-inhibition, as two variants of unexpected
surprising events.
In one hand, if a neuron is used to not receive so much excitation from its affer-
ent neurons, then sudden bursts of spikes in its excitatory afferents are unexpected.
Occurrence of such unexpected event may surprise the neuron leading to its ﬁring
(corresponding to the positive surprise). Many neurons in striatum (a part of basal
ganglia) behave like what was just explained. They ﬁre because of sudden excitation
they receive from cortical area.
On the other hand, if a neuron is used to receive lots of inhibition from its afferent
neurons, then the omission of inhibitory inputs, or a sudden relaxation of such in-
hibition may lead to its ﬁring (corresponding to the negative surprise). Unexpected
omission of inhibitory inputs from the complex of substantia nigra pars reticulata
(SNr) and globus pallidus internus (GPi) to the thalamus causes the thalamic neurons
to ﬁre, consistent with what mentioned above.
In fact, a neuron ﬁres whenever it is surprised either by excitation (positive surprise) or
dis-inhibition (negative surprise); but how surprise can efﬁciently be calculated in the
subthreshold regime of neural activity, and how it is linked to other neural parameters
(such as membrane potential) are not yet resolved.
It has been hypothesized that the actual information that is propagated in the brain is
linked to surprise [Palm, 2012]. The argument behind this hypothesis is the “sparse-
ness” of the neuronal activity, where it is compared to the volume of the information
that is required to internally describe the state of the external world, suggesting that
our external world is described only by unexpected and surprising information. This
hypothesis would need to be more scientiﬁcally investigated.
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5.3 Relation between neuromodulators and the global
factors
There are different neuromodulators in the brain such as Dopamine (DA), nora-
drenaline (NE), acetylcholine (ACh), serotonin (5-HT), etc. They play essential roles
for the modulation of neural activity all over the brain regions. On the other hand,
multi-factor learning rules may depend on several global factors corresponding to the
activity of these neuromodulatory systems. An interesting question then would be
how different neuromodulators are mapped / associated to the global factors that are
theoretically derived.
For instance, we do not know whether assigning reward to DA and surprise to NE is a
correct assumption. DA and NE might both encode reward as well as surprise using
non-linear mappings. Furthermore, neuromodulators signiﬁcantly interact with each
other, a fact that should be incorporated in theories about global factors.
5.4 Interplaybetween surprise anddifferent formsofun-
certainty
Surprise interplay with different forms of uncertainty. We already saw in our proposed
theory that surprise decreases with model uncertainty, and the model uncertainty
increases after surprising events. However, a more-in-depth study may be required to
understand the exact way that different forms of uncertainty affect each other and
surprise. In the following we brieﬂy describe some of the forms of uncertainty:
(1) World uncertainty quantiﬁes inherent stochasticity of the environment. This un-
certainty is irreducible, even if a perfect model of the environment is available. In
Bayesian framework, the conditional entropy H (x|θ) is a measure of world uncer-
tainty. This quantity calculates how much uncertainty remains in a random variable
x, without considering any uncertainty for the model of the world, i.e., the model
parameters θ.
(2) Model uncertainty determines how uncertain we are about the current model of
the environment. This incorporates uncertainty about model parameters or their
estimation. Despite of the world uncertainty, the model uncertainty is reducible
if additional information is provided. In Bayesian setting, the model uncertainty is
quantiﬁed by the entropyH (θ) of the model parameters. Note thatH (θ|x) orH (θ|X )
also quantiﬁes model uncertainty; but after a random variable x or a data sample X
has been used to modify our knowledge about the model parameters.
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(3) Expected uncertainty is the amount of uncertainty that we expect about the out-
come of a stochastic world. The expected uncertainty can be quantiﬁed by H (x),
where it implicitly incorporates both world uncertainty as well as model uncertainty.
An alternative to the expected uncertainty is the total uncertainty which is deﬁned
as the sum of the world uncertainty and model uncertainty. The total uncertainty
is quantiﬁed by the joint entropy H (x,θ)=H (x|θ)+H (θ). Although the expected
uncertainty is different from the total uncertainty, they both increases with model
uncertainty and the world uncertainty but in different ways. Total uncertainty is lin-
early expressed in terms of world uncertainty and model uncertainty, but the expected
uncertainty is non-linearly related to them.
(4) Unexpected uncertainty is a different form of uncertainty that is linked to the oc-
currence of an unexpected event beyond the known stochasticity of the environment.
Unexpected uncertainty in our terminology corresponds to surprise, as a result of a
violation in a subjective expectation about the environmental outcome. Unexpected
uncertainty quantiﬁes the uncertainty that a subject has about whether a fundamental
change in the environment is occurred or the unexpected observation is just because
of an outlier without any change in the context.
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Uncertainty and subjectivity are amongst essential requirements for evaluating sur-
prise. They may be originated from different sources including uncertainty about
message perception and the subjective element of interestingness in describing the
outcomes of a probabilistic world.
Gunther Palm [Palm, 2012] studied novelty and surprise using a new approach to
information theory. He has modiﬁed the classic information theory to consider the
process of perception or formation of the message as well as to incorporate the sub-
jective elements of interestingness by proposing two interesting concepts: description
and repertoire. Here we brieﬂy “review” his proposed method for quantiﬁcation of
novelty and surprise.
In classic information theory, any uncertainty in the perception of a message stems
from a noise that is added to the original message through communication channel,
i.e., the channel noise. There is no uncertainty about how the message was encoded
and thus no uncertainty about how it should be decoded. In other words, both sender
and receiver have agreed on a common language (a set of codes) that is used for mes-
sage transmission. The receiver just need to ﬁnd out that the received noisy message
is indicative of which code. However in reality, different individuals may use different
expressions for describing a same message. As a result, we usually receive information
through channels in which there is not only channel noise for corruption of the mes-
sage, but also we suffer from lacking a common agreed language for perception of the
message. Different channels provide different amount of information when we have
no direct access to the outcome of the stochastic world
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A.1 Description and repertoire
Throughout this section, we use terminologies from classic probability theory. The
probability space (Ω,Σ,p) is a mathematical construct which is used to model real-
world stochastic processes. It consists of three segments: (1) a sample spaceΩwhich is
deﬁned as the set of all possible outcomes ω ∈Ω, (2) a set Σ of events deﬁned as the set
of all subsets of the sample spaceΩ. where each event is a subset ofΩ containing zero
or more outcomesω, and (3) a probability function p :Σ→ [0,1] that assigns a positive
number from 0 to 1 to each event A ∈Σ. For example, in a probabilistic task such as
dice throwing, the sample space is all possible numbers which can be appeared, i.e,
Ω= {1,2,3,4,5,6}. The appearance of an even number is an event A = {2,4,6}, and the
probability of this event is p(A)= 0.5.
Description
Different individuals may use different expressions to describe a same outcome ω ∈Ω.
An expression that is used for describingωmay also be correct for a different outcome
ω′ =ω. Therefore, given an expression, we may not be able to distinguish whether the
true outcome is ω or ω′. For instance, if the outcome of a thrown dice is expressed by
“an even number”, then we cannot distinguish whether the actual outcome is 2, 4, or 6.
In Palm theory of novelty and surprise, a concept called description is deﬁned in order
to distinguish the way different people describe outcomes of a random process. A
description d :Ω→ Σ is a mapping from the sample space Ω to the event space Σ.
Each outcome ω is described by an expression d(ω) ∈Σ (as a subset of sample space
Ω) which is fulﬁlled by all the elements which comprise it including the outcome
ω ∈ d(ω).
Here we provide three different ways of describing the actual outcome of a thrown
dice. The person number 1 describes the actual outcome by telling you exactly the
number that is appeared when the dice is thrown. The description function that the
person number 1 uses for describing the outcomes is d1(ω)= {ω} ∀ω ∈Ω, indicating
that each proposition d1(ω) is fulﬁlled only by the outcome ω. The person number 2
describes each outcome just by letting you know whether the number is even or odd
(i.e., d2(ω)= {1,3,5} ∀ω ∈ {1,3,5} and d2(ω)= {2,4,6} ∀ω ∈ {2,4,6}). So, the proposition
d2(ω= 4) which is used for describing the outcome ω= 4 is fulﬁlled by all outcomes
ω ∈ {2,4,6}, because they are all even numbers. The third person describes each
outcome by telling that the appeared number is bigger than zero and less than seven
(a description that provides no useful information because all the possible outcomes
fulﬁll this condition). This way of description corresponds to d3(ω)=Ω ∀ω ∈Ω (see
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Fig. A.1).
Figure A.1 – Description functions. Each outcome ω is described differently using
different description functions di (ω). Each description is identiﬁed by a color. Blue
boxes indicate the set of outcomesΩ, where each description maps an outcome from
left box to a subset of outcomes in the right box. For instance, description number
3 (green) describes outcome ω = 4 by a statement that is fulﬁlled by all outcomes
{1, ...,6}.
A description d is ﬁner than a description d ′ (written as d ⊆ d ′), if d(ω)⊆ d ′(ω), ∀ω ∈Ω.
In fact, the ﬁner description d more precisely describes the outcomes than d ′. In
the example above, d1 ⊆ d2 ⊆ d3, meaning that d1 is the most informative way of
describing the outcomes and d3 is the least informative one. Here, informativeness
corresponds to the level of uncertainty (about the actual outcome) that is reduced by
a description d .
Novelty and Surprise
The novelty provided by ω for the description d is deﬁned as Nd (ω) = − logp(d(ω)).
Note that Nd :Ω→R+ is a randomvariable. The expected value of this randomvariable
determines the average noveltyN (d)= E(Nd ) of the description d , that quantiﬁes, on
average, the usefulness of the information provided by a description d in reducing the
uncertainty about recognizing the true outcome. In the example above, the average
novelty of each description is equal toN (d1)= log6,N (d2)= log2, andN (d3)= 0.
To quantify how surprising the information provided by a description d is, we ﬁrst
construct a new description d , deﬁned as d(ω) = {ω′ : p(d(ω′)) ≤ p(d(ω))} ∀ω ∈ Ω.
The description d describes each outcome ω by an expression d(ω) that is fulﬁlled
by all the outcomes ω′ for which p(d(ω′)) ≤ p(d(ω)). The surprise provided by ω
for the description d is deﬁned as the novelty provided by ω for description d , i.e.,
Sd (ω) = Nd (ω). Just like novelty, surprise Sd (ω) is also a random variable by which
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we can deﬁne the average surprise S (d) of a description d as the average of this
random variable which is equal to the average novelty of directed description d , i.e.,
S (d) = E(Nd ). The average surprise S (d) of a description measures how different
size of all propositions {d(ωi )}ni=1 (used for describing different outcomes {ωi }
n
i=1) is
in comparison to each other.
We already saw that d1,d2, and d3 have different average novelties corresponding to
different amounts of usefulness in reduction of uncertainty about the outcomes in the
example of dice throwing (N (d1)>N (d2)>N (d3)). However, all these descriptions
are equally surprising with the average surprise equal to zero, i.e., S (di ) = 0 for
i = 1,2,3. The reason is that in all these descriptions di ∈ {d1,d2,d3}, the novelty
Ndi (ω) is the same for all the outcomes ω ∈Ω. In other words, all the outcomes are
similarly described for a given description. We as subjects who receive information
about actual outcomes through these channels will never be surprised as there is no
unpredictability in the way that they describe different outcomes. Mathematically,
this is because di (ω)=Ω ∀ω ∈Ω and i = 1,2,3.
Now consider a fourth description d4 which describes all the outcomes except for ω=
1, for which he describes it perfectly. Such describer is modeled as d4(ω)=Ω ∀ω ∈Ω\
{1} and d4(ω= 1)= {1}. Here the channel is surprising because some one who receives
information from this channel faces an unexpected proposition (when outcome ω= 1
happens). For a person who is often used to receive no useful information through this
channel, the average surprise of the fourth describer is equal toS (d4)= 16
∑6
i=1Sd4(ω=
i )= 16 log6> 0 because
Sd4(ω= 1) = Nd4(ω= 1)
= − logp(d4(ω= 1))
= − logp({ω′ : p(d4(ω′))≤ p(d4(ω= 1))})
= − logp({ω′ = 1})
= log6, (A.1)
and Sd4(ω)=− logp(Ω)= 0 ∀ω ∈Ω\ {1}.
Repertoire
Palm has proposed the concept repertoire. For a probability space (Ω,Σ,p), a repertoire
α = {Ai }mi=1 (as a subset of Σ \ {}) is a collection of non-empty expressions Ai that
their union covers the whole sample spaceΩ (i.e., ∪mi=1Ai =Ω, where ∪ denotes the
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union operator). A repertoire α is basically a collection of expressions Ai by which a
subject describes different outcomes ω ∈Ω. Each subject may have his own repertoire
α as it is determined by his own personal desires and interests.
In the example of game of lotto, imagine some one is interested in those conﬁgurations
in which 3 or more numbers come in a row. This interest in conﬁgurations can be
expressed by repertoire α = {A3, A4, A5, A6,Ω} where An = [n numbers in a row] for
n = 3,4,5,6 is a proposition which is fulﬁlled by all conﬁgurations in which n numbers
are in a row. Note that ∪α =Ω. It means that if she wants to describe conﬁguration
X = {11,22,33,47,48,49} in example above, she can use A3 ∈α andΩ ∈α as statements
she is interested in for describing the outcomes. The way that she perceives both
conﬁgurations Y = {7,16,23,35,40,48} and W = {2,7,19,23,37,43} is that they are
ordinary conﬁgurations. In fact they will be described by her using propositionΩ ∈α
which means they do not have any speciﬁc property (as she perceived) except that
they are ordinary members of sample space Ω with no speciﬁc relation between
their elements. However, conﬁguration Z = {1,2,3,4,5,6} can be described by all
propositions in repertoire α= {A3, A4, A5, A6,Ω} as all the propositions in α is fulﬁlled
by conﬁguration Z .
If we use the propositions within α to describe lottery drawings, we ﬁrst observe that
α is no partition of a sample space Ω as there is overlap between the propositions;
on the contrary, A6 ⊆ A5 ⊆ A4 ⊆ A3 ⊆Ω. So, if a particular drawing ω fulﬁlls A6 (like
conﬁguration Z in example above), it also fulﬁlls A5, A4, A3, andΩ. Therefore it may
be correctly described by all of existing propositions in α. However, a proper choice
from α always describes ω by A6 if there are 6 numbers in a row because it is the most
accurate and informative description for such outcome among all the propositions
in α. One may also calculate the average novelty and surprise for repertoire α as
N (α)=N (dα) andS (α)=S (dα), respectively.
If there is no description, we can also think of the novelty and surprise of a repertoire
per se. The idea is that if we were able to be informed of the actual outcomes with
no restriction of receiving information from a describer, how should we describe the
events in a most accurate way with respect to a given repertoire? For an event ω ∈Ω,
the set of all possible descriptions of ω in α is denoted by αω = {Ai ∈α :ω ∈ Ai }. What
we assume is that a minimal proposition in αω should be chosen to describe ω. The
statement A is minimal if there is no other proposition in αω that is contained in A. So
a minimal proposition describes the event ω in a most accurate way compared to any
other proposition in αω. Indeed, for a repertoire α, it would be reasonable to deﬁne
the novelty of repertoire α provided by ω as the maximal novelty of all propositions in
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αω, i.e.,
Nα(ω)=max{N (A) : A ∈αω}. (A.2)
A description d is called a proper choice from α if for every ω ∈Ω, there is no propo-
sition A ∈α such that ω ∈ A ⊂ d(x). In fact, a proper choice d has this property that
it describes each event ω by a minimal proposition A ∈αω. In general, there may be
several proper choices in α. We denote by D(α) the set of all proper choices from α.
The average noveltyN (α) and surpriseS (α) of a repertoire α is deﬁned as:
N (α) = max{N (d) : d ∈D(α)} (A.3)
S (α) = max{S (d) : d ∈D(α)}. (A.4)
A repertoire α is called tight if there is exactly one proper choice from it. In this case,
this choice is denoted by dα and so D(α)= {dα}.
Given a predeﬁned repertoire α for a person, we may also be interested in measuring
the amount of novelty or surprise that is provided by an eventω through a description
d for that speciﬁc person characterized by α. The average novelty or usefulness of a
description d with respect to a repertoire α is deﬁned asNα(d)= E(Nαd ) where
Nαd =max{N (A) : d(ω)⊆ A ∈α}. (A.5)
The novelty of description d with respect to repertoire α, provided by event ω, is
considered as a random variable Nαd : Ω→ R and is computed as the maximum
possible novelty that you may receive by a proposition A ∈ α which contains d(ω).
The average novelty, then would be the expectation of such random variable. For
any ﬁnite repertoire α and any description d , we have Nα(d)≤N (d) and Nα(d)=
N (d) if and only if R(d)⊆αwhere R(d) denotes the range of description d . In other
words, the average novelty of a description with respect to a repertoire is always less
than or at most equal to the average pure novelty of that description. The equality
holds whenever all the propositions used in description for describing the events is a
member of the repertoire, meaning that we are interested in all of the propositions
d(ω) ∈R(d). One could also similarly deﬁne the average surprise of description d with
respect to repertoire α asSα(d)= E(Sαd ) where
Sαd =max{S (A) : d(ω)⊆ A ∈α}. (A.6)
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mization for Decision Making
A standard model of decision making is expected utility maximization [Meyer, 1987]
in which a decision maker selects a choice x∗ ∈X with the highest subjective expected
utility U (x∗) among all other alternatives x ∈X . In a probabilistic framework, it can
be interpreted as selecting choice x∗ with probability 1 and choosing the rest with
probability 0 (i.e. P (x)= δ(x− x∗) is the corresponding choice selection density func-
tion which determines the likelihood of selecting different choices, where δ(.) denotes
the Kronecker delta function). The density function P (x)= δ(x−x∗) maximizes the
expected value of the utility function 〈U (x)〉P among all possible density functions
P (x) because
〈U (x)〉P =
∑
x
U (x)P (x)≤∑
x
U (x∗)P (x)=U (x∗)= 〈U (x)〉δ(x−x∗) . (B.1)
In reinforcement learning, however, choosing the action with the highest value func-
tion does not allow for sufﬁcient exploration; this requires choice variability, e.g., by
adding noise. Furthermore, individual preferences should be incorporated into the
decision making processes, such as action selection in RL.
Expected utility theory accounts for individual differences by explicitly modeling
different beliefs about the probabilities of different outcomes. Instead of using a
stochastic action selection function (such as a sigmoid) we propose an information
theoretical equivalent of existing models to incorporate both individual preferences
and choice variability. As such we do not need to impose any speciﬁc form of con-
straints existing in different models. In contrast to maximizing just the average utility
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〈U (x)〉P , maximizing the functional
F[P ] = 〈U (x)〉P +
1
λ1
H(P )− 1
λ2
H(P,P0)
= 〈U (x)− 1
λ1
lnP (x)+ 1
λ2
lnP0(x)〉
P
, (B.2)
yields a choice selection density function P (x) which not only leads to a relatively
high average utility, but also allows exploration. Further, it does not allow the solution
to be highly different from a reference P0. While the entropy H(P ) = 〈− lnP (x)〉P
of a density function P in Eq. (B.2) models choice variability, the relative entropy
H (P,P0)= 〈− lnP0(x)〉P models subjectivity by involving a subjective reference density
function P0. The minus sign in the last term of the ﬁrst line in Eq. (B.2) penalizes
those density functions that are highly different from a subjective reference P0. The
parameters λ1 and λ2 control the fuzziness of the solution by changing the weights
of the second and third terms, respectively. By taking the derivative of Eq. (B.2) with
respect to P and setting it equal to zero, one could ﬁnd that the functional in Eq. (B.2)
is maximized by
P∗(x)= argmax
P
F[P ]= P0(x)
λ1
λ2 eλ1U (x)
Z (λ1,λ2)
, (B.3)
where Z (λ1,λ2)=∑x P0(x)λ1λ2 eλ1U (x) is the normalizing factor. Equation (B.3) resem-
bles a (modiﬁed) Bayes’ rule in the sense that the effect of utility U in making the
posterior density function P∗ is controlled by a free parameter λ1 and a prior belief P0
that is affected by the ratio λ1
λ2
. Although the optimal density P∗ that yields the maxi-
mal functional value F[P∗]= 1λ1 lnZ (λ1,λ2) is explicitly derived in Eq. (B.3), it can also
be learned using the functional gradient rule Eq. (4.2). This is because the functional
Eq. (B.2) can be expressed as 〈F [P ]〉P whereF [P ]=U (x)− 1λ1 lnP (x)+
1
λ2
lnP0(x) is a
density-dependent functional.
If the maximizer P∗ is approximated by any other density P˜ , then its corresponding
functional value F[P˜ ] differs from its maximal value F[P∗] in proportion to the KL
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divergence DKL(P˜ ||P∗)≥ 0. This is because,
F[P∗]−F[P˜ ] = 1
λ1
lnZ (λ1,λ2)−〈U (x)− 1
λ1
ln P˜ (x)+ 1
λ2
lnP0(x)〉
P˜
= 1
λ1
〈lnZ (λ1,λ2)− lneλ1U (x)+ ln P˜ (x)− λ1
λ2
lnP0(x)〉
P˜
= 1
λ1
〈ln Z (λ1,λ2)P˜ (x)
eλ1U (x)P0(x)
λ1
λ2
〉
P˜
= 1
λ1
〈ln P˜ (x)
P∗(x)
〉
P˜
= 1
λ1
DKL
(
P˜ ||P∗) .(B.4)
B.1 Derivation of the soft-max rule from expected util-
ity maximization
As an example, we investigate a binary decision making task (such as the two-armed
bandit problem) in which a subject has to make a decision between two alternatives
x = 1 and x = 0. The probability P (x) of making decision x is modeled by a Bernoulli
distribution parametrized by θ such that P (x)= θx(1−θ)(1−x). We use P0(x)= 0.5 to
incorporate no prior preference in making different decisions. We further assume that
λ1 =λ2 =λ to make the formula simpler. As such, the optimal probability of making
the decision x = 1 in our binary example is equal to
P∗(x = 1)= e
λU (x=1)
eλU (x=1)+eλU (x=0) =
1
1+e−λΔU , (B.5)
where ΔU =U (x = 1)−U (x = 0) is the difference between the decisions’ utilities. If
U (x = 1)>U (x = 0), the probability P∗(x = 1) of making decision x = 1 in Eq. (B.5) is
greater than 0.5. The parameter λ then determines how big that probability should
be for different values of ΔU . Note that the stochastic (sigmoid) action selection
function, which is used in the expected utility theorem for modeling choice variability,
is explicitly derived in Eq. (B.5) as the optimal solution in the sense that it maximizes
the functional Eq. (B.2).
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C Learning Associations with a Neurally
Computed Global Novelty Signal
Here we propose a model to measure novelty based on the activity of decision units in
a decision making process in neural networks. We also propose a way by which novelty
can implicitly modulate (gate) Hebbian plasticity to control learning at underlying
synapses. We apply our model to a clustering task, in which the total number of
clusters is initially unknown to the network. The proposed model is able to add more
clusters whenever it judges an input sample to be novel, i.e., a sample which may
belong to none of the existing clusters. This model represents an agent that is able to
generate (trigger) new states, an essential feature for learning new environments. The
proposed model can be used to explain how humans and animals efﬁciently encode
and discover the inherent characteristics of the environment with which they interact.
We argue that the novelty signal in this framework can be interpreted as a (global)
modulatory signal, corresponding to the diffusion of a non-speciﬁc neuromodulator
(e.g., norepinephrine (NE) released from locus coeruleus (LC) neurons) and can mod-
ulate the local Hebbian factors (i.e., the coactivity of pre- and post-synaptic neurons)
in synaptic plasticity rules. As such, it can be considered as a biologically plausible
third factor in multi-factor learning rules.
C.1 A neural network model
We use a two-layer feed-forward neural network with Oja’s learning rule in the frame-
work of competitive learning (winner-takes-all (WTA)) to classify input patterns (see
Fig. C.1A). The network consists of mmax =mused+mf ree output units, corresponding
to the maximum number of clusters the system can learn. Each of the mused units
represents a previously learned cluster (e.g., known fruits such as apple and banana).
mf ree is the number of loser units which have never been used for describing environ-
mental features. These are called loser units as they always lose the competition in
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WTA network [Hertz et al., 1991] unless a novel pattern (e.g., an unknown fruit such as
rambutan or jabuticaba) is presented.
Each output unit xi = g (hi ) is fully connected to a set of inputs x j via excitatory
connections wi j ≥ 0. Here g :R+→ [0,1] is the activation function and
hi = b+Ei − Ic − In Θ(x¯i ), (C.1)
is the net input to neuron i , where b ≥ 0 is a common excitatory input (constant
baseline activity), 0≤ Ei =∑ j wi j x j ≤ 1 is the normalized forward excitatory input, Ic
stands for the competitive inhibition (required for implementing WTA) and
In = c N (X )≥ 0, (C.2)
with a constant c is the absolute value of the inhibitory signal proportional to the
novelty 0≤N (X )≤ 1 of each presented input pattern X . The Heaviside functionΘ(.)
ensures that the novelty-related inhibitory signal is applied only to active output units
(i.e., neurons with x¯i > 0, where x¯i is the mean activity, averaged over a large number
of past examples). In what follows, we assume that
If the presented input pattern X is not novel, then we can neglect the inﬂuence of
inhibition In [Eq. (C.2)] on the net input hi [Eq. (C.1)]. Therefore, one of mused output
units (denoted by i∗) that receives maximal excitation Ei remains activated. All other
output units becomes silent as a result of WTA architecture. The set of afferent weights
to unit i∗, denoted by Wi∗ = (wi∗1, ...,wi∗n), represents the prototype of a cluster to
which input X belongs.
Dynamics of WTA network causes only one output unit (the winner i∗) to remain
active. This makes sure that only the set of afferent weights to the winner unit, i.e.,
Wi∗ , is modiﬁed. This is a consequence of the Oja’s learning rule:
Δwi j = ηxi (x j −xi wi j ), (C.3)
in which learning is gated by the activity xi of the post-synaptic neuron. That is if the
post-synaptic neuron is not activated (i.e., xi = 0), there is no change in its afferent
synaptic weights (Δwi j = 0, ∀ j ).
According to Oja’s learning rule [Eq. C.3], the set of afferent weights to the winner unit
i∗ (with xi∗ = 1) is changed byΔWi∗ = η(X −Wi∗) where η is a small learning rate. Such
an update shifts the prototype Wi∗ a bit towards X . After many trials, the prototype
approaches to the center of all data samples X that are classiﬁed in the corresponding
cluster.
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If data sample X is sufﬁciently novel, then the inhibitory term In will exceed the
excitatory term Ei . Therefore, the net input hi in Eq. (C.1), for all mused output units
(with x¯i > 0), falls below the baseline b− Ic . The net input to all mf ree loser units (with
x¯i = 0), however, is bigger than b− Ic because they never receive such an inhibition
unless they are used for learning environmental features. Therefore, in the presence of
a novel sample, one of the loser units ﬁnds the chance of winning the competition in
the WTA network. As such only one of mf ree units ﬁnally remains active in the output
layer. A learning gate is then open for the afferent weights of that unit, corresponding
to creation of a new prototype. Once a loser unit is used for representing a new cluster
for describing environmental features, it no longer belongs to the set of loser units.
C.2 Our measure of novelty
The novelty signal N (X ) in our model is negatively proportional to the maximum
excitatory input to the neurons in the output layer i.e.,
N (X )= 1−maxi [Ei ]. (C.4)
The idea behind this measure is that if none of the decision units in the output layer is
sufﬁciently activated, there is not enough evidence that the input pattern belongs to
one of existing clusters that they represent. Therefore, the input sample is novel with
respect to what the system has learned (encoded as synaptic efﬁcacies between input
and output layers).
The inhibitory signal In in Eq. (C.2) not only depends on the novelty signal [Eq. C.4],
but also it depends on a constant c. We propose to choose
c = T
1−T , 0≤ T < 1. (C.5)
Here, T is indicative of a threshold. If the activity of none of mused output units is above
T (i.e., if maxi Ei < T ), then the input data sample X is recognized as sufﬁciently
novel (withN (X )> 1−T ). The net input hi [Eq. (C.1)] to all mused output units falls
below b− I because:
hi = b+Ei−Ic−In < b+maxi Ei−Ic−cN (X )< b+T−I− T
1−T (1−T )= b−I . (C.6)
As a consequence, a former loser unit now becomes the winner of the WTA compe-
tition and a new prototype will be built. The threshold T in Eq. (C.5) is a subjective
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parameter. A larger T results in a ﬁner description of the environment. Data samples
are more frequently recognized as novel (and so more prototypes or clusters are cre-
ated) for a large T than a low T . On the other hand the coarsest description of the
environmental features is achieved by the smallest threshold, i.e., T = 0. In that case,
no data sample is recognized as novel and all the inputs are classiﬁed into one of the
existing clusters.
C.3 Simulation
We apply our proposed model to an online clustering task in which the number of
prototypes is unknown to the subject. The aim is to learn the inherent structure of the
input data space in an unsupervised fashion.
Two-dimensional input patterns randomly drawn from four multivariate normal
distributions with underlying means (±3,±3) and covariance matrix 2.56 I2 (where
In is an n ×n identity matrix) are given to the network in four blocks. Each block
contains 100 samples and has a different mean. The model is capable of recognizing
all 4 clusters, although from the beginning it was not aware of how many clusters exists
in the dataset (see Fig. C.1B). The novelty signal calculated by Eq. (C.4) is depicted in
Fig. C.1C. As expected, the novelty signal rises at those time steps where that samples
from a different distribution is presented (i.e., t = 101,201,301).
C.4 Discussion
We proposed a simple model in which a novelty signal is efﬁciently used for generating
new memories without disruption of past learned memories. Novelty signal triggers
an inhibitory signal (whenever the input pattern is not familiar for the prototypes
that have been learned) and drives learning at synapses that do not yet represent
environmental features. Using this method we adapts number of output units we
need for describing environmental features.
Once an input pattern is presented to the network, the activity of each output unit
determines to what extent it is likely that the input belongs to its corresponding
cluster. A higher activity then corresponds to a bigger extent. In classic WTA network,
a unit with maximum activity always wins the competition no matter how much it is
activated. However, in our framework low-activation is not acceptable for a unit to
be considered as a winner in the WTA network. The winner unit does not only have a
higher activity compared to the outher output units, but also it has to have an activity
that is larger than a given threshold T .
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Figure C.1 – Neural network model for novelty-based clustering. A. Input units (blue
circles in bottom layer) provide excitatory input for excitatory decision units in mid-
dle layer consisting of both loser units (cyan circles) and active units (yellow circles)
through weak (dashed arrows) and strong (solid arrows) connections, respectively.
WTA between decision units is implemented via mutual inhibition through a common
inhibitory pool (red circle). Additionally, the decision units project to an inhibitory
unit (magenta circle) via pre-deﬁned non-plastic connections to determine their max-
imum activity. A novelty detector (green circle) strongly inhibits the active units if the
maximum activity among decision units is not high enough. It will increase the chance
that one of always-loser units wins the competition. Hence, a new cluster is created.
B. Two-dimensional input patterns (colored dots). The network is able to add new
clusters (black squares) whenever a novel pattern is presented. Each color indicates
the cluster into which samples are classiﬁed. The black squares among colored dots
represent the center of each learned cluster. Black squares at (0,0) correspond to weak
synapses afferent to loser units which have not yet been used for learning a new cluster.
C. The measured novelty for each input pattern presented to the network. Whenever
the distribution from which samples are drawn is changed (i.e., trials 101,201, and
301), the novelty signal increases resulting in creation of a new cluster.
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Signal
A functional requirement for our model to work properly is that the novelty signal
has to be generated fast enough before WTA network (using competitive inhibition
Ic) determines the winner neuron. Therefore the dynamics of the novelty-triggered
inhibitory signal must be faster than the competitive inhibition. This is a plausible
assumption, as there is neurophysiological evidence that the LC-NE system (as neural
correlate of novelty) is fast enough to affect the outcome of a decision process (WTA
network), in the cortical areas [Usher et al., 1999].
The inhibitory signal In in Eq. (C.2) is a global signal. The signiﬁcance of this model
is that the novelty signal is globally available for all the output units, and can be
considered as a neuromodulatory signal which implicitly affects Hebbian plasticity.
Moreover, novelty only depends on the maximum activity in the output layer. In other
words, we do not need to track the activity of whole network in order to calculate
novelty. This is not, however, the case for other novelty measures whose calculation
depends on many parameters that have to be collected from the whole network.
The stability of categories formed by competitive learning is not guaranteed as there
is always a weight change if a new pattern is presented to the network. This problem
can be solved by freezing the learned categories by gradually stopping the learning.
However, stopping the ability to learn causes the network to lose its plasticity and not
to react to any new data. This is why we need a triggering signal like novelty that opens
a gate for a set of synapses that should be used for learning new memories. However,
too much plasticity in the neural system results in forgetting past memories. Adaptive
resonance theory (ART) [Carpenter andGrossberg, 1988] has beenproposed to address
the stability-plasticity dilemma by proposing a set of neural network models to address
the problem of pattern recognition. The idea behind the ART is very similar to what
we proposed in our model. However, ART models mainly use artiﬁcial neural networks
with algorithmic approach to address the problem, while our proposed model tries
to explain how novelty can be neurally calculated and how it can be incorporated
into plasticity rules. Although our current model is not yet fully implemented in a
biological plausible setting, we believe that our proposed model can provides some
insights about how memories can be formed in our brain.
An application of the proposed model is to address one of the challenges in clustering
problem: how many prototypes is needed to efﬁciently encode the input data space?
By efﬁciency, we mean trying not to use too many prototypes for describing an envi-
ronment, if a few is enough for doing so. In fact, the number of prototypes one need
for encoding the environment should be adaptively adjusted according to the level of
environment’s complexity. Despite of classic clustering algorithms like K-means in
which the total number of clusters is initially known to the learning agent (a machine
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or a neural system), our brain does not consider a pre-deﬁned number of prototypes
for describing the world. Instead, it gradually increases the number of prototypes as
the complexity of the environment increases.
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D What Hinders Bayesian Optimal Critic
to Distinguish Similar Tasks?
In the framework of reinforcement leaning guided by a critic [Sutton and Barto, 1998a,
Doya, 2000,Frémaux et al., 2013], simple running average can be used to estimate the
expected reward corresponding to a single task which is repeated several times during
training. However, if multiple tasks have to be learned in parallel, then the critic has to
distinguish different stimuli corresponding to different tasks in order to estimate the
expected reward separately for each underlying task [Frémaux et al., 2010].
Psychophysical experiments on perceptual learning have shown that learning two
similar tasks in parallel is impossible [Herzog et al., 2012, Tartaglia et al., 2009]. It
suggests that the brain has an imperfect critic to calculate the expected reward in a
sense that if task A and task B are highly similar, the critic can no longer distinguish
them. As such, it is not able to correctly estimate the expected reward for each of the
two tasks, separately.
Here we would like to address this problem from a theoretical point of view. We for-
mulate this problem as a simple mathematical problem in the framework of statistical
decision theory, to give an abstract theoretical answer to experimental ﬁnding above.
We argue that if the two tasks are sufﬁciently similar, reporting them as a single task
would be less riskier than reporting them as two separate tasks. Therefore, it makes
sense (from the view of decision making theory) for the subject not to make a riskier
decision (i.e., reporting them as separate tasks).
D.1 Argument 1: using statistical decision theory
Imagine that there are two different tasks A and B that must be learned in parallel. We
model different stimuli corresponding to tasks A and B as realizations of two Gaussian
distributions N (μ,1) and N (−μ,1), respectively. Here, μ ≥ 0 is the absolute mean
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value of the underlying distributions. For the simplicity we ﬁxed the standard deviation
σ of Gaussian distributions to 1 in order that similarity between task A and task B is
determined just byμ; otherwise the ratio μ
σ
determines how much two tasks are similar.
Smaller μ indicates more similarity because it causes the Gaussian distributions to
have overlap (see Fig. D.1). In other words, when μ is small, the distinction between
the two tasks becomes difﬁcult.
We assume that tasks A and B are interleaved during training; called roving condition
[Herzog et al., 2012, Tartaglia et al., 2009]. That is at each time step, either task A
or B is chosen with 50% chance. Then a random number corresponding to a noisy
stimulus associated to the chosen task is presented accordingly. As such, stimulus x
which represents either task A or task B can be modeled as a random variable with
probability density function
P (x)= 0.5N (μ,1)+0.5N (−μ,1). (D.1)
Using observed samples X= {xi }ni=1, a decision rule δ(X) is deﬁned as a statistics which
can be used for estimating the true unknown parameter μ. For a given observation
set X, two hypotheses (represented as two decision rules) should be compared. If the
critic believes in existence of a single task (the ﬁrst hypothesis), then the sample mean
δ1(X)= 1
n
n∑
i=1
xi , (D.2)
is a good candidate for estimation of the underlying parameter μ. If it believes in two
different tasks (the second hypothesis), then decision rule
δ2(X)= 0.5 ( 1|A +|
∑
i∈A +
xi − 1|A −|
∑
i∈A −
xi ), (D.3)
could be considered as a simple and rational method for the point estimation of
unknown parameter μ. HereA + andA − denote the set of indices for which samples
are non-negative (xi ≥ 0) or negative (xi < 0) values, respectively. Equation (D.3)
calculates half of distance between the samplemeans of positive andnegative samples;
a quantity which can be used for estimation of μ.
A key notion of decision theory is that decision rules (here δ1(X) and δ2(X)) should
be compared by their risk functions. A less riskier decision is more appreciated [Pratt
et al., 1995]. The risk of a decision rule is deﬁned as the expected loss incurred when
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that decision rule is employed. Here we use a quadratic loss function
L (μ,δ(X))= (μ−δ(X))2, (D.4)
which indicates how much critic loses because of its estimation method μˆ= δ(X) as
a decision rule, if true parameter is μ. Since loss functionL in Eq. (D.4) depends on
observation X, its expectation with respect to underlying distribution P (x) in Eq. (D.1)
is deﬁned as risk
R(μ,δ)= E[L (μ,δ(X))]. (D.5)
Note that the risk function in Eq. (D.5) does not depend on observation X, and it solely
depends on true parameter μ and applied decision rule δ(.) as a point estimation
method. Fig. D.2 depicts risks R(μ,δ1) and R(μ,δ2) associated with decision rules
in Eqs. (D.2) and (D.3), respectively (details of calculation are given at the end of
Appendix).
We argue that this ﬁnding is actually an answer to explain why critic is not able
to distinguish similar tasks. The reason is that if two tasks are sufﬁciently similar
(which is the case if μ < μ∗ where μ∗ is associated with the intersection point in
graph of Fig. D.2)), decision rule Eq. (D.2) (i.e., no distinction between the two tasks)
is less riskier than its alternative in Eq. (D.3) (i.e., decision on their distinctions).
Hence, if critic decides not to distinguish two similar tasks, it might be because of a
rational decision making strategy, that prefers less riskier decisions than more riskier
ones [Pratt et al., 1995].
D.2 Argument 2: using Bayesian reasoning
We show that Bayesian theory can also explain such a phenomenon. Let us assume
that stimuli are generated by a mixture of two Gaussian distributions
P (x|μ,σ)= 0.5N (μ,σ)+0.5N (−μ,σ), (D.6)
where mean μ and standard deviation σ are unknown parameters. A uniform prior
π(μ,σ) over two-dimensional space (μ,σ) is assumed. Using Bayes’ rule we calculated
posterior distribution over parameters (μ,σ) after observation of n = 1000 iid sam-
ples, where the true parameters (μ,σ) were (0.5,1) (two similar tasks) and (2,1) (two
different tasks).
Joint posterior distribution π(μ,σ|X) is depicted in Fig. D.3 and Fig. D.4 when true
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parameters are (0.5,1) and (2,1), respectively. Despite Fig. D.4 (case of different tasks)
in which the posterior distributionπ(μ,σ|X) looks like a bump around true parameters
(0.5,1), in Fig. D.3 (case of similar tasks) the posterior distribution is bended over
a wider region. It shows that if two tasks are similar (i.e., when μ < μ∗), Bayesian
framework is not also capable of distinguishing two tasks because region around
(0,1.2) (one task with a bigger standard deviation than the true value) is as likely as
region around (0.5,1) (two different tasks).
We also numerically calculated the amount of uncertainty in ﬁnal estimation (mea-
sured as the entropy of joint posterior distribution π(μ,σ|X)) for each true mean value
μ in the range of [0,2]. Fig. D.5 shows that for smaller μ estimation uncertainty is much
higher than that for bigger μ; consistent with the results inferred from Fig. D.3 and
Fig. D.4.
We would like to emphasize that the experimental results in [Herzog et al., 2012,
Tartaglia et al., 2009] are consistent with the logic of a critic. A critic which distin-
guishes all different stimuli suffers from a speciﬁc form of overﬁtting and would never
generalize. At the other extreme case, a critic which maintains just a single running
average for all stimuli is not able to learn those tasks in parallel. Therefore, an opti-
mal critic must detect the essence of stimulus and neglect the noise, which requires
building clusters on input data set. If the stimuli from two different tasks are very
similar, then it makes sense if the critic assign only one cluster to all of them, and not
distinguishing as separate tasks.
D.3 Calculation of the risk functions
R1(μ) = R(μ,δ1)= E[(μ−δ1(X))2],
= E[(μ− 1
n
∑
i
xi )
2]
= μ2+ 1
n2
E[
∑
i
x2i +
∑
i = j
xi x j ]− 2μ
n
E[
∑
i
xi ]
= μ2+ 1
n2
(
nE[x2]+n(n−1)E2[x]
)
− 2μ
n
nE[x]
= (1+ 1
n
)μ2+ 1
n
n→∞≈ μ2. (D.7)
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R2(μ) = R(μ,δ2)= E[(μ−δ2(X))2],
= E[(μ− 0.5|A +|
∑
i∈A +
xi + 0.5|A −|
∑
i∈A −
xi )
2]
(i )≈ E[(μ− 1
n
∑
i∈A +
xi + 1
n
∑
i∈A −
xi )
2]
= μ2+ 1
n2
E[
∑
i∈A +
x2i +
∑
i = j∈A +
xi x j ]+ 1
n2
E[
∑
i∈A −
x2i +
∑
i = j∈A −
xi x j ]
− 2μ
n
E[
∑
i∈A +
xi ]+ 2μ
n
E[
∑
i∈A −
xi ]− 2
n2
E[
∑
i∈A +
xi
∑
i∈A −
xi ]
= μ2+ 1
n2
(n
2
E[x2+]+
n
2
(
n
2
−1)E2[x+]
)
+ 1
n2
(n
2
E[x2−]+
n
2
(
n
2
−1)E2[x−]
)
− 2μ
n
n
2
E[x+]+ 2μ
n
n
2
E[x−]− 2
n2
n2
4
E[x+]E[x−]
(i i )= μ2+ 1
n
E[x2+]+ (1−
1
n
)E2[x+]−2μE[x+]
(i i i )= μ2+ 1
2n
(
(1+μ2)[1−Φ(−μ)]+μφ(−μ)+ (1+μ2)[1−Φ(μ)]−μφ(μ)
)
+ 1
4
(1− 1
n
)
(
μ[1−Φ(−μ)]−φ(−μ)−μ[1−Φ(μ)]−φ(μ)
)2
− μ
(
μ[1−Φ(−μ)]−φ(−μ)−μ[1−Φ(μ)]−φ(μ)
)
(i v)= μ2+ 1
2n
(1+μ2)[2−Φ(μ)−Φ(−μ)]
+ 1
4
(1− 1
n
)
(
μ[Φ(μ)−Φ(−μ)]−2φ(μ)
)2
− μ
(
μ[Φ(μ)−Φ(−μ)]−2φ(μ)
)
(v)= (1+ 1
2n
)μ2+ 1
2n
+ 1
4
(1− 1
n
)[μ er f (
μ
2
)−2φ(μ)]2
− μ[μ er f ( μ
2
)−2φ(μ)]
= (1+ 1
2n
)μ2+ 1
2n
+ 1
4
(1− 1
n
)Ψ2(μ)−μΨ(μ)
n→∞≈ 1
4
Ψ2(μ)−μΨ(μ)+μ2 (D.8)
In calculation above, we used approximation |A +| ≈ |A −| ≈ n2 in (i ) and equalities
E[x2−]= E[x2+] and E[x−]=−E[x+] in (i i ). In (i i i ) we used the fact that E[x+]= 0.5[ f (μ)+
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f (−μ)] and E[x2+]= 0.5[g (μ)+ g (−μ)] where
f (μ) =
∫∞
0
xN (μ,1) dx =μ[1−Φ(−μ)]−φ(−μ), (D.9)
g (μ) =
∫∞
0
x2N (μ,1) dx = (1+μ2)[1−Φ(−μ)]+μφ(−μ). (D.10)
Here φ(x) = e−
x2
2
2π
is the standard normal probability density function and Φ(x) =∫x
−∞φ(t)dt = 12
(
1+ er f ( x
2
)
)
is its corresponding cumulative distribution function
where er f (x)= 2
π
∫x
0 e
−t2dt is the error function. We further used equalities φ(μ)=
φ(−μ) in (i v) andΦ(μ)+Φ(−μ)= 1 as well asΦ(μ)−Φ(−μ)= er f ( μ
2
) in (v) to simplify
the ﬁnal expression written as a function of μ andΨ(μ) :=μ er f ( μ
2
)−2φ(μ).
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Figure D.1 – Mixture of two Gaussian distributions. Probability density function
P (x)= 0.5N (μ,1)+0.5N (−μ,1) for μ= 0.5 (top) and μ= 2 (bottom). Two Gaussian
distributions have overlap when true mean μ is small. It makes difﬁcult to distin-
guish two similar tasks corresponding to each of Gaussian distributionsN (μ,1) and
N (−μ,1).
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Figure D.2 – Decision risks for optimal Bayesian critic. Risk functions corresponding
to two decision rules Eq. (D.2) in blue and Eq. (D.3) in red. For similar tasks (i.e., for
μ<μ∗ where μ∗ corresponds to the intersection point), deciding not to distinguish
two tasks is less riskier than deciding to distinguish them. As such, a rational critic
(which minimizes its decision risk) must not distinguish the two tasks if they are
sufﬁciently similar.
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Figure D.3 – Bayesian decision for identiﬁcation of two similar tasks. The joint pos-
terior distribution π(μ,σ|X) obtained by the Bayes’ rule (after 50 samples) when the
true mean (horizontal axis) is μ = 0.5 and the true standard deviation (std, vertical
axis) is σ= 1. Since the true mean is small (two tasks are similar), the Bayesian agent
cannot distinguish whether the samples are generated by one Gaussian component
(with higher std) or two Gaussian components (with smaller std).
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Figure D.4 – Bayesian decision for identiﬁcation of two different tasks. The joint
posterior distribution π(μ,σ|X) obtained by the Bayes’ rule (after 50 samples) when
the true mean (horizontal axis) is μ= 2 and the true standard deviation (std, vertical
axis) is σ= 1. Since the true mean μ= 2 is relatively large, the Bayesian agent does not
have a problem in estimating the true parameters. In fact it recognizes that there are
two sufﬁciently different tasks.
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Figure D.5 – Estimation uncertainty for different mean values. The uncertainty (in-
dicated by color intensity) about the estimated mean μˆ (vertical axis) is smaller for
the larger true means μ> 1 (horizontal axis) than for smaller true means μ< 1. This
indicates that the estimation uncertainty decreases as the similarity between the two
tasks decreases. The graph also shows that the accuracy of estimation is higher for
larger μ than smaller μ (because the dots are less distributed around the diagonal
for larger μ than smaller μ). The estimated mean μˆ is calculated by averaging over
the joint distribution (i.e., μˆ=∫dμ (μ∫dσ π(μ,σ|X ))). The estimation uncertainty is
calculated by the entropy of the joint distribution π(μ,σ|X ).
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This section summarizes my contribution to each of the preceding chapters.
Chapter 1: I wrote the introduction. It was then edited by Wulfram Gerstner (WG) and
Kerstin Preuschoff (KP). The idea of the multi-factor learning rules and how they can
be linked to the activity of neuromodulatory system in the brain is proposed by WG.
Chapter 2: I introduced the conﬁdence-corrected surprise and I did the mathematical
derivations. The theory was then reﬁned by WG. The consistency of the proposed
model with the conceptual and computational characteristics of surprise has been
checked and discussed with KP. The text was written by me in collaboration with WG
and KP.
Chapter 3: I formulated the problem of learning through surprise minimization. I did
the mathematical derivations as well as the simulations. I performed data analysis
and produced the ﬁgures. I wrote the text in collaboration with WG and KP. The
dynamic decision-making task was proposed by KP, and the high-dimensional maze-
exploration task was proposed by WG, and was inspired by the previous work of Danilo
Rezende. I derived and implemented the hierarchical Bayesian model in collaboration
with Johanni Brea.
Our results in Chapters 2 and 3 were presented in multiple conferences on compu-
tational neuroscience (either as a poster or a talk), and are ready for submission to a
journal under the name:
“Balancing New against Old Information: The Role of Surprise”
M. Faraji, K. Preuschoff, and W. Gerstner (arXiv 1606.05642 [stat.ML]).
Chapter 4: WG and I derived the learning rules. The text was written by me and was
edited by WG and KP. I did the simulations and produced the ﬁgures. This work was
inspired by a previous work of Danilo Rezende. The primary results of this chapter
have been documented as an extended abstract for the International Conference
on Reinforcement Learning and Decision Making (RLDM 2015). The work was then
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extended to incorporate the spiking neural network implementation. A manuscript is
in preparation and will be submitted soon under the name:
“ A Biologically Plausible 3-Factor Learning Rule from Gradient Descent Optimization”
M. Faraji, K. Preuschoff, and W. Gerstner.
Appendix A: This section was a review of the work on surprise by Gunther Palm. I had
no personal contribution in the derivation of his theory, and I only summarized it as a
ready reference.
Appendix B: I did the derivations and wrote the text, edited by KP. The results of this
section were part of the aforementioned extended abstract at RLDM 2015.
Appendix C: The idea behind this model followed from a discussion with WG. Inspired
by Grossberg’s theory of ART, WG and I developed the proposed model in this sec-
tion. I performed the simulations and wrote the text. The results of this section were
presented as a poster at Cosyne 2015.
Appendix D: I did the mathematical derivations and performed simulations. I pre-
sented my results as a talk in Jan. 2015 for a group of researchers from different Swiss
universities working on a collaborative project (Sinergia).
Funding: During my PhD study, I have been ﬁnancially supported by the European
Research Council (ERC, grant agreement number 268689), and the Human Brain
Project (HBP, grant agreement number 604102).
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